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 Working Paper No. 99 iii 
Abstract: The paper describes a method to measure ILO member States‘ progress towards the 
application of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights. The method is based on 
coding the findings of the ILO supervisory system and compiling this information in a readily 
accessible and concise manner. It consists of both conceptual and more practical components and 
builds on four basic elements: the premises of definitional validity, reproducibility and 
transparency; the 168 evaluation criteria used to code de jure and de facto issues of non-compliance; 
the ILO textual sources selected for coding; and the general and source-specific coding rules. The 
final product is a table providing detailed and verifiable information that can be easily traced back 
to the original ILO textual source. The paper also aims to serve as a reference for future work on 
measuring progress towards the implementation of the other fundamental principles and rights at 
work, covered in the ILO 1998 Declaration. 
Resumé: Le document décrit une méthode permettant de mesurer les progrès réalisés par les États 
Membres de l'OIT concernant le respect de la liberté syndicale et du droit de négociation collective. 
La méthode est fondée sur une codification des constatations faites par le système de contrôle de 
l'OIT et sur la restitution de ces informations sous une forme concise et facilement accessible. Elle 
comporte des aspects à la fois conceptuels et pratiques, et s'appuie sur quatre éléments essentiels: les 
principes de validité des définitions, de transparence et de reproductibilité; les 168 critères 
d'évaluation utilisés pour coder les problèmes de non-respect observés dans le droit et dans les faits; 
les sources textuelles de l'OIT sélectionnées pour la codification; les règles de codification générales 
et propres aux sources. Le résultat final est un tableau contenant des informations détaillées et 
vérifiables, qu'il est facile de rattacher à la source textuelle originale de l'OIT. Le document est 
également destiné à servir de référence pour de futurs travaux sur la mesure des progrès concernant 
la mise en œuvre des autres principes et droits fondamentaux au travail contenus dans la Déclaration 
de l'OIT de 1998. 
Resumen: El documento describe un método para medir el avance de los Estados miembros de la 
OIT en la aplicación de los derechos de libertad de asociación y negociación colectiva. El método 
está basado en la codificación de los hallazgos del sistema de supervisión de la OIT y en la 
compilación de dicha información de forma concisa y fácilmente accesible. Consta de elementos 
conceptuales y prácticos, y se compone de cuatro elementos básicos: las premisas de validez de las 
definiciones, la reproducibilidad y la transparencia; los 168 criterios evaluativos empleados para 
codificar los aspectos de jure y de facto sobre incumplimientos; las fuentes textuales de la OIT 
seleccionadas para la codificación; y las reglas generales y específicas de codificación. El producto 
final es una tabla que proporciona información detallada y verificable que puede ser fácilmente 
rastreada hacia el texto original de la OIT. El documento pretende también servir como referencia 
para futuros trabajos de medición del avance en la aplicación de los otros principios y derechos 
fundamentales en el trabajo, cubiertos por la Declaración de la OIT de 1998. 
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Measuring progress towards the application 
of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights: A tabular presentation of 
the findings of the ILO supervisory system 
Introduction 
In his first report to the International Labour Conference in June 1999, ILO Director-
General Juan Somavia introduced the concept of decent work with the following words: 
‗The primary goal of the ILO today is to promote opportunities for women and men, to 
obtain decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human 
dignity‘.1 The Decent Work Agenda, built from four components (employment creation, 
social protection, social dialogue and rights at work), has subsequently become the 
organising framework for ILO activities. However, its multifaceted nature and the 
interrelated character of its components set a number of challenges for measuring progress 
towards its achievement. 
Recognizing that the lack of sufficient monitoring hampers both the ILO‘s own work and 
the ability of its constituents to monitor and evaluate their progress, measuring progress 
towards decent work has become a primary concern for ILO‘s constituents. The need to 
measure decent work was recognised by the Advisory Group on Statistics in its 
recommendations to the Director-General
2
 as far back as 2001, and, more recently, was 
strongly reaffirmed by the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for Fair Globalization, 
adopted in June 2008, recommending that member States may consider ―the establishment 
of appropriate indicators or statistics, if necessary with the assistance of the ILO, to 
monitor and evaluate the progress made‖.3 
Since 2000, the Office has undertaken a significant amount of research into methods of 
measuring decent work.
4
 The ILO Governing Body, following the Tripartite Meeting of 
Experts on the Measurement of Decent Work held in September 2008
5
, has on various 
occasions discussed the issue and provided guidance on the main principles concerning 
measurement.
6
 What has been emphasized from the beginning is that, given the nature of 
decent work as a multifaceted concept, progress towards its achievement cannot be 
 
1
 See ILO (1999). 
2
 Anker et al. (2002, p. vi.). 
3
 See ILO (2008b, Part II(B)(ii)); also available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
cabinet/documents/publication/wcms_099766.pdf (accessed 14 Sep. 2010). 
4
 For instance, inclusion of a detailed section on measuring decent work in the General Report to the 
17
th
 International Conference of Labour Statisticians; testing some of the proposed indicators in 
pilot countries; testing the measurement of some of the qualitative aspects of decent work; 
establishing a task team to consolidate the various proposals for indicators into an integrated set; 
publishing a special issue of the International Labour Review; collaboration with UNECE, 
EUROSTAT and Eurofound; discussing the possibility of a joint ILO-EC project to monitor 
progress on decent work in developing countries. (See ILO, 2008d, pp. 1-2). 
5
 The Governing Body approved the convening of the meeting in its 301st Session (March 2008). 
See ILO (2008f). 
6
 See, for example, ILO (2008f) and ILO (2008a). 
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assessed by standard quantitative indicators only, as those by themselves cannot 
adequately capture the wide-ranging and inherently qualitative nature of many aspects of 
decent work. Being relevant across the entire Decent Work Agenda, it was recognized that 
alongside statistical indicators, fundamental principles and rights at work (FPRWs)
7
 and, 
more generally, the legal framework of decent work needed to be prominently reflected 
and should also be an integral part of the ILO‘s framework for measuring decent work.8 
In order to reflect on this, two complementary proposals were endorsed: (i) the compilation 
of legal framework indicators that provide textual information on rights at work; and 
(ii) the development of reliable and reproducible indicators to monitor progress in the 
progressive implementation of fundamental principles and rights at work, as enshrined in 
the ILO 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
9
 (1998 
Declaration). Regarding the latter, the proposal suggested that indicators would be 
developed for a base year with subsequent progress towards their full application being 
recorded. The aim would be to provide objective information both on the compliance of 
national legislation with FPRWs and its actual application, but also on efforts and progress 
made towards their full application. Experts agreed that measurement should be based on a 
standard coding framework and suggested beginning with the right to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining.
10
 
With this in mind, this paper describes the method constructed to measure freedom of 
association and collective bargaining rights at the country level based on the coding of 
issues of non-compliance as recorded in ILO textual sources. The method intends to 
measure progress made towards the full application of these rights solely by compiling 
already existing information generated by the ILO‘s supervisory system in such a manner 
that would further support countries in monitoring progress and identifying gaps and areas 
of improvement. The method does not aim to provide new or differing information on 
countries compliance, but to present already existing and compiled information in an easily 
accessible and concise manner. In line with the request of the Governing Body,
11
 the 
intention of this work is not in any way to create a forum for ―naming and shaming‖ or for 
scoring and ranking countries based on their performance, but to present the findings of the 
ILO supervisory bodies in another format that is, at the same time, fully consistent with the 
work of these bodies and does not lead to the creation of an additional supervisory 
instrument. Being applied in relation to the principle of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining, the paper also aims to serve as a reference resource for the work on 
measuring progress towards the implementation of the remaining fundamental principles 
and rights at work. 
The presentation of the method is divided into two main parts. The first part of the paper 
describes the conceptual aspects of the method and is structured as follows: Section 1 
provides the broader theoretical background of the current work. Section 2 presents the 
 
7
 Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
Elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; Effective abolition of child labour; 
Elimination of  discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
8
 See ILO (2008d). 
9
 See ILO (1998) also available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm 
(accessed 14 Sep. 2010). 
10
 See ILO (2008a) and ILO (2008e, pp. 18-19). 
11
 See ILO (2008f). 
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pilot project carried out for the construction of the method. Section 3 provides a summary 
of the various elements of the method, followed by sections describing those elements that 
relate to the conceptual aspects of the method. Section 4 discusses the key premises on 
which the method is based on, Section 5 describes the structure of the evaluation criteria, 
Section 6 presents the sources selected to identify issues of non-compliance with freedom 
of association and collective bargaining rights. 
Intended to be used as a guide for the actual coding, the second part of the paper deals with 
the more practical, methodological aspects of the approach and explains in detail the 
method of the coding and its components. This part of the paper consists of three main 
sections: Section 1 on the general coding rules, Section 2 on the source-specific coding 
rules and Section 3 on the definitions of the evaluation criteria. 
The reason for combining the conceptual and the practical aspects of the method in a single 
paper is to provide all the related elements in one readily-accessible document. That is, 
instead of putting the general and source specific coding rules and the evaluation criteria 
definitions (functioning more as a manual or implementation guide) under separate 
annexes, these are included in the main body of the paper. Although this results in a 
number of repetitions within the paper, in our view this approach facilitates a fuller 
understanding at the application of the method.
12
 Lastly, it should be also noted that given 
its practical orientation, this paper does not include a comprehensive survey of comparable 
literature, but rather focuses on issues directly linked to the method itself. 
Part I. Conceptual Aspects of the Method 
1. General Background 
1.1. Qualitative indicators of labour standards 
The wider context of the present work is a rapidly growing interest in the construction and 
use of so-called ‗qualitative indicators‘ of labour standards. There are several reasons for 
this, such as an increasing interest in socially responsible investments, the still topical 
debates on the effects of labour standards on economic outcomes, and the recognition that 
traditional quantitative indicators, such as statistics on trade union membership, are too 
narrow in scope to adequately capture the intrinsically qualitative nature of labour 
standards and their application.
13
 In the absence of good data, alternative ways to measure 
compliance with labour rights needed to be explored. 
One commonly used way of measuring compliance with labour standards across countries 
is to rely on the number of ratifications of ILO Conventions.
14
 In spite of its simplicity, this 
method was widely used in econometric studies of the relationship between labour 
standards and international competitiveness,
15
 and was supported with the argument that 
―ratification and compliance are identifiable, voluntary actions by a country that indicate 
 
12
 In addition, there is a fair amount of overlap between the definitions for issues of non-compliance 
regarding the rights of workers‘ and employers‘ organizations. 
13
 Kucera (2007b, p. 1). 
14
 For examples, see Block (2007, p. 46). 
15
 Kucera (2007b, p. 2). 
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that the country is willing to provide protection to workers‖.16 However, given that the 
number of ratifications of ILO Conventions may not necessarily reflect on the actual 
implementation of labour standards,
17
 the development of more comprehensive methods to 
measure application of labour rights has become necessary.
18
 
Qualitative indicators demonstrate one form of a more comprehensive measure. Being 
based on methods such as expert assessments or – like the present method discussed below 
- coding of textual sources dealing with national legislation or the application of rights, 
these indicators seem likely to be more capable of addressing the specific nature of labour 
standards and their application.
19
 
1.2. Previous method - Qualitative Indicator of 
Trade Union Rights Violations 
The present method is based on the one that was developed and used by the International 
Labour Office to evaluate the effects of trade union rights on foreign direct investment and 
trade.
20
 The former method was built upon 37 evaluation criteria for assessing trade union 
rights, grouped into six categories: freedom of association/collective bargaining-related 
civil liberties; right to establish and join unions and worker organizations; other union 
activities; right to bargain collectively; right to strike; and export processing zones. The 
criteria jointly addressed de jure violations (the problem of non-compliance of the national 
legislation with ILO Conventions), as well as de facto violations (non-compliance with the 
country‘s own national legislation in practice) and was applied only to violations 
committed with respect to workers‘ organizations, not with respect to employers‘ 
organizations. Country-level information on trade union rights was then based on the 
coding of violations recorded in three different textual sources.
21
 
As the previous method was constructed for a different purpose, it had to first be adapted 
to the objective of measuring progress towards the application of FPRWs. In line with the 
request of the Governing Body, the main aim of the revision was to construct a method that 
builds on clear and sufficiently detailed evaluation criteria to define compliance with 
FPRWs, is fully coherent with the ILO sources and supervisory system, and at the same 
time is reliable and reproducible.
 22
 
 
16
 Block (2007, p. 47). 
17
 As Block writes:―Conventions ratified, per se, may not be a valid measure of labour standards. 
Many less developed countries have ratified more ILO Conventions than the U.S. Yet, even with its 
low level of labour standards relative to Canada and the E.U. other developed countries (...) it is not 
reasonable to believe that the U.S. has lower standards than many less developed countries that have 
ratified more ILO Conventions.‖ (Block, 2007, p. 47). 
18
 For more, see Kucera (2007a); Teitelbaum (2010, p. 462). 
19
 Teitelbaum (2010, pp. 461-74). 
20
 See Kucera (2001). 
21
 These textual sources were the followings: International Confederation of Free Trade Unions‘ 
Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights; the U.S. State Department‘s Country Reports 
on Human Rights Practices, and the ILO‘s Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association. 
22
 See ILO (2008a); see also ILO (2008d, p. 30), ILO (2008e, p. 18). 
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2. Revision of the previous method  
Following the request of the Governing Body,
23
 a pilot project was undertaken by the 
International Labour Office in 2009 to develop a system for measuring progress towards 
the application of ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 
1949 (No. 98). The pilot included five countries: Austria, Brazil, Malaysia, the United 
Republic of Tanzania and Ukraine.
24
 
The construction of the system was done in two stages. The first stage involved the 
compilation of a preliminary list of evaluation criteria derived from the relevant ILO 
sources. On the one hand, this involved careful examination of the ILO Constitution and 
Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 - the main international instruments on the subject
25
 - and on 
the other hand, the review of the related ILO principles of application as embodied in the 
(i) Digest of decisions and principles of the Committee on Freedom of Association
26
 and 
the (ii) General Survey of Conventions Nos. 87 and 98.
27
 Moreover, to ensure 
comprehensiveness, additional ILO sources dealing specifically with the subject of 
freedom of association and collective bargaining were also studied.
28
 
In order to test the method and to develop specific coding rules guiding the actual coding, 
the second stage of the pilot included the coding of a wide range of ILO textual sources 
with preliminary evaluation criteria in the five pilot countries. To apply the method 
accurately, the ILO supervisory machinery was used as the key source for identifying 
issues of non-compliance. Moreover, to see whether the method is capable of satisfying the 
demand to evaluate progress in time, the coding was done for two points in time, for the 
years of 2000 and 2008. 
After having undertaken the pilot for five countries, certain aspects of the method were 
once more tested on a few other countries at random. In doing so, the evaluation criteria, 
the coding rules and the method of coding were further amended and clarified to account 
for issues that did not arise during the first stages of the pilot. In addition, an initial 
presentation of the method was made to the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) in December 2009. Being the legal body 
responsible for the examination of the compliance of ILO member States with Conventions 
and Recommendations it was considered important to have the Committee‘s view on the 
feasibility of the method, with a particular emphasis on the list and definitions of the 
evaluation criteria. At the same time, it was also vital to demonstrate that the method and 
 
23
 See ILO (2008a). 
24
 The five countries participated in the pilot offered their collaboration with the Office in order to 
compile decent work country profiles during the 18
th
 International Conference of Labour 
Statisticians, held from 24 November to 5 December 2008 in Geneva. (ILO, 2009a). 
25
 See ILO (2008c); also available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_096122.pdf (accessed 14 Sep. 2010). 
26
 ILO (2006); also available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/digestq.htm (accessed 14 Sep. 2010). 
27
 ILO (1994); also available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/surveyq.htm (accessed 14 Sep. 2010). 
28
 See Tajgman and Curtis (2000) and ILO (2008c). 
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its aims were consistent with the work of the CEACR and the other ILO supervisory 
organs, and that these would not lead to the duplication or the diminution of their work or 
to the creation of an additional supervisory instrument. What had to be clarified is that the 
method does not aim to provide new or differing information on countries‘ compliance, but 
to compile the already existing information generated by the supervisory system in such a 
manner that would further support countries in monitoring their progress towards the 
application of the FPRWs. The CEACR remarked on the seriousness with which this 
project was being undertaken and on its potential importance for the ILO.
29
 Given the 
objective of developing a method that is fully coherent with the ILO supervisory system 
and provides an accurate reflection of its findings, it would be useful for there to be 
ongoing review by the CEACR. 
3. Elements of the method 
The above described revision of the previous method resulted in an improved and more 
comprehensive method. As noted, the refined method consists of two main components, a 
conceptual and a more practical and methodological one, and builds on the following four 
basic elements: (i) the key premises (Part I. Section 4); (ii) the evaluation criteria together 
with the evaluation criteria definitions (Table 1; Part I. Section 5; Part 2. Section 3); 
(iii) the sources selected to identify issues of non-compliance (Box 1; Part I. Section 6); 
and (iv) the general and source-specific coding rules guiding the actual coding (Part II. 
Section 1; Part II. Section 2). 
Table 1 below provides the list of the 168 evaluation criteria as they are presented in the 
so-called ‗coding spreadsheet‘, the tool where the actual coding should be done. The first 
column indicates the number of the evaluation criteria; the second column contains the 
evaluation criteria; while the third column is where the identified issues of non-compliance 
are coded by source under the year evaluated. 
 
 
 
29
 See ILO (2010). 
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Table 1. List of the 168 evaluation criteria (as presented in the coding spreadsheet) 
  Trade Unions Year 
  Ia. Fundamental civil liberties, de jure   
1 Arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of trade unionists   
2 Infringements of trade unionists' basic freedoms    
3 Infringements of trade union's right to protection of their premises and property   
4 Excessive prohibitions/restrictions on trade union rights in the event of state of emergency   
5 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re Ia   
  Ib. Fundamental civil liberties, de facto   
6 Murder or disappearance of trade unionists   
7 Committed against trade union leaders re 6   
8 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 6   
9 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 6   
10 Other violent actions against trade unionists   
11 Committed against trade union leaders re 10   
12 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 10   
13 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 10   
14 Arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of trade unionists   
15 Committed against trade union leaders re 14   
16 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 14   
17 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 14   
18 Infringements of trade unionists' basic freedoms   
19 Committed against trade union leaders re 18   
20 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 18   
21 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 18   
22 Attacks against trade union premises and property   
23 Committed against trade union leaders re 22   
24 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 22   
25 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 22   
26 Excessive prohibitions/restrictions on trade union rights in the event of state of emergency   
27 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 26   
28 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 26   
  IIa. Right of workers to establish and join organizations, de jure   
29 General prohibition on the right of workers to establish and join organizations   
30 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to establish and join organizations   
31 Previous authorization requirements   
32 Restrictions on the freedom of choice of trade union structure and composition   
33 Imposed trade union unity and/or favouritism/discrimination among workers' organizations   
34 Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or legislation   
35 Prejudice or discrimination with regard to employment because of trade union membership/ legitimate activities   
36 Lack of adequate legal guarantees against anti-union discriminatory measures re 35   
37 Discriminatory dismissal/suspension because of trade union membership/legitimate activities   
38 Lack of adequate legal guarantees against anti-union discriminatory measures re 37   
39 Acts of interference of employers and/or public authorities   
40 Lack of adequate legal guarantees against acts of interference     
41 Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international organizations   
42 Other de jure acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIa   
43 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIa   
  IIb. Right of workers to establish and join organizations, de facto   
44 Obstacles towards the development of independent workers' organizations in practice   
45 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to establish and join organizations   
46 Previous authorization requirements   
47 Restrictions on the freedom of choice of trade union structure and composition   
48 Imposed trade union unity and/or favouritism/discrimination among workers' organizations   
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49 Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or legislation   
50 Prejudice or discrimination with regard to employment because of trade union membership/legitimate activities   
51 Committed against trade union leaders re 50   
52 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re 50   
53 Discriminatory dismissal/suspension because of trade union membership/legitimate activities   
54 Committed against trade union leaders re 53   
55 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re 53   
56 Acts of interference of employers and/or public authorities   
57 Lack of adequate guarantees against acts of interference   
58 Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international organizations   
59 Other de facto acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIb   
60 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIb   
  IIIa. Other union activities, de jure   
61 Infringements on the right to freely draw up constitutions and rules   
62 Infringements on the right to freely elect representatives   
63 Infringements on the right to freely organize and control internal and financial administration   
64 Infringements on the right to freely organize activities/programmes   
65 Other de jure acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIIa   
66 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIIa   
  IIIb. Other union activities, de facto   
67 Infringements on the right to freely draw up constitutions and rules   
68 Infringements on the right to freely elect representatives   
69 Infringements on the right to freely organize and control internal and financial administration   
70 Infringements on the right to freely organize activities/programmes   
71 Other de facto acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIIb   
72 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIIb   
  IVa. Right to collective bargaining, de jure   
73 General prohibition on the right to collective bargaining   
74 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to collective bargaining   
75 Exclusion/restriction of subjects covered by collective bargaining   
76 Compulsory arbitration accorded to collective bargaining   
77 Infringements on the determination/recognition of trade unions entitled to collective bargaining    
78 Acts of interference in collective bargaining and/or insufficient promotion of collective bargaining   
79 Acts of interference according to collective agreements   
80 Infringements of the consultation with workers' organizations   
81 Other de jure acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IVa   
82 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re Iva   
  IVb. Right to collective bargaining, de facto   
83 Obstacles towards collective bargaining in practice   
84 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to collective bargaining   
85 Exclusion/restriction of subjects covered by collective bargaining   
86 Compulsory arbitration accorded to collective bargaining   
87 Infringements on the determination/recognition of trade unions entitled to collective bargaining    
88 Acts of interference in collective bargaining and/or insufficient promotion of collective bargaining   
89 Acts of interference according to collective agreements   
90 Infringements of the consultation with workers' organizations   
91 Other de facto acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IVb   
92 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IVb   
  Va. Right to strike, de jure   
93 General prohibition on the right to strike   
94 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to strike   
95 Exclusion/restriction based on the objective of the strike   
96 Exclusion/restriction based on the type of the strike   
97 Lack of compensatory guarantees accorded to lawful restrictions on the right to strike   
98 Infringements on the determination of minimum services   
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99 Compulsory arbitration accorded to strikes   
100 Infringements of the prerequisites lawfully required for exercising the right to strike    
101 Acts of interference during the course of strike action   
102 Imposing excessive sanctions in case of legitimate and peaceful strikes   
103 Other de jure acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re Va   
104 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re Va   
  Vb. Right to strike, de facto   
105 Obstacles to strike actions in practice   
106 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to strike   
107 Exclusion/restriction based on the objective of the strike   
108 Exclusion/restriction based on the type of the strike   
109 Lack of compensatory guarantees accorded to lawful restrictions on the right to strike   
110 Infringements on the determination of minimum services   
111 Compulsory arbitration accorded to strikes   
112 Infringements of the prerequisites lawfully required for exercising the right to strike    
113 Acts of interference during the course of strike action   
114 Imposing excessive sanctions in case of legitimate and peaceful strikes   
115 Committed against trade union leaders re 114   
116 Other de facto acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re Vb   
117 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re Vb   
  Employers' Organizations Year 
  VIa. Fundamental civil liberties, de jure   
118 Arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of members of employers' organizations   
119 Infringements of employers' organizations' basic freedoms and/or of their right to protection of their premises and property   
120 Excessive prohibitions/restrictions on employers' organizations' rights in the event of state of emergency   
121 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re Via   
  VIb. Fundamental civil liberties, de facto   
122 Murder or disappearance of members of employers' organizations   
123 Committed against leaders of the organization re 122   
124 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 122   
125 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 122   
126 Other violent action and/or arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of members of the employers' organizations   
127 Committed against leaders of the organization re 126   
128 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 126   
129 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 126   
130 Infringements of employers' organizations' basic freedoms and/or attacks against their premises and property   
131 Committed against leaders of the organization re 130   
132 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 130   
133 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 130   
134 Excessive prohibitions/restrictions on employers' organizations' rights in the event of state of emergency   
135 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 134   
136 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 134   
  VIIa. Right of employers to establish and join organizations, de jure   
137 Prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion from the right of employers to establish and join organizations   
138 Restrictions on the right of employers to establish and join to organizations of their own choosing   
139 Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or legislation   
140 Acts of interference of workers' organizations and/or public authorities   
141 Lack of adequate legal guarantees against acts of interference     
142 Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international organizations   
143 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re VIIa   
  VIIb. Right of employers to establish and join organizations, de facto   
144 Prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion from the right of employers to establish and join organizations   
145 Restrictions on the right of employers to establish and join to organizations of their own choosing   
146 Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or legislation   
147 Acts of interference of workers' organizations and/or public authorities   
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148 Lack of adequate guarantees against acts of interference     
149 Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international organizations   
150 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re VIIb   
  VIIIa. Other activities of employers organizations, de jure   
151 Infringements on the right to freely draw up constitutions, rules and to organize their administration, activities, programmes   
152 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re VIIIa   
  VIIIb. Other activities of employers organizations, de facto   
153 Infringements on the right to freely draw up constitutions, rules and to organize their administration, activities, programmes   
154 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re VIIIb   
  IXa. Right to collective bargaining, de jure   
155 Prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion from the right to collective bargaining   
156 Exclusion/restriction of subjects covered by collective bargaining   
157 Compulsory arbitration accorded to collective bargaining   
158 Infringements on the determination/recognition of employers' organizations entitled to collective bargaining   
159 Acts of interference in collective bargaining and collective agreement   
160 Infringements of the consultation with employers' organizations   
161 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IXa   
  IXb. Right to collective bargaining, de facto   
162 Prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion from the right to collective bargaining   
163 Exclusion/restriction of subjects covered by collective bargaining   
164 Compulsory arbitration accorded to collective bargaining   
165 Infringements on the determination/recognition of employers' organizations entitled to collective bargaining   
166 Acts of interference in collective bargaining and collective agreement   
167 Infringements of the consultation with employers' organizations   
168 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IXb   
 
Box 1 below includes the list of the seven textual sources selected to identify issues of non-
compliance at the country level. For further details with regard the sources see Part I. 
Section 6. 
 
 
Box 1 
Sources selected to identify issues of non-compliance 
 
a: Comments made by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR comments); 
b: Reports from the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards (Conference Committee reports); 
c: Country baselines under the ILO Declaration Annual Review (Country Baselines); 
d: Representation under article 24 of the ILO Constitution (Representations); 
e: Commissions of inquiry appointed under article 26 of the ILO Constitution (Complaints); 
f: Committee on Freedom of Association cases (CFA cases); 
g: National legislation.30 
 
 
 
30
 National legislation becomes relevant in relation to the Country Baselines under the ILO 
Declaration Annual Review. 
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As explained in Table 2 (‗Coding Steps‘) the coding exercise first requires a good 
understanding on the conceptual aspects of the method. This is particularly important 
regarding the parts dealing with the key premises and the construction and definitions of 
the evaluation criteria. It is only after this that the actual coding can begin by collecting the 
sources relevant for the year evaluated. The actual coding, i.e. identifying and 
documenting the observed issues of non-compliance, is the last step in the process. 
However, as the present part of the paper focuses on the conceptual aspects of the method, 
the following sections will describe in detail (i) the key premises that form the foundation 
and the frame of the entire method (definitional validity, reproducibility, transparency); 
(ii) the structure of the 168 evaluation criteria, explaining the significance and meaning of 
the distinction between de jure and de facto non-compliance and the recurring additional 
evaluation criteria (‗other acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference‘, ‗lack of 
guarantee of due process of law‘ and ‗committed against leaders of the organization‘); and 
last (iii) the rationale behind the selection of the seven sources, explaining why these and 
not other sources were chosen to identify observed issues of non-compliance at the country 
level. 
The practical aspects of the method are elaborated in the second part of the paper, 
including the general and source-specific coding rules governing the actual coding and the 
definitions of the evaluation criteria. In practice, the coding is done in a spreadsheet 
(Annex I) where the issue of non-compliance, with reference to the actual source (by using 
the letters of ‗a‘-‗g‘) should be recorded. The actual coding is furthermore backed by 
systematic documentation, recording the coded information in a way that further facilitates 
the coding itself and the tracing of an observed issue of non-compliance back to a 
particular textual source and the evidence it records. 
1
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 Table 2. Coding Steps 
 
Preparation  
Reading the 
key elements 
BEFORE STARTING THE CODING CAREFUL READING OF THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS IS IMPORTANT. 
 Key premises (definitional validity, reproducibility and transparency) 
 List of evaluation criteria and their definitions (168 evaluation criteria and their definitions indicating the most frequent issues of non-compliance the criteria cover) 
 General coding rules (provide the rules relevant for all the sources) 
 Source-specific coding rules (provide the coding rules for each of the seven sources selected to identify issues of non-compliance) 
Part I. Section 4 
Part I. Section 5 
Part II. Section 3 
Part II. Section 1 
Part II. Section 2 
Tools 
IN ORDER TO DO THE CODING, THE FOLLOWING TOOLS ARE NEEDED: 
 Coding Spreadsheet  
 Evaluation criteria definitions 
 Supplementary annex attached to the coding spreadsheet to document specific issues 
 
Annex I. 
Part II. Section 3 
Annex II-III. 
Steps To do References 
Step One 
Selection of 
the documents 
relevant to the 
year evaluated 
AS THE CODING IS DONE ANNUALLY, COLLECTING THE SOURCES RELEVANT FOR THE YEAR EVALUATED AND FOR THE COUNTRY CONCERNED IS THE FIRST STEP OF THE CODING. THE COLLECTION OF 
THE RELEVANT SOURCES DEPENDS ON WHETHER THE COUNTRY HAS RATIFIED THE CONVENTION CONCERNED. 
 
 
 
Part I. Section 6 
Part II. Section 2 
 
 Sources for countries that ratified the Convention concerned:  
− CEACR comments: annual coding, for all countries that ratified the Convention 
− Conference Committee Reports: annual coding, for countries selected by the 
Committee 
− Representations, Complaints, CFA cases: coding only if report is adopted for the 
country in the year evaluated 
 Sources for countries that have not ratified the Convention concerned: 
− Country Baselines: annual coding, for all countries that have not ratified the 
Convention 
− National legislation: annual coding, for all countries that have not ratified the 
Convention 
− CFA cases: coding only if report is adopted for the country in the year evaluated 
Step Two 
Coding issues 
of non-
compliance in 
the  selected 
sources 
 
THE CODING IS DONE BY READING THE COLLECTED SOURCES RELEVANT FOR THE YEAR EVALUATED. ISSUES OF NON-COMPLIANCE ARE IDENTIFIED BASED ON THE EVALUATION CRITERIA DEFINITIONS. 
IDENTIFIED ISSUES OF NON-COMPLIANCE ARE CODED UNDER LETTERS ‘a’-‘g’ IN A SPREADSHEET, INDICATING THE SOURCE WHERE THE INFORMATION WAS FOUND. 
1. Reading the collected sources and identifying issues of non-compliance 
2. Coding the identified issues of non-compliance: 
− The coding of the identified issues of non-compliance is done based on the general and the source-specific rules  
− The actual coding is done in a spreadsheet, where the issue of non-compliance, with reference to the actual source should be recorded by using the letters of ‘a’-‘g’. 
 
 
Part II. Section 1 
Part II. Section 2 
Annex I. 
Step Three 
Documentation 
 
THE CODING IS COMPLEMENTED BY A SYSTEMATIC BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION 
 Documentation of specific issues in the supplementary annex:  
− Records the evaluation criterion of (i) ‘severity’; (ii) ‘excluded workers/employers’; and (iii) ‘other acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference’; and other information (e.g. 
coded legislation; cases when the Government repeatedly fails to reply to the CFA, etc.) by copying word for word the paragraphs referring to the observed issue of non-
compliance from the original text.  
 General documentation: 
−  Database consisting of all the sources used during the coding. 
 
 
Annex II. 
Annex III. 
Part II. Section 1 
Step Two 
Coding non-compliance 
in the selected sources 
Step Three 
Documenting the coding 
Step One 
Collecting the relevant 
sources 
Preparation 
Reading the key 
elements of the coding 
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4. Key premises 
As noted above, the main aim when developing the method was to construct clear and 
sufficiently detailed evaluation criteria to define compliance with FPRWs and to develop a 
method that is fully coherent with the ILO sources and supervisory system and is at the 
same time reliable and reproducible. In order to achieve this, it was essential to base the 
method on the following key premises: (i) definitional validity, that is whether the 
definitions used to construct the evaluation criteria reflect accurately on the phenomena it 
aims to measure; (ii) reproducibility, that is to what extent are different evaluators able to 
consistently arrive at the same results; and (iii) transparency, that is how well a coded issue 
of non-compliance can be traced back to individual information sources.
31
 
Definitional validity 
To ensure definitional validity, two methods are used: 
(i) First, the list of evaluation criteria are constructed directly based on the ILO 
Constitution, Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 and the relevant ILO principles of application,
32
 
both in terms of the structure of the criteria and the language used to phrase them. Using 
the same categories and terminology as in the ILO sources, the aim is to facilitate 
identifying the issues of non-compliance in a consistent manner and to thus ensure 
coherence across the system and with the above sources. By doing so, the coding became 
more direct, preventing differing interpretations of the issues of non-compliance recorded 
in the textual sources. Attaining definitional validity in such manner also strengthens the 
reproducibility of the method (see below). 
(ii) Second, a document was developed to provide detailed ‗definitions‘ for each of the 168 
criterion, indicating the types of non-compliance that should be coded under the evaluation 
criterion. These ‗definitions‘ are constructed by listing matching quotations from 
Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 and related ILO principles with each of the evaluation criteria 
(Part II. Section 3). As presented in Box 2 below, the structure of the definitions is built on 
‗text-boxes‘, providing both (i) the source of the definition by referring to the concrete 
Articles of ILO Constitution and Conventions and the relevant Paragraphs of the ILO 
principles,
33
 (ii) and the ‗definition‘ itself, listing specific quotations from the above 
sources. However, it should be highlighted that as the definitions are given by listing some 
frequently occurring examples for the specific issue of non-compliance, as identified in 
ILO textual sources and principles of application, one should always keep in mind the 
illustrative nature of the definitions, from which the observed issue of non-compliance may 
be deduced, strictly consistent with the classification of the ILO supervisory mechanism. 
Moreover, since reference to employers‘ organizations is not always explicit in the relevant 
paragraphs of the ILO principles, definitions provided for workers‘ organizations were also 
used in developing definitions for employers‘ organizations. 
 
 
31
 These are also the key premises the previous method was based on. See Kucera (2007c, p. 159). 
32
 This refers to principles embodied in: (i) Freedom of Association: Digest of decisions and 
principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO (ILO, 2006); 
and (ii) ILO: Freedom of association and collective bargaining: General Survey of the reports on 
the Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87), 1948, and the Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98) (ILO, 1994). 
33
 Ibid. 
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Box 2 
Example for coding definitions, evaluation criterion number 31, ’De jure previous authorization requirement’ 
(Part II. Section 3) 
31. Previous authorization requirements (de jure) 
Article 2 and 7 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 272-308 (Chapter 4) in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 68-78 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows public authorities to impose previous authorization requirements that may constitute an 
obstacle to the establishment of an organization (Digest, Para. 272.); 
 Includes legislation that goes beyond setting formalities to ensure the normal functioning of organization (Digest, 
Paras. 275-278.); 
 Includes legislation obliging organizations to deposit their rules, unless this is merely a formality; 
 Includes acquisition of legal personality subject to legal conditions that restrict establishment of workers’ organizations 
(Digest, Para. 272.); 
 Includes legal requirements regarding minimum number of members at too high level (Digest, Paras. 283-292.); 
 Includes legal formalities (e.g. excessively detailed provisions) that are able to impair or discourage workers from the 
establishment of organization (Digest, Para. 281.); 
 Includes conditions of registration that are tantamount to obtaining previous authorization from the public authorities 
(e.g. complicated, lengthy procedures, excessive registration requirements) (Digest, Paras. 294-295.); 
 Includes legislation that entitles the competent authority with discretionary power to grant or reject registration; 
 Includes legislation that allows a decision to prohibit the registration of a trade union to become effective before the 
statutory period of lodging an appeal has expired or before the court has confirmed the appeal (Digest, Para. 301.). 
Reproducibility 
In constructing the method, great importance was given to reproducibility: that is, two 
evaluators working independently should consistently arrive at the same result when using 
the method. Achieving reproducibility ensures the credibility and accuracy of the method. 
To satisfy the condition of reproducibility, it was therefore necessary to develop precise 
and comprehensive coding rules. These rules include (i) general coding rules (Part II. 
Section 1); (ii) coding rules addressing the issues specific to each of the selected seven 
sources (Part II. Section 2); (iii) and the above mentioned detailed coding definitions 
developed for each of the 168 evaluation criteria (Part II. Section 3). 
The detailed and explicit coding rules suggest that adherence to the coding rules can, 
indeed, lead to the attainment of reproducible results. As noted, this requires becoming 
conversant with the definitions of the evaluation criteria, creating the foundation of a 
common understanding on what each of the evaluation criteria mean. This is essential in 
order to identify the observed issues of non-compliance in a consistent manner. The next 
step requires the careful examination of the general and the specific coding rules, 
important for ensuring the reproducible coding of the sources selected for the method. 
Transparency 
There are three tools built into the system to guarantee the transparency of the method. 
(i) The first, as explained below, is the use of the large number of evaluation criteria 
aiming to ensure the identification of issues of non-compliance in a precise, evident 
manner. 
(ii) The second is the method of the actual coding. Problems found regarding the 
evaluation criteria are coded with letters ‗a‘-‗g‘, respectively, indicating each one of the 
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different textual sources selected for the method (see Box 1, particularly the letters 
marking the selected textual sources). Such coding facilitates tracing of an observed non-
compliance back to a particular textual source. 
Table 3 below provides an example for the actual coding as it appears in the coding 
spreadsheet. The letters in the last two columns indicate the source(s) where the issue of 
non-compliance was recorded. 
Table 3. Example of the actual coding in the spreadsheet, evaluation criteria number 29-34 
  IIa. Right of workers to establish and join organizations, de jure 2000 2008 
29  General prohibition on the right of workers to establish and join organizations     
30  Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to establish and join organizations acg    
31  Previous authorization requirements cg  fg  
32  Restrictions on the freedom of choice of trade union structure and composition ag  afg  
33  Imposed trade union unity and/or favouritism/discrimination among workers' organizations     
34  Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or legislation cg   
(iii) Third, the coding spreadsheet is complemented by two separate supplementary textual 
documents (one for trade unions and another for employers‘ organizations, Annex II-III), 
where the evaluation criterion of (i) ‗severity (widespread and/or systematic)‘,34 
(ii) ‗excluded workers/employers‘, and (iii) ‗other acts of prohibitions, infringements and 
interference‘ is elaborated, by copying word for word the paragraphs referring to the issue 
of non-compliance from the original text. The rationale behind this method arose from the 
nature of these criteria which made it necessary to provide the exact information on which 
the coding was based (i.e. when requiring a more complex judgement from the evaluator or 
when the specific details are particularly important). Documenting evidence in this way 
further enhances the transparency of the method and also provides the essential details with 
regard to those issues of non-compliance it felt necessary. 
5. List of Evaluation Criteria 
5.1. Construction of the evaluation criteria 
The coding framework is based on 168 criteria, 117 for assessing trade union rights and 51 
for employers‘ organizations rights. The criteria are split into de jure and de facto criteria 
and grouped into five main categories: I. fundamental civil liberties; II. right of workers to 
establish and join organizations; III. other union activities; IV. right to collective 
bargaining; and V. right to strike, only in relation to trade unions (see Table 1). 
 
34
 Severity in the present context includes flagrant cases, occurring in a widespread and/or 
systematic manner that is continuously followed by the absence of independent judicial inquiry 
and judgements against the guilty parties (situation of impunity), therefore reinforcing the 
climate of violence and insecurity and creating an extremely damaging effect on the exercise of 
trade union rights. (See Part II. Section 3). 
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These 168 evaluation criteria provide a working definition of rights of workers‘ and 
employers‘ organizations. Though the number of evaluation criteria is sizeable, it is built 
up from what seemed a manageable number of categories, with – as described below - a 
great deal of parallel structure within these categories.
35
 The argument that supported the 
number of evaluation criteria was to avoid building a system that is not transparent or 
capable of identifying issues of non-compliance in a precise manner, for instance by using 
broad criteria embracing multiple ―sub-criteria‖ from which the exact non-compliance is 
hardly identifiable. It is also worth bearing in mind that the list of evaluation criteria 
simply provides a means of recording issues of non-compliance as determined by the 
ILO‘s supervisory system, not a checklist where all evaluation criteria are monitored. 
As was indicated above, in serving the aim of capturing all possible issues of non-
compliance, each evaluation criterion has been split into de jure and de facto non-
compliance.
36
 The underlying rationale was that in spite of the increasing number of 
ratifications and the adoption of the sufficient and enabling legal environment, the 
effective implementation of these rights in practice may still lag behind in many countries. 
Therefore the distinction between de jure and de facto issues of non-compliance aims to 
also record those cases where despite the sufficient national legislation, the actual de facto 
situation differs and workers‘ and employers‘ rights are violated. 
(i) De jure non-compliance thus refers, on the one hand, to national legislation
37
 that is not 
in conformity with the ILO freedom of association and collective bargaining standards and 
principles that stem from the ILO Constitution, Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 and relevant 
ILO principles, but, on the other hand, also to actions that were taken based on this 
legislation. 
(ii) As against this, de facto non-compliance refers to incidents that are committed in 
practice despite and in violation of the existing national legislation that is in conformity 
with the ILO freedom of association and collective bargaining standards and principles. 
Distinguishing between de jure and de facto non-compliance in a precise manner was a 
crucial aspect of the method. The decisive factor was to identify the origin of the non-
compliance. If the non-compliance occurs in practice but is due to an existing de jure 
infringement, this requires the amendment of the legislation and not more effective 
implementation as such. The same rationale was used to deal with the question of absence 
of relevant national legislation. If the lack of legislation in itself constitutes a de jure non-
compliance as defined in the ILO freedom of association and collective bargaining 
standards and principles (such as in the case of lack of adequate legal guarantees against 
 
35
 See the issue of ‗Additional Evaluation Criteria‘ under Part I. Sub-Section 5.2. 
36
 There are, however, two exceptions to this main rule: ‗Murder or disappearance‘ of the members 
of workers‘ and employers‘ organizations and ‗Other violent actions‘. These are codedjust under de 
facto non-compliance as it is unlikely that legal provisions can be found which would explicitly 
render, for example, death penalty for trade union membership or activities. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that even though the distinction between de jure and de facto issues of non-compliance was 
made for all types of non-compliance, there certainly are criteria according to which either de jure 
or de facto non-compliance seem to be more likely and frequent, while the other will not, or only 
rarely happen. 
37
 Working definition of national legislation: national legislation in the framework of the present 
coding method shall mean national level general collective agreements and (other) legal sources 
created by legislative authorities that are in effect and are applicable to and binding on all 
workers/employers or – based on statutory exemption - a specific type of worker/employer within 
the national jurisdiction. (See under Part II, Section 2). 
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anti-union discriminatory measures) the issue is coded under a specific de jure non-
compliance. If, however, the absence of legislation does not constitute a de jure non-
compliance but nevertheless leads to negative impact on de facto situation of workers‘ and 
employers‘ rights (as in relation to the right to strike), such instances are coded under de 
facto non-compliance (under the general obstacles towards the application of these rights, 
unless the non-compliance links to a specific criterion in which case it should be coded 
under that specific criterion). In some cases, however, there is a fine line between de jure 
and de facto incidents, and the situation may occasionally arise where the issue of non-
compliance could be coded both under de jure and de facto infringements.
38
 This is usually 
the case when the de jure issue of non-compliance has an implication in practice that 
cannot be directly derived from the de jure non-compliance. 
5.2. Additional evaluation criteria 
As was noted, each of the main categories of the evaluation criteria
39
 (both de jure and de 
facto) build upon a parallel structure, being systematically complemented by three 
additional criteria: (i) ‗other acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference‘; (ii) ‘lack 
of guarantee of due process of law‘; and (iii) a criterion established for cases ‗committed 
against the leaders of the organization‘.40 
(i) Adding the criterion of ‗other acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference‘, the 
aim was to ensure that all instances of non-compliance, even those that could not be coded 
under any explicit criterion, are captured and recorded. That is because it was thought that, 
despite the comprehensive list of evaluation criteria, in reality there might still exist the 
possibility for issues of non-compliance that are not addressed by any of the other criteria. 
Therefore, to record these issues the decision was made to code them under the criterion of 
‗other acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference‘. This criterion is added to each 
one of the main categories of the evaluation criteria, with two exceptions: the additional 
criterion ‗other acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference‘ is not used in the 
categories of ‘fundamental civil liberties‘ and in none of the categories related to 
employers‘ organizations, as the listed evaluation criteria under these categories seemed 
able to capture all possible issues of non-compliance. 
(ii) The criterion ‗lack of guarantee of due process of law‘ was based on the premise that in 
order to ensure the free exercise of freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
appropriate measures for their effective protection should as well be guaranteed. 
Measuring compliance with the principle of sufficiently prompt and fair trial by an 
independent and impartial judiciary was therefore seen as an indispensable element of the 
method. Thus an additional criterion of ‗lack of guarantee of due process of law‘ was 
attached to each of the main categories of the evaluation criteria. 
 
38
 One example that occurred during the pilot was the case when the actual non-compliance was a 
result of a de jure infringement (de jure exclusion/restriction from the right to establish and join 
organizations), it nonetheless affected a certain group of workers in practice that was not 
specifically intended to be affected by the law. 
39
 The main categories of the evaluation criteria are: I. fundamental civil liberties; II. right of 
workers to establish and join organizations; III. other union activities; IV. right to collective 
bargaining; V. right to strike, being solely assessed in relation to trade unions. 
40
 In the list of evaluation criteria, this criterion appears either as ‗committed against trade union 
leaders‘ or as ‗committed against the leaders of the organization‘, depending on whether the 
criterion links to workers‘ or employers‘ organizations. 
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In addition, having a fundamental role with regard to de facto non-compliance with 
fundamental civil liberties, a ‗lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity‘ 
criterion was added separately to each one of the evaluation criterion
41
 (see Categories Ib 
and VIb in the list of evaluation criteria).
42
 Besides, in connection with cases of ‗anti-union 
discrimination‘ and ‗acts of interference‘,43 the system yet again provided a due process 
criterion for each of these criteria, considering it particularly important vis-à-vis these 
complaints.
44
 This is also underlined by Article 3 of Convention No. 98 which requires that 
―Machinery appropriate to national conditions shall be established, where necessary, for 
the purpose of ensuring respect for the right to organise...‖. 
(iii) As regards the emphasis on the leaders of the workers‘ and employers‘ organizations 
(evaluation criterion ‗committed against leaders of the organizations‘), the aim was to give 
greater weight to incidents committed against leaders. Such incidents can obstruct the 
leaders of the organizations from performing their duties in full independence and, 
therefore, could amount to intimidation aimed at preventing the free exercise of their 
functions or even lead to the dissolution of the organization.
45
 Being the most frequently 
occurring cases and the ones where the leaders‘ position is particularly vulnerable, it was 
decided to add the evaluation criterion of ‗committed against leaders of the organizations‘ 
to the following evaluation criteria: all de facto fundamental civil liberties evaluation 
criteria, anti-union discrimination criteria and the criterion of ‗use of excessive sanctions in 
case of legitimate and peaceful strikes‘. 
6. Coding sources 
In seeking to monitor both de jure and de facto aspects of countries‘ compliance with 
international labour standards, the incompleteness of the existing information sources, 
being an unavoidable difficulty, had to be accepted as a limitation of the process. Problems 
of incomplete information are less acute for de jure than for de facto issues of non-
compliance. Nevertheless these concerns led to the construction of a method that builds on 
coding sources that are readily and systematically available. Alongside this, the selected 
sources also had to meet with the above described key premises and be fully consistent 
 
41
 It should be noted, that with regard de facto issues of non-compliance in relation to fundamental 
civil liberties, alongside the additional criterion ‗lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or 
impunity‘, the criterion ‗severity (widespread and/or systematic)‘ was as well added separately to 
each one of the evaluation criterion. 
42
 As the CEACR and CFA repeatedly stress a genuinely free and independent trade union 
movement can only develop where fundamental human rights are fully respected and where in the 
event of violation measures are taken to identify, bring to trial and convict the guilty parties. (ILO, 
2006, Paras. 33 and 51). 
43
 ‗Anti-union discrimination‘ refers to two evaluation criteria: ‗prejudice or discrimination with 
regard to employment because of trade union membership/legitimate activities‘ and ‗discriminatory 
dismissal/suspension because of trade union membership/legitimate activities‘. ‗Acts of 
interference‘ refers to ‗acts of interference of employers and/or public authorities‘ and ‗acts of 
interference of workers‘ organizations and/or public authorities‘ evaluation criteria. 
44
 In case of de jure anti-discrimination (‗de jure prejudice or discrimination with regard to 
employment because of trade union membership/legitimate activities‘ and ‗de jure discriminatory 
dismissal/suspension because of trade union membership/legitimate activities‘) the ‗lack of 
guarantee of due process of law ‗criterion is expressed under the title of ‗lack of adequate legal 
guarantees against acts of interference‘. 
45
 ILO (2006, Paras. 799 and 810). 
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with the ILO provisions and principles of application. From these aspects the information 
gathered by the ILO‘s supervisory system (see Box 3) proved to be the essential source. 
Through this system the ILO regularly examines the application of international labour 
standards in member States and points out lagging areas and/or provisions that are in 
violation with the standards and principles. 
Box 3 
Supervisory system of the ILO 
The application of international labour standards is supported by the ILO’s unique supervisory system. This supervisory system is 
based on two types of mechanisms: 
A. Regular supervisory system: relies on the regular reporting of governments and workers’ and employers’ organizations 
on ratified Conventions;  
B. Complaint-based special procedures: include procedure for representation, procedure for complaint and a special 
procedure regarding freedom of association rights.  
A. Regular supervisory system: based on the examination of reports and comments sent regularly by the Government and 
workers’ and employers’ organizations with regard to the measures which it has taken to give effect to the provisions of ratified 
Conventions. The reports are reviewed by two ILO bodies:  
 Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations: made up of twenty independent 
jurists appointed by the Governing Body. Based on the examination of the reports the Committee provides its comments 
(observations and direct requests) published in the Committee’s annual report.  
 Conference Committee: tripartite standing committee of the International Labour Conference (ILC), made up of 
government, employer and worker delegates. It examines in a tripartite setting a selected number of observations 
adopted by the CEACR in the previous December. 
B. Complaint-based special procedures: based on the submission of representation or complaint, that are examined in three 
procedures: 
 Procedure for representations: allows workers’ and employers’ organizations to present a representation against any 
member State which failed to comply with a ratified Convention. The representation is examined by a tripartite committee 
of three members established by the ILO Governing Body. 
 Procedure for complaints: allows for the examination of a complaint filed by a member State that ratified the 
Convention concerned, a delegate to the ILC or the Governing Body. It is the strongest measure among the supervisory 
procedures that gives rise to a Commission of Inquiry in case a member State is accused committing persistent and 
serious violations and has repeatedly refused to address them. The Commission is composed of three independent 
members, appointed by the ILO Director-General. 
 Special procedure for complaints regarding freedom of association: allows for the examination of complaints 
alleging violations of freedom of association, even where the relevant Conventions have not been ratified. The complaint 
is examined by the Committee of Freedom of Association, a tripartite body composed of nine members along of nine 
deputy members and an independent chairperson. The Committee meets three times a year. 
By providing the compiled information in a more accessible and concise manner, the 
possible improvement of the information sources constitutes one of the possible outcomes 
of the method. The enhanced visibility of the information generated by the ILO 
supervisory system may reveal issues arising from lack of information, encouraging 
constituents to share more up-to-date and accurate information with the supervisory 
bodies. 
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The available information regarding the eight fundamental conventions,
46
 as covered by 
the 1998 Declaration, is, however, more complete under the ILO‘s supervisory system, 
both in relation to countries that have and have not ratified the Convention concerned. 
For one thing, information is more frequently collected, as the countries that have ratified 
any of the eight fundamental conventions (as well as the four priority conventions
47
) are 
obliged to submit reports every two years to the CEACR detailing the steps taken in law 
and practice to apply them.
48
 For all the other ratified conventions, reports must be 
submitted every five years.
49
 As presented in Box 3, based on the information sent by the 
governments, the CEACR publishes its annual report examining the compliance by ILO 
member States with the ILO Conventions and Recommendations. In addition to these 
reports, the reports adopted annually by the Conference Committee on the Application of 
Standards also assess the manner in which member States fulfil their obligations with 
respect to ratified Conventions. 
In addition, information is available as a result of the adoption of the 1998 Declaration and 
its follow-up. The aim of the follow-up procedure is to encourage and review the efforts 
made by the member States to promote fundamental principles and rights at work, 
enshrined in the 1998 Declaration. As the 1998 Declaration states, ―all Members, even if 
they have not ratified the Conventions in question, have an obligation arising from the very 
fact of membership in the Organization, to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith 
and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights 
which are the subject of those Conventions‖.50 In order to achieve its objective, the 1998 
Declaration and its follow-up established three tools. First, the Annual Review process 
composed of the annual reports submitted by member States which have not ratified the 
relevant ILO conventions relating to the principles and rights stated in the 1998 
Declaration. These annual reports are publicly available in the forms of Country 
 
46
 The eight fundamental Conventions are: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 
1949 (No. 98); Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29); Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 
1957 (No. 105); Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138); Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention, 1999 (No. 182); Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100); Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111). 
47
 The four priority Conventions are: Labour Inspection Convention, 1974 (No. 81); Labour 
Inspection (Agriculture) Convention, 1969 (No. 129); Tripartite Consultation (International Labour 
Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144); Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122). Selecting 
these conventions as ―priority‖ instruments, the Governing Body‘s aim was to encourage their 
ratification due to their particular importance in the functioning of the international labour standards 
system. (ILO, 2009c, p. 13; also available at:  
http://www.ilo.org/global/What_we_do/Publications/lang--en/docName--
WCMS_108393/index.htm). 
48
 Note that subsequent to the decision of the ILO Governing Body taken during its 306th Meeting 
(March 2009, (GB.306/LILS/4 (Rev.)), as from 2012 the two-year reporting cycle with regard to the 
fundamental and priority Conventions will change to a three-year cycle, resulting also in 
adjustments of the Regular Reporting Schedule. Rules described in the present paper reflect on the 
biannual reporting system that was applicable at the time the pilot project was carried out and the 
present paper was written. 
49The exceptions from this rule are the conventions that have been ―shelved‖, which are no longer 
supervised on a regular basis. Furthermore it should also be noted that reports on the application of 
conventions may be requested at shorter intervals. For more information see ILO (2009, pp. 80-92). 
50
 ILO (1998, Art. 2). 
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Baselines.
51
 Second, the Global Reports that provide each year a global picture of one of 
the four categories of FPRWs. Third, the technical cooperation projects, aiming to address 
specific needs in relation to the 1998 Declaration and to strengthen local capacities. 
In spite of the above mentioned follow-up mechanism, there still exist differences in the 
reporting requirements and the actual examination of the reports between countries that 
have and have not ratified a given ILO Convention, and this may create an information 
bias between these two groups of countries. This can be offset by additionally making use 
of such sources that are equally available for all the ILO member States. These are the 
reports of the Committee on Freedom of Association
52
 and the national legislation of the 
member States. However, as the regular Supervisory System examines the compliance of 
national legislation in countries that have ratified the Conventions concerned, national 
legislation is only used for member States that have not ratified either or both of the 
relevant fundamental Conventions, and only as a complementary source to the Country 
Baselines. This is because the use of national legislation proved to be a vital asset to clarify 
the information provided in the Country Baselines and to attain more accurate information 
on the realization of these principles. 
A further benefit of using multiple sources is the increased probability of detecting 
information on de facto non-compliance, thus the increased capability to offset the 
information bias between de jure and de facto issues of non-compliance. In particular, 
reports of the supervisory system which provide information on issues of non-compliance 
of a more de facto nature offer valuable information to measure countries‘ compliance. 
Alongside the CFA reports these are the reports on representation procedures (governed by 
articles 24 and 25 of the ILO Constitution) and the reports on complaint procedures 
(governed by articles 26 to 34 of the ILO Constitution). 
Based on the above, in order to identify issues of non-compliance in relation to the rights 
of workers‘ and employers‘ organizations, the following sources were selected: CEACR 
comments; Conference Committee Reports; Country Baselines - complemented with the 
national legislation; Representations; Complaints and CFA cases. (See Box 1). 
 
51
 The current compilation of Country Baselines is available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/follow-up/annualreview/countrybaselines/lang--en/index.htm 
(accessed on 31 Aug. 2010). 
52
 Obvious information bias between regions and countries exists with regard to the cases brought 
before the CFA. Considering the years 2006-2008, about two-thirds of the new cases come from 
Latin American countries, indicating mainly that workers‘ organizations rely more actively on this 
mechanism. 
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Part II. Practical Aspects of the Method 
1. General Coding Rules 
1.1. Introduction 
To satisfy the requirement of reproducibility and therefore to ensure the credibility and 
accuracy of the method, the construction of detailed rules guiding the coding is 
indispensable. These rules consist of the (i) general coding rules (Part II. Section 1); 
(ii) source-specific coding rules concerning the coding of each of the selected seven 
sources (Part II. Section 2); and (iii) detailed coding definitions developed for each of 
the 168 evaluation criteria (Part II. Section 3). Although the coding is guided, for the most 
part, by the source-specific coding rules, general coding rules had to be adopted to ensure 
consistency concerning issues that are relevant across the sources. 
The general coding rules, as discussed below, are the followings: 
 Frequency of the coding 
 Codable and Non-codable evidence 
 Coding the additional criteria 
 Coding the different factors of non-compliance 
 Documentation of the coding 
 
Note that although the examples provided below mostly refer to issues of non-compliance 
with trade union rights, the same rules are applicable for issues of non-compliance with 
employers‘ organizations‘ rights, where relevant. Moreover, the rules and examples listed 
below are applicable to both de jure and de facto issues of non-compliance. 
1.2. Frequency of the coding 
In order to record progress made towards the application of Conventions Nos. 87 and 98, 
the decision was made to test whether the coding can be done on an annual basis. The most 
important factor determining this was the ILO Regular Supervisory System, consisting of 
the CEACR and the Conference Committee. This System is based on the ILO Regular 
Reporting Schedule,
53
 which governs the regular reporting obligation of ILO member 
States regarding ratified Conventions by indicating the year the Government‘s report is 
due. As a rule, reports are requested every two years for the fundamental and priority 
Conventions and every five years for other Conventions.
54
 However, owing to the high 
number of ratifications, the Regular Reporting Schedule divided member States into two 
groups based on alphabetical order requesting them to report on the fundamental and 
priority conventions not in the same but every other year. To illustrate the above with an 
example, with regard Convention No. 87, the Regular Reporting Schedule indicates that 
86 member States (countries with letters from A to J) are requested to send their reports for 
the year 2011, while the other 89 member States (countries with letters from K to Z) will 
 
53
 The ILO Regular Reporting Schedule is available at: 
http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/schedule/index.cfm.cfm?lang=EN 
(accessed 15 Sep. 2010) 
54
 See footnote No. 48. 
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do so for the year 2012.
55
 Accordingly, the CEACR provides comments on an annual 
basis, allowing the coding as well to be done annually. However, as the CEACR provides 
its comments only biannually for any given country, whereas other supervisory bodies 
either deal with a changing number of countries (e.g. Conference Committee) or do not 
provide reports on an annual basis (e.g. Representations, Complaints), rules for the annual 
coding of each source had to be established. 
Table 4 below provides the rules corresponding to the annual coding. In the first column, 
the sources selected for the coding are listed. The second column specifies the frequency of 
the coding, indicating whether the coding is done every year or only upon the adoption of 
the relevant report in the year evaluated. The last column provides information on the 
countries covered by the sources, therefore indicates the countries for which the coding can 
be done. 
Table 4. Coding frequency 
Source Coding frequency Countries covered by the source 
CEACR comments Every year 
All ILO member States that ratified the 
Convention concerned 
Conference Committee 
Reports 
Every year 
Only those ILO member States selected by the 
Conference Committee for the year evaluated 
Country Baselines Every year 
All ILO member States that have not ratified the 
Convention concerned 
Representations 
Only if Representation Procedure is closed 
in the year evaluated 
Only  the country against who a representation 
procedure has been closed by a final report in 
the year evaluated 
Complaints 
Only if Complaint Procedure is closed in the 
year evaluated 
Only the country against who a complaint 
procedure has been closed by a final report in 
the year evaluated 
CFA cases 
Based on the CFA report(s) adopted in the 
year evaluated  
Only countries whose case(s) is included in any 
of the Reports of the CFA adopted/published in 
the year evaluated 
National legislation Every year 
All ILO member States that have not ratified the 
Convention concerned 
It should, however, be noted that no final decision has been made on the frequency of the 
coding. The above rules reflect the situation in which the coding would be done on an 
annual basis. 
1.3. Codable and non-codable evidence 
To ensure consistency and reproducibility and also to prevent possible subjectivity, the 
following rules were established to determine whether the recorded evidence can or cannot 
be coded as an issue of non-compliance: 
(i) Being valid across the entire method and reflected in all the rules guiding the coding, 
the decisive rule is that solely the information already recorded by the ILO supervisory 
bodies can serve as the basis of the coding. That is, the aim of the method is merely to 
 
55
 The Schedule is, however, subject to change if additional reports are requested, or reports were 
not received or in case of new ratifications. 
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collect the already existing evidence acknowledged by the supervisory bodies, without 
providing new or differing ones. 
(ii) Cases where the supervisory bodies request clarification on a potential problem or 
provide comments on draft legislation, i.e. legislation that is not yet applicable, cannot be 
coded as issue of non-compliance. 
(iii) When an issue of non-compliance occurs but is remedied in the same year, the 
incident is coded as an issue of non-compliance for that year. Not coding the remedied 
issue of non-compliance would indicate as if remedied issues of non-compliance have 
never occurred. 
(iv) International Trade Union Confederation‘s (ITUC) reports on trade union rights‘ 
violations,
56
 or reports from other workers‘ and employers‘ organizations, not being 
subject to revision by any of the ILO supervisory bodies, are not selected as sources for the 
method. References to evidence found in these comments, can nonetheless be coded as an 
issue of non-compliance if the given government has already acknowledged the criticism 
and this is mentioned in the ILO supervisory document or if the supervisory body 
acknowledged it as an observed issue of non-compliance. Taking this approach, the 
method allows considering information provided by these organizations in a way that is in 
line with the ILO supervisory mechanism and the aim of the coding. 
(v) Stemming from the nature of the sources selected for the coding (see Box 1) – 
reflecting on the principle of tripartism - situations involving contradicting information 
either within the same source or between different sources might possibly occur. As a rule, 
unless the contradicting evidence is refuted in a way that the supervisory body concerned 
fully accepts it, (a) if contrary evidence is found within the same source, the information is 
excluded from coding; however; (b) if contrary evidence is found between different 
sources, evidence is coded under each source on its own terms.  
(vi) Only observations of issues non-compliance, but not observations of progress and/or 
good practices are coded. However, by not coding good practices, or by not coding a 
(resolved) non-compliance for the subsequent year, the method, indirectly, acknowledges 
and indicates progress and good practices. 
Table 5 below provides a quick summary on the above explained rules on evidences that 
can and cannot be coded as an issue of non-compliance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56
 Indicating comments made in the ITUC Annual Survey of violations of trade union rights;  
http://www.ituc-csi.org/ (accessed 15 Sep. 2010). 
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Table 5. Codable and Non-codable evidence 
Codable evidence Non-codable evidence 
− Non- compliance recorded by any of the ILO supervisory 
bodies in any of the sources selected for the coding. 
− Non-compliance remedied within the same year it was 
committed. 
- Comments requesting further information or explanation 
without acknowledging any issue of non-compliance. 
- Comments on draft legislation. 
References to ITUC Reports or reports of other workers’ or 
employers’ organizations, solely if the government 
concerned fully accepts it and it is mentioned in the ILO 
comment or report and/or if the supervisory body 
acknowledges it. 
References to ITUC Reports or reports of other workers’ or 
employers’ organizations, if the government concerned does 
not accept it and it is mentioned in the ILO comment or report 
and/or if the supervisory body does not acknowledge it. 
Contradictory evidence, if the contradiction occurs 
between different sources. 
Contradictory evidence, if the contradiction occurs within the 
same source. 
Evidence of non-compliance Evidence of progress and/or good practices  
1.4. Coding the additional criteria 
As explained in the first part of the paper, the main categories of the evaluation criteria 
were complemented by the following additional criteria: (i) ‗other acts of prohibitions, 
infringements and interference‘; (ii) ‗lack of guarantee of due process of law‘; and 
(iii) ‗committed against leaders of the organizations‘. In order to ensure their consistent 
coding, the following should be considered: 
(i) With regard to the first additional criterion („other acts of prohibitions, infringements 
and interference‟), it was decided to add the criterion to each of the main categories of 
evaluation criteria, with the exceptions of the category of ‘fundamental civil liberties‘ and 
the categories related to employers‘ organizations.57 Therefore, the coding of an issue of 
non-compliance under this additional criterion requires coding the non-compliance under 
the main category to which it links. For instance, if the issue of non-compliance links to 
the main category of de jure ‗right of workers to establish and join organizations‘ (IIa), it 
should be coded under the evaluation criterion no. 42, ‗other de jure acts of prohibitions, 
infringements and interference re IIa‘ (Table 6). 
Table 6. Coding the criterion ‘other acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference’ 
  IIa. Right of workers to establish and join organizations, de jure  2008 
29 General prohibition on the right of workers to establish and join organizations   
30 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to establish and join organizations   
31 Previous authorization requirements   
32 Restrictions on the freedom of choice of trade union structure and composition   
33 Imposed trade union unity and/or favouritism/discrimination among workers' organizations   
34 Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or legislation   
35 Prejudice or discrimination with regard to employment because of trade union membership/ legitimate activities   
36 Lack of adequate legal guarantees against anti-union discriminatory measures re 35   
37 Discriminatory dismissal/suspension because of trade union membership/legitimate activities   
38 Lack of adequate legal guarantees against anti-union discriminatory measures re 37   
39 Acts of interference of employers and/or public authorities   
 
57
 The reason for not including the additional evaluation criterion into these categories was that the 
listed evaluation criteria under these categories seemed to be able to capture all possible issues of 
non-compliance. 
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40 Lack of adequate legal guarantees against acts of interference     
41 Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international organizations   
42 Other de jure acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIa a 
43 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIa   
 
However, as the content of the incidents coded under this additional evaluation criterion 
does not emerge from the coding spreadsheet, in order to attain transparency the actual 
coding of these issues of non-compliance necessitates an accurate documentation 
indicating exactly what the recorded non-compliance is. Therefore when coding such 
incidents, the original text recording the non-compliance should be copied word-by-word 
to the supplementary textual document attached to the coding spreadsheet (Annex II-III). 
(ii) Concerning the additional criterion „lack of guarantee of due process of law‟: a) one 
‗lack of guarantee of due process of law‘ criterion is attached to each one of the main 
categories of the evaluation criteria; b) a ‗lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or 
impunity‘ criterion is added to each one of the evaluation criterion listed under the de facto 
non-compliance relating to fundamental civil liberties; c) a further ‗lack of guarantee of 
due process of law‘ is added to ‗anti-union discrimination‘ criteria and ‗acts of 
interference‘ evaluation criterion. 
a) With regard to the actual coding, in the first case (one ‗lack of guarantee of due process 
of law‘ criterion attached to each of the main categories), if a non-compliance relating to 
due process of law occurs, it is coded under the ‗lack of guarantee of due process of law‘ 
criterion that is included in the category to which the non-compliance links. This means 
that if the non-compliance relating to due process of law, for instance, occurs with regard 
‗de facto previous authorization requirements‘ (evaluation criterion no. 46), the non-
compliance relating to due process of law should be coded under the criterion ‗de facto 
lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIb‟ (evaluation criterion no. 60) (Table 7). 
Table 7. Coding the criterion ‘lack of guarantee of due process of law’ added to the main categories 
  IIb. Right of workers to establish and join organizations, de facto  2008 
44 Obstacles towards the development of independent workers' organizations in practice   
45 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to establish and join organizations   
46 Previous authorization requirements f 
47 Restrictions on the freedom of choice of trade union structure and composition 
 
48 Imposed trade union unity and/or favouritism/discrimination among workers' organizations 
 
49 Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or legislation 
 
50 Prejudice or discrimination with regard to employment because of trade union membership/legitimate activities 
 
51 Committed against trade union leaders re 50 
 
52 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re 50 
 
53 Discriminatory dismissal/suspension because of trade union membership/legitimate activities 
 
54 Committed against trade union leaders re 53 
 
55 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re 53 
 
56 Acts of interference of employers and/or public authorities 
 
57 Lack of adequate guarantees against acts of interference 
 
58 Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international organizations 
 
59 Other de facto acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIb 
 
60 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIb f 
 
 Working Paper No. 99 27 
b) - c) Concerning the second and third cases (‗lack of guarantee of due process of law 
and/or impunity‘ criterion added to each criteria under ‗de facto fundamental civil 
liberties‘; ‗lack of guarantee of due process of law‘ criterion added to ‗anti-union 
discrimination‘ and ‗acts of interference‘ criteria), these additional criteria should always 
be coded only with regard the particular criterion they are added to. This means that, for 
example, if a non-compliance relating to due process of law occurs with regard to ‗de facto 
murder or disappearance of trade unionists‘ (evaluation criterion no. 6), the non-
compliance relating to ‗lack of guarantee of due process of law‘ should be coded under the 
evaluation criterion no. 8 (Table 8). 
Table 8. Coding the criterion ‘lack of guarantee of due process of law’ added to each of the evaluation 
criterion of ‘de facto fundamental civil liberties’ 
  Ib. Fundamental civil liberties, de facto  2008 
6 Murder or disappearance of trade unionists f 
7 Committed against trade union leaders re 6 
 
8 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 6 f 
9 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 6   
10 Other violent actions against trade unionists   
11 Committed against trade union leaders re 10   
12 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 10   
13 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 10   
14 Arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of trade unionists   
15 Committed against trade union leaders re 14   
16 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 14   
17 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 14   
18 Infringements of trade unionists' basic freedoms   
19 Committed against trade union leaders re 18   
20 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 18   
21 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 18   
22 Attacks against trade union premises and property   
23 Committed against trade union leaders re 22   
24 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 22   
25 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 22   
26 Excessive prohibitions/restrictions on trade union rights in the event of state of emergency   
27 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 26   
28 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 26   
 
 
If a non-compliance relating to due process of law occurs with regard to ‗de facto 
discriminatory dismissal/suspension because of trade union membership/legitimate 
activities‘ (evaluation criterion no. 53), the non-compliance relating to ‗lack of guarantee 
of due process of law‘ should be coded under evaluation criterion no. 55 (Table 9). 
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Table 9. Coding the criterion ‘lack of guarantee of due process of law’ added to the anti-union 
discrimination evaluation criteria 
  IIb. Right of workers to establish and join organizations, de facto  2008 
44 Obstacles towards the development of independent workers' organizations in practice   
45 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to establish and join organizations   
46 Previous authorization requirements   
47 Restrictions on the freedom of choice of trade union structure and composition   
48 Imposed trade union unity and/or favouritism/discrimination among workers' organizations   
49 Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or legislation   
50 Prejudice or discrimination with regard to employment because of trade union membership/legitimate activities   
51 Committed against trade union leaders re 50   
52 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re 50 
 
53 Discriminatory dismissal/suspension because of trade union membership/legitimate activities f 
54 Committed against trade union leaders re 53 
 
55 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re 53 f 
56 Acts of interference of employers and/or public authorities   
57 Lack of adequate guarantees against acts of interference   
58 Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international organizations   
59 Other de facto acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIb   
60 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIb   
 
Note, however, that - as detailed in Part II. Sub-Section 1.5. - the ‗lack of guarantee of due 
process of law‘ criterion can either be coded by itself or together with another non-
compliance it links to (which we refer as a ‗basis non-compliance‘), if the ‗basis non-
compliance‘ was acknowledged by the supervisory body. 
(iii) Coding the incidents of „committed against leaders of the organizations‟, the above 
described rule is applied: this additional criterion should always be coded only with regard 
the particular criterion it is added to. These are the criteria under ‗de facto fundamental 
civil liberties‘, ‗anti-union discrimination‘ and the ‗use of excessive sanctions in case of 
legitimate and peaceful strikes‘. 
To give an example, in case a ‗de facto discriminatory dismissal/suspension because of 
trade union membership/legitimate activities‘ (evaluation criterion no. 53) is committed 
against a leader of the organization, the case should also be coded under evaluation 
criterion no. 54, indicating that the it was committed against a leader of the organization 
(Table 10). 
Table 10. Coding the evaluation criterion ‘committed against leaders of the organizations’ 
  IIb. Right of workers to establish and join organizations, de facto  2008 
44 Obstacles towards the development of independent workers' organizations in practice   
45 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to establish and join organizations   
46 Previous authorization requirements   
47 Restrictions on the freedom of choice of trade union structure and composition   
48 Imposed trade union unity and/or favouritism/discrimination among workers' organizations   
49 Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or legislation   
50 Prejudice or discrimination with regard to employment because of trade union membership/legitimate activities   
51 Committed against trade union leaders re 50   
52 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re 50   
53 Discriminatory dismissal/suspension because of trade union membership/legitimate activities f 
54 Committed against trade union leaders re 53 f 
55 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re 53   
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56 Acts of interference of employers and/or public authorities   
57 Lack of adequate guarantees against acts of interference   
58 Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international organizations   
59 Other de facto acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIb   
60 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIb   
Table 11 below provides the summary for the above described rules. The first column lists 
the additional evaluation criteria (i.e. evaluation criteria added systematically to the main 
categories of the evaluation criteria). The second column provides the information on the 
occurrence of the additional criterion (i.e. where and how many additional criterion is 
included in the list of evaluation criteria). The last column indicates the rules on how to 
code these criteria. 
Table 11. Coding the additional evaluation criteria 
Additional evaluation criteria The additional evaluation criterion is added to Coding  
‘Other acts of prohibitions, 
infringements and interference’ 
− Each of the main categories58 
− Coding is done with regard the 
main category the non-compliance 
links to. 
‘Lack of guarantee of due 
process of law’ 
− Each of the main categories 
 
− Coding is done with regard the 
main category the non-compliance 
links to. 
− Each de facto civil liberties evaluation criteria; 
− Anti-union discrimination evaluation criteria; 
− Acts of interference evaluation criteria. 
− Coding is done only with regard the 
particular criterion the additional 
criterion is added to. 
‘Committed against leaders of 
the organization’ 
− Each de facto civil liberties evaluation criteria; 
− Anti-union discrimination evaluation criteria; 
− Imposing excessive sanctions in case of 
legitimate and peaceful strikes evaluation 
criterion. 
− Coding is done only with regard the 
particular criterion the additional 
criterion is added to. 
1.5. Coding the different factors of non-
compliance 
Notwithstanding the considerably large number of evaluation criteria aiming to attain 
transparency and unambiguousness, the situation can occur when an observed issue of non-
compliance links to two or more evaluation criteria. In order to capture all aspects of these 
issues of non-compliance particular attention should be given to the coding of each of 
those evaluation criteria to which the non-compliance links. 
(i) Such way of coding occurs, most often, in relation to the additional criterion 
a) ‗committed against leader of the organization‘; b) ‗severity (widespread and/or 
systematic)‘; and c) the ‗lack of guarantee of due process of law‘, as these criteria rarely 
stand on their own, but rather as a non-compliance exacerbating another non-compliance 
(‗basis non-compliance‘). For example, in the case of de facto ‗arrest, detention, 
imprisonment, charging and fining of trade unionists‘ occurs (evaluation criterion no. 14) 
 
58
 There are, however, two exceptions from this rule: additional criterion ‘other acts of prohibitions, 
infringements and interference‘ is not used in the categories of ‘fundamental civil liberties‘ and in 
none of the categories related to employers‘ organizations. 
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that was committed against the leader of the organization, this should be coded under both 
the evaluation criterion no. 14 (de facto ‗arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and 
fining of trade unionists‘) and no. 15 (de facto ‗committed against trade union leaders 
re 14‘). 
a) With regard to the evaluation criterion „committed against leader of the organization‟, 
the following cases can occur: 
 Case A: the criterion is coded together with the ‗basis non-compliance‘ (Table 12, 
column A); 
 Case B: the criterion is coded together with the criterion ‗lack of guarantee of due 
process of law and/or impunity‘ (Table 12, column B); 
 Case C: the criterion is coded together with the ‗basis non-compliance‘ and with the 
criterion ‗lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity‘ (Table 12, 
column C); 
 Case D: the criterion is coded together with the ‗basis non-compliance‘, with the 
criterion ‗lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity‘ and ‗severity 
(widespread and/or systematic) (Table 12, column D). 
Table 12. Coding the evaluation criterion ’committed against leaders of the organization’ 
 
 
b) With regard to the evaluation criterion ‟severity (widespread and/or systematic)‟, the 
following incidents are possible: 
 
 Case A: the criterion is coded together with the ‘basis non-compliance‘ (Table 13, 
column A); 
 Case B: the criterion is coded together with the ‘basis non-compliance‘ and with the 
criterion ‗lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity‘ (Table 13, 
column B); 
 Case C: the criterion is coded together with the ‗basis non-compliance‘, the criterion 
‗committed against the leaders of the organizations‘ and ‗lack of guarantee of due 
process of law (Table 13, column C). 
Table 13. Coding the evaluation criterion ’severity (widespread and/or systematic)’ 
 
c) In comparison with the above explained cases, the coding of the evaluation criterion 
„lack of guarantee of due process of law‟ is slightly different, as it can also be coded on its 
own, being considered per se a non-compliance. This also means that if ―lack of guarantee 
of due process of law‖ concerns the leader of the organization, the criterion ‗committed 
  Ib. Fundamental civil liberties, de facto A B C D 
14 Arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of trade unionists f  f f 
15 Committed against trade union leaders re 14 f f f f 
16 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 14 
 
f f f 
17 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 14 
 
  f 
 
Ib. Fundamental civil liberties, de facto A B C 
14 Arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of trade unionists f f f 
15 Committed against trade union leaders re 10 
 
 f 
16 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 14 
 
f f 
17 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 14 f f f 
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against leaders of the organisations‘ should be coded with the ―lack of guarantee of due 
process of law‖, irrespectively of the alleged ‗basis non-compliance‘. 
With regard the evaluation criterion ‗lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or 
impunity‘, the following cases can occur: 
 Case A: the criterion is coded by itself (Table 14, column A); 
 Case B: the criterion is coded only with the criterion ‗committed against leaders of the 
organizations‘ (Table 14, column B); 
 Case C: the criterion is coded together with the ‗basis non-compliance‘ (Table 14, 
column C); 
 Case D: the criterion is coded together with the ‗basis non-compliance‘ and the criterion 
‗committed against leaders of the organizations‘ (Table 14, column D); 
 Case E: the criterion is coded together with the ‗basis non-compliance‘, the criterion 
‗committed against leaders organizations‘ and ‗severity (widespread and/or systematic) 
(Table 14, column E). 
Table 14. Coding the evaluation criterion ’lack of guarantee of due process of law’ 
(ii) The other area where the same approach is applicable is cases where the de facto 
intervention of police into legitimate and peaceful strikes (and where the law and order is 
not seriously threatened) for strike-breaking purposes leads to murder, arbitrary arrest or 
detention of striking workers, or to other violent actions against participants. 
Concerning the above described situation, the following cases can occur: 
 Case A: the criterion is coded by itself (Table 15, column A); 
 Case B: the criterion is coded with ‗murder or disappearance of trade unionists‘, if it 
occurs during and in relation to a police intervention (Table 15, column B); 
 Case C: the criterion is coded with ‗other violent actions against trade unionists‘, if it 
occurs during and in relation to a police intervention (Table 15, column C); 
 Case D: the criterion is coded with ‗arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining 
of trade unionists‘, if it occurs during and in relation to a police intervention (Table 15, 
column D); 
 Case E: the criterion is coded together with ‗murder or disappearance of trade unionists‘ 
and ‗other violent actions against trade unionists‘ if those occur during and in relation 
to a police intervention (Table 15, column E); 
 Case F: the criterion is coded together with ‗other violent actions against trade 
unionists‘ and ‗arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of trade unionists‘ 
if those occur during and in relation to a police intervention (Table 15, column F); 
 Case G: the criterion is coded together with ‗murder or disappearance of trade 
unionists‘ and ‗arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of trade unionists‘ 
if those occur during and in relation to a police intervention (Table 15, column G); 
 Case H: all four criteria are coded together if those occur during and in relation to a 
police intervention (Table 15, column H). 
Note that in the above cases the ‗basis non-compliance‘ is the ‗acts of interference during 
the course of strike actions‘. 
 
Ib. Fundamental civil liberties, de facto A B C D E 
14 Arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of trade unionists 
 
 f f f 
15 Committed against trade union leaders re 14 
 
f  f f 
16 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 14 f f f f f 
17 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 14 
 
   f 
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Table 15. Coding of the de facto evaluation criteria ‘Acts of interference during the course of strike 
action’ (i.e. police intervention during peaceful and legitimate strike) in cases it leads to murder, 
arrest/detention or other violent actions against striking workers 
(iii) The last issue under this sub-section is the infringements of the rights relating to 
federations, confederations and international organizations of workers and employers. 
These infringements constitute at the same time an issue of non-compliance with the rights 
accorded to these organizations in general and in relation to the more specific freedom of 
association and collective bargaining rights. 
Contrary to the above described cases where the non-compliance is coded under each 
evaluation criteria it links to, in this case the decision was made to select the most 
significant issues of non-compliance and to code each one of them under one evaluation 
criterion, the ‗infringement of the right to establish and join 
federations/confederations/international organizations‘. This means that with regard to 
these selected issues of non-compliance, federations, confederations and international 
organizations of workers and employers are treated separately from workers‘ and 
employers‘ organizations, whereas with regard to all other issues of non-compliance, 
federations, confederations and international organizations of workers and employers are 
treated as workers‘ and employers‘ organizations. 
The selected issues of non-compliance are the followings: 
- General prohibition on the right to establish federations, confederations and to affiliate 
with international organizations; 
- Exclusion, restriction from the right to establish and join federations, confederations 
and to affiliate with international organizations; 
- Previous authorization requirements to establish federations, confederations and to 
affiliate with international organizations. 
 
With regard to the coding of issues of non-compliance in relation to federations, 
confederation and international organizations of workers and employers, the following 
cases can occur: 
 Case A: the criterion is coded by itself, as the non-compliance links to general 
prohibition on the right to establish federations, confederations and to affiliate with 
international organizations (Table 16, column A); 
 Case B: the criterion is coded by itself, as the non-compliance links to exclusion, 
restriction from the right to establish and join federations, confederations and to affiliate 
with international organizations (Table 16, column B); 
 Case C: the criterion is coded by itself, as the non-compliance links to previous 
authorization requirements to establish federations, confederations and to affiliate with 
international organizations (Table 16, column C); 
 Case D: the criterion is not coded, as the non-compliance links to a criterion 
(‗restrictions on the freedom of choice of trade union structure and compositions‘) other 
than the selected issues of non-compliance (Table 16, column D). 
 
Ib. Fundamental civil liberties, de facto A B C D E F G H 
6 Murder or disappearance of trade unionists  f   f  f f 
10 Other violent actions against trade unionists  
 
f  f f  f 
14 Arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of trade unionists  
 
 f  f f f 
 
Vb. Rights to strike, de facto  
 
      
113 Acts of interference during the course of strike actions f f f f f f f f 
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Table 16. Coding the issues of non-compliance in relation to federations, confederations and 
international organizations of workers and employers 
 
Table 17 below summarizes the above explained rules for coding the different factors of 
non-compliance. The first column lists the evaluation criteria concerned with the coding. 
The second column indicates those criteria the evaluation criterion (listed in the first 
column) can be coded with. The last column provides the information on whether the 
evaluation criterion listed in the first column can or cannot be coded by its own. 
Table 17. Rules for coding the different factors of non-compliance 
Evaluation criterion The evaluation criterion can be coded with Coding on its own 
‘Lack of guarantee of due 
process of law’ 
The ‘basis non-compliance’ and/or the criterion 
of ‘committed against leader of the 
organizations’ 
Yes 
‘Committed against leaders of 
the organization’ 
The ‘basis non-compliance’ and/or the criterion 
of ‘lack of guarantee of due process of law’ 
No, only either with the ‘basis non-
compliance’ and/or with the criterion 
‘lack of due process of law’ 
‘Severity (widespread and/or 
systematic) 
The ‘basis non-compliance’  
No, only with the ‘basis non-
compliance’  
‘Acts of interference during the 
course of strike actions’ (de 
facto) 
The de facto evaluation criterion of: 
- ‘murder or disappearance of trade unionists’; 
- ‘other violent actions against trade unionists’; 
- ‘arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and 
fining of trade unionists’. 
Yes 
‘Infringement of the right to 
establish and join to 
federations/confederations/ 
International organizations’ 
Not applicable 
Yes, including: 
- General prohibition to establish 
federations/confederations and to 
affiliate with international 
organizations 
- Exclusion/restriction from the right 
to establish and join 
federations/confederations and to 
affiliate with international 
organizations  
- Previous authorization 
requirements to establish 
federations/confederations and to 
affiliate with international 
organizations. 
 
  IIb. Right of workers to establish and join organizations, de jure  A B C D 
29 General  prohibition on the right of workers to establish and join organizations      
30 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to establish and join organizations      
31 Previous authorization requirements      
32 Restrictions on the freedom of choice of trade union structure and composition 
 
  a 
41 Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international organizations a a a  
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1.6. Documentation 
Because of the need to ensure transparency and reproducibility, a systematic and accurate 
documentation of evidences coded in the selected sources is important. This implies 
careful recording of information on the evaluation criteria (i) ‗severity (widespread and/or 
systematic)‘; (ii) ‗excluded workers/employers‘; (iii) ‗other acts of prohibitions, 
infringements and interference‘, and on other information59 by copying word for word the 
paragraphs referring to the issue of non-compliance from the original text (Annex II-III). 
Moreover, by recording all the information detected during the coding, the documentation 
also assists the formation of a ‗database‘ consisting of all the sources used during the 
coding that facilitates the coding itself and the tracing of an observed issue of non-
compliance back to a particular textual source and the evidence it records.
60
 
Table 18 below presents the summary of the general coding rules by providing the above 
listed tables in a single document. The tables are identical to the ones used above and are 
complemented by a brief introduction/explanation. 
 
 
 
59
 For example, information can be provided on coded legislation; on cases when the Government 
repeatedly fails to reply to the CFA; or difficulties with regard to the information sources, etc. 
60
 This can be ensured by different means given that they satisfy the above mentioned key premises 
of the method. 
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A. Coding Frequency: 
The table below provides the rules corresponding to the annual coding of the sources. The first column lists the sources selected for the coding, the second column specifies the frequency of the coding (annually 
or upon the adoption of a report in the year evaluated), while the last column indicates the countries covered by the sources (i.e. countries for which the coding can be done).  
Source Coding frequency Countries covered by the source 
CEACR comments Every year All ILO member States that ratified the Convention concerned 
Conference Committee Reports Every year 
Only those ILO member States selected by the Conference Committee for the year 
evaluated 
Country Baselines Every year All ILO member States that have not ratified the Convention concerned 
Representations Only if Representation Procedure is closed in the year evaluated 
Only the country against who a representation procedure has been closed by a final report 
in the year evaluated 
Complaints Only if Complaint Procedure is closed in the year evaluated 
Only the country against who a complaint procedure has been closed by a final report in the 
year evaluated 
CFA cases Based on the CFA report(s) adopted in the year evaluated  
Only for countries whose case(s) is included in any of the Reports of the CFA 
adopted/published in the year evaluated 
National legislation Every year All ILO member States that have not ratified the Convention concerned 
 
B. Codable and Non-codable evidence 
The present table provides the summary of the rules established to determine whether the evidence, recorded in the sources selected for the coding, can or cannot be coded under the evaluation criteria. Codable 
evidence means that the identified evidence can be coded as a non-compliance; non-codable evidence means that the identified evidence cannot be coded as a non-compliance. 
Codable evidence Non-codable evidence 
− Non-compliance recorded by any of the ILO supervisory bodies in any of the sources selected for the coding. 
− Non- compliance remedied within the same year it was committed. 
- Comments requesting further information or explanation without acknowledging any issue of non-compliance. 
- Comments on draft legislation. 
References to ITUC Reports or reports of other workers’ or employers’ organizations solely if the government 
concerned fully accepts it and it is mentioned in the ILO comment or report and/or if the supervisory body 
acknowledges it. 
References to ITUC Reports or reports of other workers’ or employers’ organizations, if the government 
concerned does not accept it and it is mentioned in the ILO comment or report and/or if the supervisory body 
does not acknowledge it. 
Contradictory evidence, if the contradiction occurs between different sources. Contradictory evidence, if the contradiction occurs within the same source. 
Evidence of non-compliance Evidence of progress and/or good practices 
 
Table 18. General Coding Rules 
3
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C. Coding the additional criteria 
The table below provides the rules on how to code the additional evaluation criteria. The first column lists the additional evaluation criteria; the second column indicates where and how many additional criteria are 
added to the evaluation criteria list. The third column gives the rules with regard to the coding of the additional evaluation criteria. 
Additional evaluation criteria The additional evaluation criterion is added to Coding  
‘Other acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference’ − Each of the main categories of the evaluation criteria61 − Coding is done with regard the main category the non-compliance links to. 
‘Lack of guarantee of due process of law’ 
− Each of the main categories of the evaluation criteria; − Coding is done with regard the main category the non-compliance links to. 
− Each de facto civil liberties evaluation criteria; 
− Anti-union discrimination evaluation criteria; 
− Acts of interference evaluation criteria. 
− Coding is done only with regard the particular criterion the additional criterion is added to. 
‘Committed against leaders of the organization’ 
− Each de facto civil liberties evaluation criteria; 
− Anti-union discrimination evaluation criteria; 
− Imposing excessive sanctions in case of unlawful, but otherwise 
legitimate and peaceful strikes evaluation criterion. 
− Coding is done only with regard the particular criterion the additional criterion is added to. 
 
D. Coding the different factors of non-compliance 
The table below explains the rules established for the coding of cases where an issue of non-compliance links to more evaluation criteria. The first column contains the evaluation criteria concerned. The second 
column lists the criteria which can be coded with the evaluation criterion indicated in the first column. The last column clarifies if the evaluation criteria listed in the first column can be coded on its own, being 
considered a non-compliance per se, or if it can only be coded if the ‘basis non-compliance’ was acknowledged by the supervisory bodies. 
Evaluation criterion The evaluation criterion can be coded with Coding on its own 
‘Lack of guarantee of due process of law’ 
The ‘basis non-compliance’ and/or the criterion of ‘committed against 
leader of the organizations’ 
Yes 
‘Committed against leaders of the organization’ 
The ‘basis non-compliance’  and/or the criterion of ‘lack of guarantee 
of due process of law’ 
No, only either with the ‘basis non-compliance’ and/or with the criterion ‘lack of due process 
of law’ 
‘Severity (widespread and/or systematic) The ‘basis non-compliance’  No, only with the ‘basis non-compliance’  
‘Acts of interference during the course of strike actions’ (de 
facto) 
The de facto evaluation criterion of: 
- ‘murder or disappearance of trade unionists’; 
- ‘other violent actions against trade unionists’; 
- ‘arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of trade 
unionists’. 
Yes 
‘Infringement of the right to establish and join 
federations/confederations/ 
International organizations’ 
 
Not applicable 
Yes, including: 
- General prohibition to establish federations/confederations and to affiliate with 
international organizations 
- Exclusion/restriction from the right to establish and join federations/confederations and to 
affiliate with international organizations 
- Previous authorization requirements to establish federations/confederations and to 
affiliate with international organizations. 
 
61
 There are, however, two exceptions from this rule: additional criterion ‘other acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference‘ is not used in the categories of 
‘fundamental civil liberties‘ and in none of the categories related to employers‘ organizations. 
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2. Source-specific Coding Rules 
2.1. Introduction 
The following section describes the rules governing the coding of the sources selected for 
the present method.
 
The section is constructed in a manner in which the same structure is 
applied when dealing with each of the sources. In general, the first part provides a short 
introduction with regard to the source itself, including a reference to the URL
62
 where the 
relevant source can be found. In the following parts, the document explains the rules for 
choosing the particular source relevant for the year examined and the rules guiding their 
actual coding. 
As noted above, in the framework of the present method, the observed issues on non-
compliance are identified by coding the following sources: 
 
a: Comments made by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR comments); 
b: Reports from the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards (Conference 
Committee Reports); 
c: Country baselines under the ILO Declaration Annual Review (Country Baselines); 
d: Representation under article 24 of the ILO Constitution (Representations); 
e: Commissions of inquiry appointed under article 26 of the ILO Constitution 
(Complaints); 
f: Committee on Freedom of Association cases (CFA cases); 
g: National legislation. 
Note that as no final decision has been made on the frequency of the coding, rules 
explained below reflect the situation in which the coding would be done on an annual 
basis.
63
 
 
 
 
62
 The URL links provided in the present document were accessed and active during the period of 
July – Sep. 2010. 
63
 See footnote No. 48. 
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2.2. Comments made by the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations (CEACR comments)64 
– ‘a’ 
Source 
Established in 1926, the CEACR, being part of the ILO‘s Regular Supervisory System,65 
represents the legal body responsible for the examination of compliance by ILO member 
States with the international labour standards. It is composed of twenty independent jurists 
appointed by the Governing Body for renewable periods of three years. The bases of the 
examination are the reports sent by the governments on those Conventions the country has 
ratified, as well as comments provided from workers‘ and employers‘ organizations. As 
regards the eight fundamental and four priority conventions, these reports are required 
every two years, while all the other conventions are requested every five years.
66
 
The CEACR adopts its report annually.
67
 When examining the application of international 
labour standards, the CEACR provides two kinds of comments: (i) observations, 
containing comments on fundamental questions raised by the application of a particular 
convention by a country, and (ii) direct requests, relating to more technical questions or 
requesting for further information. While observations are published in the Committee‘s 
annual report, direct requests, without being published in the report, are communicated 
directly to the governments concerned. The Committee meets once a year. 
 
 
 
 
 
64
 The Sub-Section is based on the following sources: 
ILO (2009c, pp. 80-81); also available at: 
http://www.ilo.int/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/publication/wcms_108393.pdf (accessed 15 Sep. 2010) 
http://www.ilo.int/global/What_we_do/InternationalLabourStandards/ApplyingandpromotingIntern
ationalLabourStandards/CommitteeofExperts/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 15 Sep. 2010). 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/ceacre.htm (accessed 15 Sep. 2010). 
65
 The ILO Regular Supervisory System consists of the CEACR, on the one hand, and the 
Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations on the other hand. 
66
 As noted earlier, the exceptions from this rule are the conventions that have been ―shelved‖, 
which are no longer supervised on a regular basis. Furthermore it should also be noted that reports 
on the application of conventions may be requested at shorter intervals. 
67
 The CEACR‘s annual report consists of three parts: Part I. General report, which includes the 
comments about member states‘ respect for their Constitutional obligations and highlights from the 
observations; Part II., which provides observations on the application of international labour 
standards; Part III., which includes the General Survey. 
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Box 4 
Links for the CEACR comments (accessed 31 Aug. 2010) 
1. Application of International Labour Standards (Lybsind): Reports and cases of the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) 
and comments from the CEACR regarding Conventions Nos. 87 and 98. 
http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/libsynd/index.cfm?Lang=EN&hdroff=1 
2. Database on International Labour Standards (ILOLEX): ILOLEX is a database containing ILO Conventions and Recommendations, 
ratification information, comments of the CEACR and the CFA, representations, complaints, interpretations, General Surveys, and 
numerous related documents. Besides, its ‘Advanced Query Form’ (see second link) offers a particularly useful database portal. 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/index.htm 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/iloquery.htm 
3. NATLEX Country Profiles: The database brings together information on national labour law and the application of international 
labour standards in one portal. 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/country_profiles.home?p_lang=en 
Coding rule for choosing the source relevant for the year examined 
For the CEACR comments, the year of adoption and the year of publication differs. It was 
therefore decided that these comments shall be coded under the year the observation/direct 
request was made and not under the year it was published. 
For example: if the year examined is 2008, comments to be coded are the ones made 
in 2008 and published in 2009. 
Rules of coding 
As noted above with regard to the eight fundamental and four priority conventions, reports 
are required every two years from governments. Consequently, whereas the coding of the 
source is proposed to be done for all member States on an annual basis, comments 
regarding the eight fundamental and four priority conventions are, as a rule,
68
 provided 
only biannually for any given country by the CEACR. However, as this does not 
necessarily imply that comments made in the reporting year are not relevant for the 
following non-reporting year, it was decided that for those years where no report is 
required and therefore no comments are made by the Committee, the same comments 
adopted for the previous year should be considered applicable. In cases when the country 
complies with the Committee‘s comment in the meantime, this will be indicated under the 
subsequent coding, i.e. by not coding the issue of non-compliance. 
For example: if the reporting year is 2008, no comments are provided by the CEACR 
for 2009. Therefore, comments adopted in 2008 should be applied as one and the same for 
both years. However, for the year 2010, comments adopted in 2010 should be coded. 
As regards the content of the CEACR comments, as noted under the general coding rules, 
those observations and direct requests where the Committee requests further information or 
explanation, without giving a statement on the issue at hand, are not coded as issues of 
non-compliance. Cases where the Committee provides comment on draft legislation are 
also not coded as issues of non-compliance. It should be noted, however, that the actual 
coding does not distinguish between comments made in the form of observation and 
 
68
 Reports on the application of conventions may be requested at shorter intervals. 
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comments provided in the form of direct request. This is because the coding rules per se 
reflect on the differences between the content of these two types of comments (see above). 
Regarding references made to International Trade Union Confederation‘s (ITUC) reports 
on trade union rights‘ violations or to reports of other workers‘ and employers‘ 
organizations, the above listed general coding rule remains: these can only be coded as an 
issue of non-compliance if the given government has already acknowledged the criticism 
and this is mentioned in the Committee‘s comment or the Committee acknowledged it as 
an issue of non-compliance. This is because these reports as a whole are not subject to 
revision by any of the ILO supervisory bodies and the CEACR usually refers to these 
issues non-compliance only together with a request for the governments to send their 
observations on the alleged issues. 
Notwithstanding the general clarity of the CEACR reports, in cases when the Committee 
solely refers back to previously made comments without elaborating on the issue, reading 
of the comments from previous years may become necessary. 
2.3. Reports from the Conference Committee on 
the Application of Standards (Conference 
Committee reports)69 – ‘b’ 
Source 
The Committee on the Application of Standards is a specialised tripartite standing 
committee of the International Labour Conference (ILC), made up of governments‘, 
employers‘ and workers‘ delegates. Being part of the ILO Regular Supervisory System, it 
is formed at each session of the ILC to examine the report adopted by the CEACR in the 
December preceding the session. Based on this report, the Conference Committee selects 
for discussion a number of observations made by the CEACR on the application of a 
particular convention by an ILO member State. Governments referred to in these selected 
observations are invited to respond before the Conference Committee and to provide 
information on the issue in question. Based on the tripartite discussion, the Conference 
Committee draws up conclusions recommending that governments take specific steps to 
remedy a problem or to invite ILO missions or technical assistance. 
The discussions and the subsequent conclusions adopted by the Conference Committee are 
published in its report, submitted to the ILC. The report has two parts: Part One on the 
general discussion (General Report); and Part Two on the discussion of the CEACR 
observations.
70
 
 
 
69
 The Sub-Section is based on the following sources: 
http://www.ilo.int/global/What_we_do/InternationalLabourStandards/ApplyingandpromotingIntern
ationalLabourStandards/CCAS/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 15 Sep. 2010) 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/ilccre.htm (accessed 15 Sep. 2010). 
70
 At the time of the writing of the present paper the Conference Committee‘s report also contained 
a separate part on the ―Special sitting to examine developments concerning the question of the 
observance by the Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)‖. 
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Box 5 
Links for the Conference Committee reports (accessed 31 Aug. 2010) 
1. Database on International Labour Standards (ILOLEX): ILOLEX is a database containing ILO Conventions and 
Recommendations, ratification information, comments of the CEACR and the CFA, representations, complaints, interpretations, 
General Surveys, and numerous related documents. Besides, its ‘Advanced Query Form’ (see second link) offers a particularly 
useful database portal. 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/index.htm 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/iloquery.htm 
 
To obtain the Conference Committee’s report relevant for the year evaluated (e.g. 2008), the subsequent year (e.g. 2009) should be 
selected in the Query Form. 
2. NATLEX Country Profiles: The database brings together information on national labour law and the application of international 
labour standards in one portal. 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/country_profiles.home?p_lang=en 
Coding rule for choosing the source relevant for the year examined 
Unlike the comments made by the CEACR, reports of the Conference Committee are 
adopted and published in the same year. However, as the Conference Committee bases its 
examination on the CEACR annual report, adopted in the previous December, the 
corresponding year for the comments of the Conference Committee is the year that follows 
the adoption of the CEARC's report (the year evaluated). 
For example: When evaluating the year 2008,  the relevant report is the one adopted and 
published by the 98
th
 Session of the ILC, held in 2009, as that is the report that reflects on 
the comments made by the CEACR in 2008. 
Rules of coding 
The Conference Committee provides an opportunity for representatives of governments, 
employers and workers to jointly examine the manner in which States fulfil their 
obligations deriving from international labour standards. Taking into account the special 
characteristics of this source arising from the interactive nature of the discussions (e.g. 
including general comments made by the government, employers‘ or workers‘ delegates 
rather than exact statements, or containing contradictory information given by the different 
participants of the discussion) it was decided to code only those comments that are not 
contradictory and are consistent with the final conclusion of the Conference Committee. 
Although information is provided by the representatives of governments, employers and 
workers, the coding rules are applicable irrespective of who provides the information. 
Draft legislation, similarly to the rules relative to the CEACR comments, should not be 
coded. Likewise, references made to ITUC or other workers‘ or employers‘ organizations‘ 
reports can only be coded as an issue of non-compliance if the government acknowledges 
the criticism or if the Conference Committee acknowledged it as an issue of non-
compliance. 
Conversely, as the report of the Conference Committee does not deal systematically with 
all the countries examined by the CEACR, merely with those where ―it would appear 
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desirable to invite government to provide information to the Conference Committee‖,71 
only comments adopted and published regarding the year evaluated should be taken into 
consideration. Previously made comments are not coded under the year evaluated, 
particularly because in some cases there is a significant interval between reports adopted 
vis-à-vis the same country. 
2.4. Country baselines under the ILO Declaration 
Annual Review (Country Baselines)72 – ‘c’ 
Source 
Being part of the ILO1998 Declaration, the follow-up procedure aims to support the 
commitment of member States to respect and promote principles and rights in four 
categories, irrespective of whether they have ratified the relevant ILO Convention (See 
Part I. Section 6). Under the follow-up procedure to the 1998 Declaration, member States 
that have not ratified one or more of the eight core Conventions are asked to report 
annually on the status of the relevant rights and principles within their country with the aim 
to inform the needs/challenges of the member States, the actions undertaken and the results 
achieved in the promotion of the fundamental principles and rights at work. These annual 
reports are presented in the form of Country Baselines. 
Box 6 
Link for the Country Baselines (accessed 31 Aug. 2010) 
Current compilation of country baselines: 
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/follow-up/annualreview/countrybaselines/lang--en/index.htm 
Coding rule for choosing the source relevant for the year examined 
As the compilation of the annual reports provided by the member States is carried out 
every year, Country Baselines are up-dated annually. This at the same time entails that the 
new Country Baseline replaces and integrates the previous baselines. Therefore, the coding 
should always be done with regard to the current compilation of Country Baselines, even 
though, only information provided before and pertaining to the year evaluated should be 
coded. 
For example: in case the coding is done based on the Country Baseline (2000-10) but for 
the year of 2008, only information provided before and for the year of 2008 should be 
coded. Information provided for the years of 2009-10 cannot be taken into account during 
the coding of the year 2008. 
 
71
 ILO (2009b, p. v), also available at: 
http://www2.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/publication/wcms_116491.pdf (accessed 15 Sep. 2010). 
72
 The Sub-Section is based on the following sources: 
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 15 Sep. 2010) 
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/follow-up/annualreview/countrybaselines/lang--en/index.htm 
(accessed 15 Sep. 2010). 
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Rules of coding 
As Baselines are based on multiple elements (e.g. governments‘ reports, observations by 
employers‘ and workers‘ organizations, observations/recommendations by the ILO 
Declaration Expert-Advisers), dealing with the different parts of the document requires 
that different approaches be taken. 
The main rules are the followings: First, if the information provided by the Baseline relates 
to national legislation, regardless of the year under which it is provided, it should be coded, 
if it is still applicable. This means if there is new information afterwards that would differ 
from the previous information, only the new information should be coded. Second, if the 
information links to issues other than national legislation (e.g. policy measures, de facto 
issues of non-compliance, etc.), only the information provided under the year evaluated 
should be coded. 
References to ITUC or other workers‘ or employers‘ organizations‘ reports shall not be 
coded. Information regarding these comments in the Baseline is usually provided not for 
one specific year but for a period, and since the Baseline summarizes rather than provides 
the full text of the paragraphs of the ITUC reports, it would be difficult to capture precise 
information relevant for the year evaluated. The only possible way of reflecting on these 
comments is if the government‘s reply, included in the fourth part of the Baseline, 
acknowledges the alleged issue of non-compliance. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that since the wording of the Baseline does not always 
reach the level of precision required by the coding, in certain cases the coder should rely 
on the national legislation in order to code the issue of non-compliance with confidence. 
Furthermore, it must also be taken into consideration that there are parts of the Baseline 
(e.g. Reporting; Observations by the Social Partners; Technical Cooperation) which, by 
nature of the subject, do not contain information relevant for the coding. 
Table 19 below indicates the specific rules applicable for the different parts of the 
Baseline, specifying the year that should be coded: (i) the year evaluated or (ii) all the 
years for which information is provided. 
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Table 19. Coding rules relating to the different parts of the Baseline73 
Part of the Baseline Part of the Baseline Year to be coded 
Reporting Fulfilment of Government’s reporting 
obligations 
Year evaluated Involvement of Employers’ and 
Workers’ organizations in the 
reporting process 
Observations by the Social Partners Employers’ organizations 
Year evaluated 
Workers’ organizations 
Efforts and progress made in realizing 
the principle and right 
Ratification Year evaluated 
Recognition of the  principles and right 
(prospects(s), means of action, basic 
legal provisions) 
All years 
Exercise of the principle and right All years 
Monitoring, enforcements and 
sanctions mechanisms 
All years 
Involvements of the social partners Year evaluated 
Promotional activities Year evaluated 
Special initiatives/Progress Year evaluated 
Challenges in realizing the principle and 
right 
According to the social partners Year evaluated 
According to the Government Year evaluated 
Technical Cooperation Request 
Year evaluated 
Offer 
Expert-Advisers’ 
observations/recommendations 
 Year evaluated 
Governing Body 
Observations/Recommendations 
 Year evaluated 
 
 
73
 The names of the ‗parts of the baseline‘ are identical to the ones in the first two columns in the 
‗Country Baselines under the 1998 ILO Declaration Annual Review‘, see for example: 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
declaration/documents/publication/wcms_091262.pdf (accessed 15 Sep. 2010). 
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2.5. Representation under article 24 of the ILO 
Constitution (Representations)74 – ‘d’ 
Source 
The representation procedure is governed by articles 24 and 25 of the ILO Constitution. It 
grants to workers' or employers' organizations the right to present to the ILO Governing 
Body a representation against any member State which, in their view, "has failed to secure 
in any respect the effective observance within its jurisdiction of any Convention of which 
it is a party".
75
 A tripartite committee of three members of the Governing Body may be 
established to examine the representation and the response of the government. The report 
of the tripartite committee states the legal and practical aspects of the case, examines the 
information submitted and provides recommendations. Upon adoption of the report, the 
Governing Body passes the case to the CEACR for follow-up on the country‘s compliance 
with the findings of the tripartite committee. 
It should be noted that representations concerning the application of Conventions Nos. 87 
and 98 are referred to the CFA for examination. 
Box 7 
Links for the Representations (accessed 31 Aug. 2010) 
1. Database on International Labour Standards (ILOLEX): ILOLEX is a database containing ILO Conventions and 
Recommendations, ratification information, comments of the CEACR and the CFA, representations, complaints, interpretations, 
General Surveys, and numerous related documents. Besides, its ‘Advanced Query Form’ (see second link) offers a particularly 
useful database portal. 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/index.htm 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/iloquery.htm 
 
2. List of representations under article 24 of the ILO Constitution 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/repframeE.htm 
3. NATLEX Country Profiles: The database brings together information on national labour law and the application of international 
labour standards in one portal. 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/country_profiles.home?p_lang=en 
 
 
74
 The Sub-Section is based on the following sources: 
ILO (2009c, pp. 84-85); available at: 
http://www.ilo.int/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/publication/wcms_108393.pdf (accessed 15 Sep. 2010) 
http://www.ilo.int/global/What_we_do/InternationalLabourStandards/ApplyingandpromotingIntern
ationalLabourStandards/Representations/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 15 Sep. 2010) 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/art2426e.htm (accessed 15 Sep. 2010). 
75
 Article 24 of the ILO Constitution. 
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Coding rule for choosing the source relevant for the year examined 
Representations are coded under the year the report of the tripartite committee is 
published,
76
 not under the year the representation is submitted. This is because the final 
report provides the conclusion and the recommendations of the tripartite committee, which 
– as will be explained below - serves as the basis of the coding on its own. Previous 
documents adopted by the Governing Body subsequent to the submission of the 
representation are interim technical/procedural documents reporting on the status of the 
representation procedure bear no reference to the substance of the case. 
Nevertheless, in case the representation is referred for examination to the CFA, rules 
governing the selection of the relevant sources in relation to the cases brought before the 
CFA should be applied (see below). 
Rules of coding 
As noted above, coding is done exclusively regarding the conclusion and recommendations 
of the final report of the tripartite committee. Given that the present method only aims to 
compile the already existing information generated by the ILO‘s supervisory mechanism, 
the coding rules had to reflect on what the tripartite committee observed based on the 
information provided, not the provided information per se. Obviously, allegations and 
statements made by the parties should also be reviewed for a better understanding. 
However, these allegations/statements cannot serve as the basis of coding as that would 
require a rather subjective interpretation from the evaluator. 
Should the representation be referred to the CFA, the rules governing the coding of the 
CFA cases ought to be followed (see below). Nonetheless, in order to satisfy the key 
premise of transparency, the decision was made that issues of non-compliance recorded by 
the CFA in cases referred to it by the Governing Body should be coded with the letter ‗f‘, 
therefore allowing that these be traced back to the source where the evidence is recorded. 
Applying the same reasoning, when the Governing Body passes the case to the CEACR for 
the follow-up on the country‘s compliance with the findings of the tripartite committee, 
comments made by the CEACR should be coded with the letter ‗a‘. 
 
76
 As regards Representations, the final report is adopted and published under the same year. 
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2.6. Commissions of inquiry appointed under 
article 26 of the ILO Constitution 
(Complaints)77 – ‘e’ 
Source 
The complaint procedure is governed by articles 26 to 34 of the ILO Constitution. A 
complaint may be filed either by a member State invoking the non-compliance of another 
member State with a Convention that both have ratified, a delegate to the ILC or ex officio 
by the Governing Body. In case a member State is accused of committing persistent and 
serious violations and has repeatedly refused to address them, the Governing Body may, 
subsequent to the filing of a complaint, form an ad hoc Commission of Inquiry comprising 
three independent members. The Commission of Inquiry, as the ILO‘s highest-level 
investigative procedure, is responsible for carrying out a full investigation of the complaint 
and for making recommendations concerning the measures to be taken to address the 
issues raised by the complaint.
78
 The report of the Commission of Inquiry is submitted to 
the Governing Body. 
Within a period of three months, the government must indicate to the Director-General of 
the ILO whether or not it accepts the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry. In 
the event it does not accept them, the government may submit the case to the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), whose decision shall be final. However, in case the government 
refuses to fulfill the recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry or the ICJ, the 
Governing Body, in virtue of article 33 of the ILO Constitution, can take action ―as it may 
deem wise and expedient to secure compliance therewith‖.79 
In the event the government accepts the recommendations, the Governing Body passes the 
case to the CEACR or the CFA (or both) for follow-up on the country‘s compliance with 
the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry. If the government appeals the 
decision, the follow-up is assured following the decision by the ICJ. 
 
77
 The Sub-Section is based on the following sources: 
ILO (2009c, pp. 86-87); also available at: 
http://www.ilo.int/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/publication/wcms_108393.pdf (accessed 15 Sep. 2010) 
http://www.ilo.int/global/What_we_do/InternationalLabourStandards/ApplyingandpromotingIntern
ationalLabourStandards/Complaints/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 15 Sep. 2010) 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/art2426e.htm (accessed 15 Sep. 2010). 
78
 For more, see: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/art2426e.htm (accessed 15 Sep. 2010). 
79
 Article 33 states the following: "[i]n the event of any Member failing to carry out within the time 
specified the recommendations, if any, contained in the report of the Commission of Inquiry, or in 
the decision of the International Court of Justice, as the case may be, the Governing Body may 
recommend to the Conference such action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance 
therewith." Also available at: 
http://www.ilo.int/global/What_we_do/InternationalLabourStandards/ApplyingandpromotingIntern
ationalLabourStandards/Complaints/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 15 Sep. 2010) 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/art2426e.htm (accessed 15 Sep. 2010). 
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Similar to representations, complaints concerning the application of Conventions Nos. 87 
and 98 may be referred to the CFA for examination, pending a final decision on the 
establishment of a Commission of Inquiry. 
Box 8 
Links for the Complaints (accessed 31 Aug. 2010) 
1. Database on International Labour Standards (ILOLEX): ILOLEX is a database containing ILO Conventions and 
Recommendations, ratification information, comments of the CEACR and the CFA, representations, complaints, interpretations, 
General Surveys, and numerous related documents. Besides, its ‘Advanced Query Form’ (see second link) offers a particularly 
useful database portal. 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/index.htm 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/iloquery.htm 
2. List of Commissions of Inquiry 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/INQUIRY.htm 
3. NATLEX Country Profiles: The database brings together information on national labour law and the application of international 
labour standards in one portal. 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/country_profiles.home?p_lang=en 
Coding rule for choosing the source relevant for the year examined 
Complaints should be coded under the year the report of the Commission of Inquiry is 
published,
80
 not under the year the complaint is submitted. The underlying rational remains 
unchanged: the final report provides the conclusion and the recommendations of the 
Commission of Inquiry, serving as its own the basis of the examination and coding, while 
previously adopted documents pertaining to the complaint are merely interim technical and 
procedural documents reporting solely on the status of the complaint procedure. 
However, this method can only be applied if the government accepts the recommendations 
of the Commission of Inquiry within the available period of three months. In the event the 
government appeals to the International Court of Justice, then the basis of the coding 
should be the decision of the Court and, therefore, the observed issue of non-compliance 
should only be coded under the year the ICJ adopts its decision. 
If the complaint is referred for examination to the CFA, rules governing the selection of 
the relevant sources in relation to the cases brought before the CFA should be applied (see 
below). 
Rules of coding 
With regard to the rules guiding the coding of the complaints, the above described rules 
concerning the coding of representations are likewise applicable. Therefore the coding 
should be done exclusively regarding the conclusion and recommendations of the report of 
the Commission of Inquiry or of the decision of the ICJ, if the government appeals against 
the recommendations to the ICJ. Similar to the representations, allegations and statements 
made by the parties should also be reviewed. These allegations and statements cannot, 
however, serve as the basis of the coding for the reasons indicated previously. 
 
80
 As regards Complaints, the final report is adopted and published under the same year. 
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Should the complaint be referred to the CFA, the rules governing the coding of the CFA 
cases is to be followed (see below). However, as was explained with regard to 
representations, issues of non-compliance recorded by the CFA in cases referred to it by 
the Governing Body should be coded with ‗f‘, so as to meet the requirement of 
transparency. For the same reason, once the Governing Body passes the case to the 
CEACR or CFA (or both) for the follow-up of the country‘s compliance with the 
recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry or the decision adopted by the ICJ, 
comments made by the CEACR or CFA should be coded with letter ‗a‘ or ‗f‘, respectively. 
2.7. Committee on Freedom of Association Cases 
(CFA cases)81 – ‘f’ 
Source 
The CFA is a tripartite body that was set up in 1951 by the Governing Body with the 
purpose of examining complaints alleging violations of freedom of association. Allegations 
may be brought against a member State by employers‘ and workers‘ organizations, 
irrespective of the ratification of the relevant convention by the country concerned. Having 
a tripartite structure, the CFA is composed of nine members and nine deputies from the 
government, workers‘ and employers‘ groups of the Governing Body, and has an 
independent chairperson. 
The CFA meets three times a year. Based on the examination of the allegations submitted, 
the CFA makes recommendations to the governments through the Governing Body on how 
the situation could be remedied. In cases where the country has ratified the relevant 
instruments, legislative aspects of the case may be referred to the CEACR for follow-up. 
The CFA may also choose to propose an ILO mission to assist in resolving the problem 
directly with government officials and the social partners. 
The reports of the CFA are submitted to the Governing Body for approval and published in 
the ILO Official Bulletin. 
Box 9 
Link for the CFA cases (accessed 31 Aug. 2010) 
Application of International Labour Standards (Lybsind): Reports and cases of the CFA and comments from the CEACR regarding 
Conventions No. 87 and 98. 
http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/libsynd/index.cfm?Lang=EN&hdroff=1 
 
 
81
 The Sub-Section is based on the following sources: 
ILO (2009c, pp. 88-89); also available at: 
http://www.ilo.int/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/publication/wcms_108393.pdf (accessed 15 Sep. 2010) 
http://www.ilo.int/global/What_we_do/InternationalLabourStandards/ApplyingandpromotingIntern
ationalLabourStandards/CFA/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 15 Sep. 2010) 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/cfae.htm (accessed 15 Sep. 2010). 
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Coding rule for choosing the source relevant for the year examined 
The coding of the cases brought before the CFA brings to surface the complexities 
stemming from the procedure itself. As the CFA reports are case-driven, where cases may 
proceed for years without the adoption of a definitive report that would close the case, 
clear rules are needed on how to select the reports and information relevant for the coding. 
The general rules for the coding of CFA cases are, first, that evidence can only be coded if 
the CFA makes a recommendation consistent with the complaint in any of the reports
82
 
and, second, that issues of non-compliance should always be coded for the year evaluated 
and not for the year the allegation was submitted.
83
 Concerning the latter, while this rule is 
based on the assumption that as long as the case is open, the non-compliance is still active, 
there is also a practical reason for doing so, as coding the information in a retroactive 
manner would make the coding process cumbersome and less transparent. 
Concerning the selection of the relevant report, the main rule is that all cases for which a 
CFA report is provided under the year evaluated should be considered, regardless of the 
year of submission or the actual status of the case. This means that not only the closed 
cases, but also the follow-up and active (i.e. ongoing) cases are examined and coded. 
For example: If countries are evaluated for the year 2008, all cases for which a report was 
adopted in 2008 should be coded, even if, for instance, the case was submitted in 2006 and 
closed in 2008 (closed case) or closed only in 2010 (ongoing case). 
Furthermore, given that the reports of the CFA have either a more technical content in 
which the Committee does not discuss the substance of the case (e.g. reports on urgent 
appeals, on the arrival of new cases, on observations requested from governments and/or 
complainants, on received observations, etc.) or a content that provides recommendations 
that specifically focus on the substance, only reports that deal with the substance of the 
case will be coded. 
Considering that the CFA meets three times a year, the situation may arise when in the 
same year the Committee provides more than one report on the substance of the same case. 
In such situation the main rule is that all recommendations that are consistent with the 
complaint should be coded, even if a subsequent report adopted in the same year 
acknowledges that the government met the recommendations of the CFA. Compliance 
with a recommendation will be reflected by not coding the issue of non-compliance for the 
following year. 
Rules of coding 
As indicated, the basic rule for coding CFA cases is that an issue of non-compliance can 
only be coded if the Committee makes a recommendation consistent with the complaint. In 
addition, issues of non-compliance that did not directly originate from the allegation but 
which were nevertheless admitted and ascertained by the CFA should also be coded. 
Furthermore, since the coding aims to code only recommendations made by the CFA, 
coding is done exclusively regarding the conclusion and recommendations of the CFA 
 
82
 This is the same rule that was applied in the previous method. See Kucera (2007c, p. 151). 
83
 This rule differs from the one used in the previous method, where issues of non-compliance were 
always coded for the year the allegation was submitted. See Kucera (2007c, p. 151). 
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Report. Allegations and statements made by the complainant and by the government 
should also be reviewed, but these statements cannot serve as the basis of the coding. The 
most important reason behind this approach is that, as was noted above, the method does 
not aim to provide new or differing information on countries‘ compliance, but to compile 
the already existing information generated by the supervisory system. Allegations and 
replies of the parties can both contain information not necessarily admitted by the CFA. 
Another key coding rule is that only recommendations provided in the year evaluated (e.g. 
2008) should be coded, and report(s) provided in the previous years (e.g. in 2006, 2007) 
should not be applied.
84
 However, with regard to on-going cases, if the CFA does not adopt 
any report on the substance of the case for the year evaluated, the latest recommendations 
made by the CFA should be considered as applicable. 
From the viewpoint of content, the CFA cases can be divided into two groups. The first 
group includes cases which contain only de facto issues of non-compliance, while the 
second group includes cases that – either together or without de facto non-compliance – 
contain de jure issues of non-compliance. 
In cases of de jure non-compliance, the above described system can, for the most part, 
work without further problems. In other words, once the de jure non-compliance, 
consistent with the allegation is acknowledged by the CFA, the non-compliance is to be 
coded under each successive report adopted by the CFA, pending the Government‘s 
compliance with the Committee‘s recommendation(s). 
The difficulties mainly occur in case of de facto issues of non-compliance. If the report 
examined is a definitive report (one which closes a case) the non-compliance can be coded 
without further questions based on the final recommendations of the CFA. However, in 
active and follow-up cases (examined under ―Interim Report‖, ―Report where effect given 
to the Recommendations of the Committee and the Governing Body‖ or in ―Report in 
which the Committee requests to be kept informed of developments‖) the allegations are 
still pending without final statement from the side of the CFA. In these cases the CFA 
usually requests the government (or sometimes the alleging party) to, for instance, provide 
further information, to provide their comments regarding a certain question, to establish an 
independent inquiry to examine the allegations or to provide the CFA with the final 
judgement made by the national Court. In these cases, the CFA is either waiting for 
sufficient information to decide on the case, and therefore the alleged non-compliance 
cannot be coded yet, or, as regards follow-up cases, monitors the steps taken by the 
government concerned to comply with the CFA‘s recommendations. Nevertheless both 
cases have to be considered during the coding, especially as those can already provide 
codable findings of the CFA. 
There is, however, one specific issue of non-compliance that can and should be coded even 
without being alleged or without the CFA acknowledging the initially alleged non-
compliance (‗basis non-compliance‘, see Part II. Sub-Section 1.5.): „lack of guarantee of 
due process of law‟. As an example, assume that the allegation is discriminatory dismissal 
committed in 1994. In 1996, the CFA already noted that ‗justice delayed is justice denied‘, 
expressing the issue of non-compliance in relation to due process of law, considering the 
time that has elapsed since the alleged incident to be too long. Therefore, this non-
compliance could already be coded under „lack of guarantee of due process of law‟ for the 
year of 1996. Next, in 1999, the CFA made a recommendation consistent with the 
complaint – thus acknowledging the alleged issue of non-compliance in relation to the anti-
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 In spite of this, reading the preceding Reports adopted by the CFA is essential to grasp the alleged 
non-compliance and the underlying circumstances. 
 52 Working Paper No. 99 
union discriminatory dismissal – and requested the reinstatement of the dismissed worker. 
This means that for the year 1999 the non-compliance should be coded under two 
evaluation criteria, under ‗de facto discriminatory dismissal/suspension because of trade 
union membership/legitimate activities‘ and under ‗de facto lack of guarantee of due 
process of law‘. If in 2000, since the worker has not yet been reinstated, the CFA repeats 
its recommendation, the non-compliance should again be coded under both evaluation 
criteria. Were the CFA to again repeat its recommendation in the year 2003, the same non-
compliance should again be coded and so on. 
In addition, in cases where the given Government repeatedly fails to reply, even after 
urgent appeals by the CFA, the method was chosen to record the issue by copying the 
notice made by the CFA on it in the attached supplementary document. (Annex II-III) 
2.8. National legislation – ‘g’ 
Source 
As noted above (Part I. Section 6), concerning national legislation, the determining rule is 
that national legislation is used only with regard to member States that have not ratified 
either or both of the two fundamental Conventions, and only as a complementary source to 
the Country Baselines. 
Dealing with this source, it was necessary to decide how to define national legislation in 
the frame of the present method. Although the information indicated in the Country 
Baselines provides a good starting point on the relevant legal sources existing at the 
national level, a working definition fulfilling a number of prerequisites had to be adopted. 
Bearing in mind the diversity that exists between countries, the definition had to be broad 
enough to account for considerable differences. At the same time, it also needed to be valid 
across the jurisdictions, while simultaneously, being consistent across countries. One of the 
main issues was whether collective agreements or other model agreements should be 
considered as possible sources for national legislation. Taking into account their restricted 
applicability,
85
 the difficulties that could arise from the lack of accessibility of or 
information on these agreements, and the possibly large number of such agreements, it was 
decided that collective or other model agreements will not be assessed under the source of 
national legislation. The sole exception is national level general collective agreements, 
being applicable throughout the whole jurisdiction. 
All things considered, it was opted that for the present coding method national legislation 
shall mean national level general collective agreements and (other) legal sources created by 
legislative authorities that are in effect and are applicable to and binding on all 
workers/employers or – based on statutory exemption - a specific type of worker/employer 
within the national jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
85
 For example, they may only cover workers belonging to the same employer in case of enterprise-
level collective agreements. 
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Box 10 
Links for the national legislation (accessed 31 Aug. 2010) 
1. Current compilation of country baselines: 
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/follow-up/annualreview/countrybaselines/lang--en/index.htm 
2. NATLEX: Database of national labour, social security and related human rights legislation maintained by the ILO's International 
Labour Standards Department. Records in NATLEX provide abstracts of legislation and relevant citation information, and they are 
indexed by keywords and by subject classifications. 
NATLEX Country Profiles: The database brings together information on national labour law and the application of international labour 
standards in one portal. 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/country_profiles.byCountry?p_lang=en 
3. National Labour Law Profiles: Produced by ILO Industrial and Employment Relations Department of the ILO (DIALOGUE), the 
National Labour Law Profiles intend to provide a rapid overview of the labour law in a number of ILO member States. Their purpose is 
to facilitate a general understanding of how the labour law works in each country, and to provide easy access to information on a 
number of topics. However, the profiles do not intend to give a comprehensive description of the labour law in any country. 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/info/national/index.htm 
Coding rule for choosing the source relevant for the year examined 
Alongside using the information provided in the Country Baselines, the following issues 
should be considered in the selection of the relevant national legislation. As the sources 
relating to freedom of association and collective bargaining constitute only a part of a 
broader national legislation, the first issue arising is the selection of the legal sources 
relevant to freedom of association and collective bargaining. The second issue is to find the 
relevant legislation that is at the same time the one that is in effect in the country. Together 
with the Country Baselines, the database provided by NATLEX or other relevant ILO 
documentation (e.g. National Labour Law Profiles under Dialogue) proved to be a useful 
information source. However, one should bear in mind the possible limits of these 
databases (e.g. not necessarily covering all the relevant legislation; not necessarily 
providing the most recent version of the legislation, etc). 
Moreover, reflecting on a situation in which the coding would be done on an annual basis, 
the above described careful selection of the relevant sources would also need to be done 
every year. Again, although the information provided in the annually up-dated Country 
Baselines can serve as a main reference source, national legislation should, if needed, also 
be collected to complement that information. 
Rules of coding 
As regards the actual coding of national legislation, the most important rules are the ones 
relating to the selection of the relevant sources (see above). In general, it should be noted 
that in the process of coding national legislation, the major challenges are posed by the 
incomplete nature of the accessible information sources. Once the sources are selected, the 
coding is relatively straightforward, in comparison with the use of other sources. 
The difficulties mainly arise from the possibly long length of the sources and the 
interpretation of the legal provisions. Therefore, while guided by the information provided 
in the Country Baselines, the coding of national legislation first and foremost requires the 
precise examination and – more importantly – documentation of the evidence found. 
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Table 20 provides the summary of the above explained source-specific coding rules. In 
order to support the process of the actual coding, the aim of the table is to present the rules 
in an easily understandable, user-friendly manner. The first column lists the seven sources 
that were selected for the method. The next columns indicate the rules that correspond to 
the particular source. These are the rules with regard to the coding letters that indicate the 
source in which the evidence is recorded; the rules concerning the collection of the sources 
relevant to the year evaluated (the year to code and the source corresponding to the year); 
and the coding rules relating to the frequency of the coding and to the content of the 
source. 
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Table 20. Source specific Coding Rules 
Source Coding letter 
Year to 
code 
Corresponding 
source 
Coding rules related to the frequency of the coding Coding rules related to the content of the sources 
a: CEACR comments 
 a 
Year 
evaluated 
Year the 
comments are 
made 
− - Coding is done annually and for all countries.  
− - As comments are provided biannually, for the year 
where no comments are made, comments adopted for 
the previous year are applicable. 
− - Observations and direct requests are coded based on the same rules.  
− - Comments requesting further information and comments on draft legislation are not coded. 
− - Comments referring to ITUC or other reports are not coded, except if the government acknowledges it, 
and it is mentioned in the CEACR’s comment and/or the CEACR acknowledges it. 
b: Conference 
Committee reports  
 b 
Next year 
after the 
year 
evaluated 
Year of the 
adoption/ 
publication of 
the report 
- - Coding is done annually, but only for countries selected 
by the Committee for the year evaluated. 
− - Only the report adopted regarding the year evaluated is 
coded. Previously made reports are not considered for 
the coding. 
− - Only evidence that is not contradictory and is in line with the Committee’s conclusion is coded. 
− - It is irrelevant which representative provides the information, same coding rules are applicable.    
− - References to draft legislation are not coded. 
− - References to ITUC or other reports are not coded, except if the government acknowledges it, and it is 
mentioned in the Report and/or the Conference Committee acknowledges it. 
c: Country Baselines  
 c 
Year 
evaluated  
- - Coding is done annually, but concerns only countries 
that have not ratified either or both of the two 
fundamental Conventions. 
- - As country baselines are up-dated annually in a way to 
integrate the previous baselines, only information 
provided previously and with regard to the year 
evaluated should be coded. 
− - Different parts of the baseline require different approaches for the coding. 
− - Information relating to legislation is coded regardless of the year under which it is provided. If, however, 
new - evidence is provided afterwards, it should be coded. 
− - Information relating to other issues is coded only if it is provided under the year evaluated. 
− - Contradictory evidence between the different parts of the baseline is not coded. 
− - References to ITUC or other reports and to draft legislation are not coded, except the Government 
acknowledges it in the last part of the Baseline. 
d: Representations  
 d, but 
− - if referred to CFA, it 
is coded with letter 'f';  
− during its follow-up 
by the CEACR, it is 
coded with letter 'a'. 
Year 
evaluated 
Year of the 
adoption/ 
publication of 
the final report, 
but not the year 
of its 
submission 
- - Coding is done only if a final report is 
adopted/published in the year evaluated and only for the 
country concerned.  
− - Only the final report is coded. 
− - Only the conclusion and recommendation is coded. 
− - If the case is referred to the CFA, and during its follow-up by the CEACR, the representation should be 
coded based on the rules applicable for those sources. 
− - Comments on draft legislation are not coded.  
− - References to ITUC or other reports are not coded, except if it is acknowledged in the 
conclusion/recommendations. 
  
e: Complaints 
 e, but  
− - if referred to CFA, it 
is coded with letter 
'f'; during its follow-
up by the CEACR or 
CFA, it is coded with 
letter 'a' or ‘f’, 
respectively. 
Year 
evaluated 
Year of the 
adoption/ 
publication of 
the final report, 
but not the year 
of its 
submission 
- - Coding is done only if a final report is 
adopted/published in the year evaluated and only for the 
country concerned.  
- - Only the final report is coded.  
− - If the case is appealed before the ICJ, the ICJ’s 
decision serves as the basis of the coding. 
− - Only the conclusion and recommendation is coded. 
− - If the case is referred to the CFA and during its follow-up by the CEACR or CFA, it should be coded 
based on the rules applicable for those sources. 
− - If the case is appealed to the ICJ, it should be continued to be coded under the coding rules applicable 
for Complaints. 
− - Comments on draft legislation cannot be coded. 
− - References to ITUC or other reports are not coded, except if it is acknowledged in the 
conclusion/recommendations. 
f: CFA cases 
 f 
Year 
evaluated 
Year of the 
adoption/ 
publication of 
the report 
- - Coding is done annually, but concerns only countries 
whose case is dealt with by the CFA in the year 
evaluated. 
- - Coding is done both for closed, follow-up and active 
cases, but only for report(s) dealing with the substance of 
the case. 
- - If more reports adopted on the substance in the same 
year, all recommendations consistent with the allegation 
are coded. 
− - If no report is adopted on the case for the year 
evaluated, or the report is a technical one, the latest 
report on the substance of the case is applicable. 
− - Only the conclusion and recommendation is coded. 
− - Non-compliance is only coded if the CFA makes recommendation consistent with the complaint.  
− - Non-compliance is always coded for the year evaluated. 
− - Non-compliance that does not originate directly from the allegation, but is ascertained and admitted by 
the CFA is also coded. 
− - Requests for further information/comments or an independent inquiry are not coded.  
− - Cases when the government repeatedly fails to reply are noted in the supplementary document (Annex 
II-III.). 
g: National legislation 
 g 
Year 
evaluated 
n/a 
− The coding is done annually and for those countries that 
have not ratified either or both of the two fundamental 
Conventions. 
− - Coding is based for the most part on the information provided in the Country Baselines. 
− - Coding requires the careful selection of the relevant legal sources that are in effect.  
− - Coding implies the careful examination and documentation of evidences. 
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3. Definitions of the Evaluation Criteria 
The following section provides the detailed ‗definitions‘ for each of the 168 criterion 
(Table 1) by indicating the types of non-compliance that should be coded under the 
evaluation criterion. As explained above (Part I. Section 5), the 168 evaluation criteria 
assess both the rights of workers‘ and employers‘ organizations and are split into de jure 
and de facto issues of non-compliance. 
The structure of the definitions is built on ‗text-boxes‘, providing both (i) the source of the 
definition by referring to the concrete Articles of ILO Constitution and Conventions and 
the relevant paragraphs of the ILO principles; (ii) and the ‗definition‘ itself, listing specific 
quotations from the above sources. 
Box 11 
Sources of the definitions 
In constructing the definitions, the following sources were used86: 
 Constitution of the International Labour Organisation 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/leg/amend/constitution.pdf; 
 ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm; 
 ILO Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm; 
 Freedom of Association: Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of 
the ILO (Digest of decisions and principles) 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/digestq.htm; 
 ILO: Freedom of association and collective bargaining: General Survey of the reports on the Freedom of Association and the 
Right to Organise Convention (No. 87), 1948, and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98) (General 
Survey 1994) 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/surveyq.htm 
Note, that as the ‗definitions‘ of the 168 evaluation criteria are given by listing some 
frequently occurring examples for the specific issue of non-compliance, as identified in the 
ILO textual sources and principles of application, these by no means can be considered an 
exhaustive list of possible issues of non-compliance. Therefore, the illustrative nature of 
the definitions should always be kept in mind, from which the observed issue of non-
compliance may be deduced, strictly consistent with the classification of the ILO 
supervisory mechanism. Moreover, since reference to employers‘ organizations is not 
always explicit in the relevant paragraphs of the ILO principles, definitions provided for 
workers‘ organizations were also used in developing definitions for employers‘ 
organizations. 
 
86
 The URL links provided in the present document were accessed and active during the period of 
July – Sep. 2010. 
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3.1. Issues of non-compliance in relation to trade 
union rights 
Ia. Fundamental civil liberties, de jure 
1. Arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of trade unionists (de jure) 
Paras.
87
 61-95 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 31-32 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows (arbitrary) arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging, 
fining and other heavy criminal sanctions (e.g. education through labour, forced labour) 
for reasons connected with trade union membership and/or legitimate trade union 
activities – even for a short period; 
 Includes legislation that indicates prosecution and sanction for trade union membership 
and/or trade union activities that should be considered legitimate even if the national 
legislation considers it illegal, but the legislation is such as to impair or shall be so applied 
as to impair civil liberties, trade union rights and its guarantees; 
 Includes legislation that allows arrest/mass arrest and detention/preventive detention of 
trade unionists without any charges being laid or court warrants being issued and without 
being accompanied by safeguards; 
 Includes legislation that allows the arrest and sentencing of trade unionists on ground of 
the ―disturbance of public order‖; 
 Includes legislation that imposes sanctions that are not proportionate to the offence or 
fault committed. 
 
2. Infringements of trade unionists' basic freedoms (de jure) 
Paras. 121-175 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 34-39 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes de jure non-compliance with freedom of movement; rights of assembly and 
demonstration; freedom of opinion and expression; 
 Includes legislation that (directly or indirectly) violates freedom of movement of trade 
unionists (Digest, Paras. 121-129.). It includes cases such as: 
- Prohibition for persons to leave any country, including trade unionists‘ own country, and 
to return to his/her country for reasons of trade union membership and/or legitimate 
activities (Digest, Para. 122.); 
- House arrest, surveillance, banishment for trade union membership and/or legitimate 
activities (Digest, Para. 124.); 
- Expulsion of trade unionists from their country for activities connected with the exercise 
 
87
 In the present document ―Para.‖ and ―Paras.‖ refer to paragraph(s) in the Digest of decisions and 
principles (Digest) and in the General Survey 1994 (General Survey). 
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of their functions (Digest, Para. 128.); 
 Includes legislation that is such as to violate trade unionists‘ right for peaceful and 
legitimate assembly and demonstration in pursuit of their legitimate objectives (Digest, 
Paras. 130-153.); 
- Includes prohibition or dissolution of peaceful and legitimate demonstrations that are 
considered to be illegitimate by national legislation, but the national legislation is such as 
to impair or shall be so applied as to impair civil liberties, trade union rights and its 
guarantees; 
- Includes both the meetings of organizations in their premises, and also public meetings 
and demonstrations (Digest, Paras. 131-151.); 
- Includes prior authorization, interference by public authorities based on legislation for 
reasons that go beyond the aim of maintaining public order; 
- Includes attendance of trade union meetings by a representative of the public authorities; 
- Includes requesting unreasonable, excessive formalities, setting time restrictions; 
- Includes lack of precise instruction to police authorities in order to avoid cases where 
people are arrested simply for having organized or participated in a demonstration. 
 Includes legislation that violates trade unionists‘ freedom of opinion and expression 
(Digest, Paras. 154-174.); 
- This includes freedom of opinion and expression both at trade union‘s meetings, in 
publications (through uncensored and independent press (Digest, Para. 158.)) and in other 
trade union activities (Digest, Para. 154.); 
- Includes acts of previous authorization and censorship of publications; subjecting trade 
union publication to the granting of a licence at the discretion of licensing authorities; 
imposing restrictions on the subject matter of publications; requirement to provide a 
substantial bond before being able to publish a newspaper; 
- Includes measures of administrative control, arbitrary withdrawal of a licence; 
- Includes the temporary or definitive suspension and/or seizure of publications (Digest, 
Paras. 172-173.). 
 
3. Infringements of trade union's right to protection of their premises and property (de jure) 
Paras. 178-192 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 706-708 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Para. 40 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows arbitrary occupation and seizure of trade union‘s and trade 
unionists‘ premises and property; 
 Includes confiscation based on legislation and legally obtained court order for reasons 
considered to be illegitimate by national legislation, but where the legislation is such as to 
impair or shall be so applied as to impair civil liberties, trade union rights and its 
guarantees;  
 Includes entry or search with prior authorization or with obtained legal warrant for 
activities considered to be illegitimate by national legislation, but where the legislation is 
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such as to impair or shall be so applied as to impair civil liberties, trade union rights and 
its guarantees; 
 Includes legislation that allows the disposal of dissolved assets of organizations in a 
manner contrary to the organizations‘ own rules, or in the absence of such rules, which 
disposes the assets to others than the workers concerned (Digest, Paras. 706-709.; General 
Survey, Paras. 186-188.). 
 
4. Excessive prohibitions/restrictions on trade union rights in the event of state of emergency (de 
jure) 
Paras. 193-204 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 677, 701, 777 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 41-43 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows unjustified suspensions, prohibitions, derogations, 
exemptions from civil liberties, trade union rights and its guarantees based on a reason 
that a state of emergency exists (e.g. arbitrary arrest, detention of trade unionists, 
restrictions on trade union meetings, restrictions on publications; unilateral setting or 
changing of terms of employment, suspension or dissolution of associations by 
administrative authority, restrictions on the right to strike, etc.). 
 Does not include restrictions imposed in the context of a state of emergency if such 
restrictions are justified in the event of an acute national emergency and are accompanied 
by normal judicial safeguards (Digest, Paras. 198-199.). 
 
5. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re Ia (de jure) 
Paras. 48-57, 75-83, 89-90, 96-120 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 29, 31-32 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes lack of adequate legislation that would guarantee the due process of law (fair and 
rapid trial by an independent and impartial tribunal, e.g. non-informing about charges, 
delays in procedure, lack of adequate time and/or facilities to prepare defence, etc.); 
 Includes the lack of legal guarantees for recourse to judicial authority (e.g. the lack of the 
right to appeal or cases where the appeal can only be lodged to one of the Ministries) 
against any administrative decision concerning the trade union rights; 
 Includes legal proceedings overly lengthy (Digest, Paras. 104-105.); 
 Includes the lack of dissuasive and exemplary sanction or compensation for damages 
suffered. 
 Note: Includes de jure lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de jure 
fundamental civil liberties, as listed under evaluation criteria nos. 1-4. 
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Ib. Fundamental civil liberties, de facto 
6. Murder or disappearance of trade unionists (de facto) 
Paras. 42-60 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 28-30 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes those cases where the murder or disappearance is connected with trade union 
membership and/or trade union activities (e.g. targeted killings, dispersal of public 
meetings by the police involving loss of life); 
 Refers only to de facto issues of non-compliance, as it is unlikely that national legislation 
would contain any paragraph that would explicitly render death penalty for trade union 
membership or activities; 
 Includes murder or disappearance of trade unionists‘ family members. 
 In case the murder or disappearance occurs during and in relation to a police 
intervention in a peaceful and legitimate strike, it should be coded together with 
evaluation criterion no. 113. 
 
7. Committed against trade union leaders re 6 (de facto) 
 
 
 Includes cases when the incident is committed against trade union leaders. 
 
8. Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 6 (de facto) 
Paras. 48-57, 75-83, 89-90, 96-120 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 29, 31-32 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes infringements in practice of the right to fair and rapid trial (e.g. non-informing 
about charges, delays in procedure, lack of adequate time and/or facilities to prepare 
defence, etc.); 
 Includes legal proceedings overly lengthy (‗Justice delayed is justice denied‘) (Digest, 
Paras. 104-105.); 
 Includes lack of independent and impartial judiciary; 
 Includes absence of judgement, impunity or lack of dissuasive sanctions, compensation 
for damages suffered. 
 Note: Impunity refers to cases in which those committing violations are not brought to 
account since they are not subject to inquiry that might lead to their being accused, 
arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to dissuasive sanctions. It also includes 
ineffective investigatory institutions in which no meaningful progress in investigative and 
judicial phases can be observed or where such institutions are observed not to be 
independent. 
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9. Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 6 (de facto) 
Paras. 52-53 in Digest of decisions and principles. 
 
 Includes flagrant cases, occurring in a widespread and/or systematic manner that is 
continuously followed by the absence of independent judicial inquiry and judgements 
against the guilty parties (situation of impunity), therefore reinforcing the climate of 
violence and insecurity and thus creating an extremely damaging effect on the exercise of 
trade union rights. 
 
10. Other violent actions against trade unionists (de facto) 
Paras. 42-60 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 28-30, 33 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes those cases where the violent action is connected with trade union membership 
and/or activities; 
 Includes violent actions against trade unionists‘ family members; 
 Refers only to de facto issues of non-compliance; 
 Includes violent actions such as physical assault, attacks, injury, torture, cruelty or ill-
treatment while in detention (Digest, Para. 56.); internment in psychiatric hospitals 
(Digest, Para. 91.); 
 Includes intimidation (e.g. death threat), coercion under threat of force; 
 Includes cases in which the dispersal of public meetings by the police, being excessive, 
has involved serious injury; 
 Includes the militarization of workplaces; 
 Includes the creation of an environment of fear, climate of violence, coercion and threats, 
but does not include threats of dismissal. Threats of dismissal should be coded under 
evaluation criterion no. 56. (Digest, Paras. 58-60.). 
 In case the other violent action is committed during and in relation to a police 
intervention in a peaceful and legitimate strike, it should be coded together with 
evaluation criterion no. 113. 
 
11. Committed against trade union leaders re 10 (de facto) 
 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 7 
12. Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 10 (de facto) 
Paras. 48-57, 75-83, 89-90, 96-120 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 29, 31-32 in General Survey 1994. 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 8 
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13. Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 10 (de facto) 
Paras. 52-53 in Digest of decisions and principles. 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 9 
14. Arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of trade unionists (de facto) 
Paras. 61-95 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 31-32 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes prosecution of and arbitrary sanctions  (arrest, detention, imprisonment, fines or 
other heavy criminal sanctions) for reasons connected with trade union membership 
and/or legitimate trade union activities; 
 Includes prosecution of and arbitrary sanctions (arrest, detention, imprisonment, fines) 
based on fictitious charges; 
 Includes arrest/mass arrest, detention/preventive detention and apprehension without any 
charges being brought or without any court warrant being issued; 
 Includes cases where the sanction imposed is not proportionate to the offence or fault 
committed (heavy criminal sanctions); education through labour systems; 
 Includes apprehension and systematic or arbitrary interrogation by police in practice 
(Digest, Para. 68.). 
 In case the arrest or detention occurs during and in relation to a police intervention in a 
peaceful and legitimate strike, it should be coded together with evaluation criterion 
no. 113. 
 
15. Committed against trade union leaders re 14 (de facto) 
 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 7 
16. Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 14 (de facto) 
Paras. 48-57, 75-83, 89-90, 96-120 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 29, 31-32 in General Survey 1994. 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 8 
17. Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 14 (de facto) 
Paras. 52-53 in Digest of decisions and principles. 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 9 
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18. Infringements of trade unionists' basic freedoms (de facto) 
Paras. 121-175 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 34-39 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes de facto non-compliance with freedom of movement; rights of assembly and 
demonstration; freedom of opinion and expression; 
 Includes infringements in practice that results in the prohibition or restriction of freedom 
of movement. It includes cases such as: 
- Prohibition to leave any country, including trade unionists‘ own country, and to return to 
his/her country, withholding travel documents (Digest, Para. 122.) or other measures that 
prevent representatives of occupational organizations from e.g. participating in 
international trade union meetings; 
- Restricted movement; house arrest, surveillance (Digest, Para. 124.); 
- Practice of freeing trade unionists on condition that they leave the country (Digest, 
Para. 127.); 
- Restriction of a person‘s movements to a limited area, accompanied by the prohibition of 
entry into the area in which his/her trade union operates and he/she carries on his/her trade 
union functions. 
 Includes infringements in practice of the right of peaceful and legitimate assembly and 
demonstration by interference of public authorities for reasons that go beyond the aim of 
maintaining public order and security (Digest, Paras. 130-153.); 
- Includes both the meetings of organizations in their premises and also public meetings and 
demonstration (Digest, Paras. 131-151.); 
- Includes the use of force that goes beyond the aim of maintaining public order and 
security; 
- Includes cases of arbitrary refusal to hold public meetings and demonstrations;  
- Includes the holding of meetings only with the presence of the members of the police or 
any representative of the authorities (General Survey, Para. 35.); 
- Includes lack of precise instruction to police authorities in order to avoid cases where 
public order is not seriously threatened, people are not arrested simply for having 
organized or participated in a demonstration. 
 Includes infringements in practice of trade unionists‘ freedom of opinion and expression 
(Digest, Paras. 154-173.); 
- This includes freedom of opinion and expression both at trade union‘s meetings, in 
publications (through uncensored and independent press (Para. 158.)) and in other trade 
union activities (Digest, Para. 154.); 
- Includes measures of arbitrary administrative control, withdrawal of a licence, control of 
printing plants and equipments, the control of paper supply (General Survey, 
Paras. 38-39.); 
- Includes censorship in practice; and the arbitrary temporary or definitive suspension 
and/or seizure of publications (Digest, Paras. 172-173.). 
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19. Committed against trade union leaders re 18 (de facto) 
 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 7 
20. Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 18 (de facto) 
Paras. 48-57, 75-83, 89-90, 96-120 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 29, 31-32 in General Survey 1994 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 8 
21. Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 18 (de facto) 
Paras. 52-53 in Digest of decisions and principles. 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 9. 
22. Attacks against trade unions premises and property (de facto) 
Paras. 178-192 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 706-708 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Para. 40 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes arbitrary occupation, seizure and destruction of trade union premises and 
property in practice; 
 Includes arbitrary confiscation of property without legally obtained court order; 
 Includes entry or search without prior authorization or without having obtained legal 
warrant (Digest, Paras. 180-182., 185.); 
 Includes entry or search with prior authorization or with obtained legal warrant in cases 
where the public authority does not have good reasons to believe that evidence of criminal 
proceeding under the ordinary law will be found; 
 Includes cases where the search is not restricted to the purpose for which the warrant was 
issued; 
 Includes cases where the assets of organizations that are dissolved are seized and not 
handed over to the association that succeeds it or distributed in accordance with its own 
rule, or in the absence of such rule, is handed at the disposal of others than the workers 
concerned (Digest, Paras. 706-709.; General Survey, Paras. 186-188.). 
 
23. Committed against trade union leaders re 22 (de facto) 
 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 7 
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24. Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 22 (de facto) 
Paras. 48-57, 75-83, 89-90, 96-120 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 29, 31-32 in General Survey 1994. 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 8 
25. Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 22 (de facto) 
Paras. 52-53 in Digest of decisions and principles. 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 9 
26. Excessive prohibitions/restrictions on trade union rights in the event of state of emergency (de 
facto) 
Paras. 193-204 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 677, 701, 777 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 41-43 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes unjustified suspensions, prohibitions, derogations, exemptions from civil 
liberties, trade union rights and its guarantees based on a reason that a state of emergency 
exists (e.g. arbitrary arrest, detention of trade unionists, restrictions on trade union 
meetings, restrictions on publications; unilateral setting or changing of terms of 
employment, suspension or dissolution of associations by administrative authority, 
restrictions on the right to strike, etc.); 
 Includes calling state of emergency by the state for the purpose of evading trade union 
rights, freedom of association principles or ignoring civil liberties; 
 Includes major difficulties, restrictions in practice on civil liberties, trade union rights and 
its guarantees in the event of state of emergency; 
 Includes delays in restitution of rights or e.g. reinstating trade unionists who might have 
been dismissed for their union activity. 
 Does not include restrictions imposed in the context of a state of emergency if such 
restrictions are justified in the event of an acute national emergency and are accompanied 
by normal judicial safeguards (Digest, Paras.198-199.). 
 
27. Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 26 (de facto) 
Paras. 48-57, 75-83, 89-90, 96-120 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 29, 31-32 in General Survey 1994. 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 8 
28. Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 26 (de facto) 
Paras. 52-53 in Digest of decisions and principles. 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 9 
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IIa. Right of workers to establish and join organizations, de jure 
29. General prohibition on the right of workers to establish and join organizations (de jure) 
Articles 1-2 of Convention No. 87; 
Para. 209 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 44-46 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes explicit general legal prohibition on the establishment of workers‘ organization. 
30. Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to establish and join organizations (de jure) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 210-271 (Chapter 3) in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 45-67 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Does not include exclusion/restriction of the armed forces and the police (with the 
exception of civilian staff); 
 Does not include restrictions on the right to join organizations of senior public officials 
and managerial and executive staff in private sector and agricultural workers, if they are 
entitled to establish their own organizations and that the categories of such workers are 
not defined too broadly; 
 Includes the explicit or indirect exclusion/restriction of workers other than the armed 
forces and the police in law from the right to establish and/or join workers organizations; 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on race, political opinion, nationality (Digest, 
Paras. 210-215.); 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on occupational categories (Digest, Paras. 216-270.): 
e.g. 1. public sector workers; 2. private sector workers; 3. workers in atypical occupation; 
4. workers in Export Processing Zones and 5. workers in other vulnerable situation (e.g. 
domestic workers; migrant workers, seafarers, women; workers affected by structural 
changes e.g. outsourced workers; self-employed workers; workers in ―disguised‖ 
employment relationship.); 
 Includes the exclusion/restriction of workers undergoing a period of probation, workers 
who have been dismissed and retired workers (Digest, Paras. 268-270.). 
 
31. Previous authorization requirements (de jure) 
Article 2 and 7 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 272-308 (Chapter 4) in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 68-78 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows public authorities to impose previous authorization 
requirements that may constitute an obstacle to the establishment of an organization 
(Digest, Para. 272.); 
 Includes legislation that goes beyond setting formalities to ensure the normal functioning 
of organization (Digest, Paras. 275-278.); 
 Includes legislation obliging organizations to deposit their rules, unless this is merely a 
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formality; 
 Includes acquisition of legal personality subject to legal conditions that restrict 
establishment of workers‘ organizations (Digest, Para. 272.); 
 Includes legal requirements regarding minimum number of members at too high level 
(Digest, Paras. 283-292.); 
 Includes legal formalities (e.g. excessively detailed provisions) that are able to impair or 
discourage workers from the establishment of organization (Digest, Para. 281.); 
 Includes conditions of registration that are tantamount to obtaining previous authorization 
from the public authorities (e.g. complicated, lengthy procedures, excessive registration 
requirements) (Digest, Paras. 294-295.); 
 Includes legislation that entitles the competent authority with discretionary power to grant 
or reject registration; 
 Includes legislation that allows a decision to prohibit the registration of a trade union to 
become effective before the statutory period of lodging an appeal has expired or before 
the court has confirmed the appeal (Digest, Para. 301.). 
 
32. Restrictions on the freedom of choice of trade union structure and composition (de jure) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 333-337, 360-362 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 79-90 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legal restrictions on the structure and composition of organizations; 
 Includes restrictions in law that affect the size of organizations by setting that a certain 
number of members should belong to the same occupation or enterprise; 
 Includes legal restrictions on the composition of the workers‘ organizations (e.g. 
restricting the members of the organization to workers from the same occupation, setting 
undue quota or high minimum proportion of certain workers in law, or requiring that a 
trade union should have a certain proportion of citizens as members); 
 Includes cases where legislation permits only first level organizations. 
 Does not include the following cases: 
- Restriction that forbids public servants to form mixed (members from other sectors) 
organizations at the first level, as long as their organizations are not restricted to 
employees of any particular ministry, department or service, and that they may freely join 
federations, confederation of their own choosing; 
- Prohibition of executives, managers, confidential employees to form organizations open 
to lower-grade workers, as long as they have the right to form their own organizations 
and that the category of executive and managerial staff is not so broadly defined as to 
weaken the organizations of other workers in the enterprise or branch of activity by 
depriving them of a substantial proportion of their actual or potential membership; 
- Restrictions on first-level organizations of agricultural and domestic workers, as long as 
they are enabled to affiliate federations, confederation of their own choosing (General 
Survey, Paras. 84-91.). 
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33. Imposed trade union unity and/or favouritism/discrimination among workers' organizations 
(de jure) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 309-332, 339-345 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 91-107 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that permits only single unions at various levels and imposes trade 
union monopoly (e.g. by prohibiting the creation of more than one first-level organization 
either in a given occupation, economic category or a given territorial are (Digest, 
Paras. 311-332.), or by permitting  one national trade union for a given category of 
workers); 
 Includes legislation that imposes either trade union unity or the proliferation of trade 
unions and thus obstruct trade unions to establish or join organizations ―of their own 
choosing‖ (Digest, Para. 323.); 
 Includes cases when the indirect result of a legislation is that it is impossible to establish a 
second organization representing workers‘ interest (e.g. by fixing the percentage for 
membership in a level that makes it impossible to establish several organizations, e.g. by 
requiring the participation of at least 50 per cent of the workers (General Survey, 
Para. 94.); 
 Includes cases where legislation institutionalizes a factual monopoly, by referring to the 
single organization by name (Digest, Para. 330.); 
 Includes obligation in law to affiliate to the single central organization or to conform to 
the constitutions of the single existing central organization or to pay contributions to a 
single national trade union; 
 Includes legislation that places a trade union at an advantage or disadvantage in relation to 
another trade union and thus indirectly creates a trade union monopoly (General Survey, 
Paras. 91-96.), e.g. by granting an advantage in relation to the others. 
 Does not include the distinction between the most representative trade union 
organizations and other trade union organizations, except if this distinction has an effect 
of depriving other trade union organizations of the essential means for defending the 
occupational interests of their members, for organizing their administration and activities 
and formulating their programmes (Digest, Para. 346.) or if the determination of the most 
representative trade union is not based on objective and pre-established criteria (Digest, 
Para. 347.). 
 Discrimination between trade union organizations should be coded under evaluation 
criterion no. 39, except if it leads to a trade union monopoly in which case it should be 
coded under evaluation criterion no. 33. 
 Note: Systems which prohibit union security practices (closed shop, union shop and 
agency shop) in order to guarantee the right not to join an organization, as well as systems 
which authorize such practices, are compatible with Convention No. 87. However, when 
union security clauses are imposed by the law itself, the right of workers to set up and join 
organizations of their own choosing is compromised. Legislation, which makes it 
compulsory to join a union or which designates a specific trade union as the recipient of 
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union dues, or which achieves the same aim through regulation of the system of 
compulsory union dues, has similar effect to provisions establishing at trade union 
monopoly and is not compatible with the Convention (General Survey, Para. 103.). 
 
34. Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or 
legislation (de jure) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 677-705 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 180-185 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows dissolution or suspension by administrative authorities, 
(administrative dissolution of trade unions) without ensuring the right of appeal to an 
independent and impartial judicial body; 
 Includes legislation that allows the cancellation of registration of an organization by the 
registrar or the removal of trade unions from the register (Digest, Para. 685) or the 
annulment/suspension of legal personality; 
 Includes legislation that allows dissolution and suspension for reasons considered to be 
illegal in the national legislation, but which legislation is such as to impair or shall be so 
applied to impair trade union rights and its guarantees; 
 Includes dissolution and suspension by law on account of unreasonably determined 
insufficient membership (Digest, Para. 680.); 
 Includes legislation that allows dissolution or suspension for reasons that are not 
proportionate (e.g. for illegal activities carried out by some leaders, for irregularities in the 
financial management, etc.); 
 Includes dissolution/suspension by law where the dissolution/suspension is not being a 
remedy of last resort with the exhaustion other possibilities with less serious effects for 
the organization as a whole; 
 Includes cases where the administrative decision can take effect before the expiry of the 
statutory period for lodging an appeal, without an appeal having been entered or before 
the confirmation of such decisions by a judicial authority (Digest, Para. 703.). 
 
35. Prejudice or discrimination with regard to employment because of trade union membership/ 
legitimate activities (de jure) 
Article 1 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 769-781, 782-788, 799-803, 654-657, 658, 660, 675 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 199-212 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows direct and/or indirect discriminatory measures on grounds 
of trade union membership or legitimate trade union activities both at the time of 
recruitment/hiring and in the course of employment (General Survey, Para. 210.); 
 Includes legislation that allows direct and/or indirect discriminatory measures such as 
non-renewal of contract, excluding union members from receiving bonuses, transfers, 
downgrading, restrictions of any kind (e.g. remuneration, social benefits, vocational 
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training) (Digest, Paras. 781., 785-788.); 
 Includes legislation that allows direct and/or indirect discriminatory measures for 
participating in legitimate and peaceful strikes; 
 Includes legislation that allows anti-union discrimination (by not forbidding it) against 
former trade union members and trade union officials (Digest, Para. 775.) or trade unions 
not recognized by the employers as representing the majority of workers concerned 
(Digest, Para. 776.).
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36. Lack of adequate legal guarantees against anti-union discriminatory measures re 35 (de jure) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 813-836 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 214-224 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes lack of appropriate measures guaranteeing effective protection of trade unionists 
and ensuring that complaints of anti-union discrimination are examined in the framework 
of national procedures which are prompt, impartial and considered as such by the parties 
concerned (Digest, Para. 817.); 
 Includes lack of specific provisions accompanied by civil remedies and penal sanctions 
for the protection of workers against acts of anti-union discrimination (Digest, 
Para. 824.); 
 Includes lack of access to means of redress which are expeditious, inexpensive and fully 
impartial (Digest, Para. 820.); 
 Includes lack of provisions for sufficiently dissuasive sanctions against acts of anti-union 
discriminative measures, lack of legislation providing full compensation, both in financial 
and in occupational terms; 
 Includes legislation that does not provide the same protection against anti-union 
discrimination for trade union members and former trade union officials as to current 
trade union leaders (Digest, Para. 775.) or to trade unions not recognized by the 
employers as representing the majority of workers concerned (Digest, Para. 776.). 
 
37. Discriminatory dismissal/suspension because of trade union membership/legitimate activities 
(de jure) 
Article 1 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 769-781, 789-798, 799-802, 804-812, 658-666, 674 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 199-210, 213 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows direct and/or indirect discriminatory dismissal or 
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 Public servants engaged in the administration of the State who are not included within the scope 
of Convention No. 98 (Article 6) are to be protected against anti-union discrimination in 
employment by virtue of Article 4 of the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 
(No. 151), where ratified. 
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suspension on grounds of trade union membership or legitimate trade union activities; 
 Includes legislation that allows dismissal/suspension for participating in legitimate and 
peaceful strikes; 
 Includes legislation that allows anti-union discrimination (by not forbidding it) against 
former trade union members and trade union officials (Digest, Para. 775.) or trade unions 
not recognized by the employers as representing the majority of workers concerned 
(Digest, Para. 776.).
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38. Lack of adequate legal guarantees against anti-union discriminatory measures re 37 (de jure) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 813-853 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 214-224 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes lack of appropriate measures that guarantee an effective protection of trade 
unionists and ensure that complaints of anti-union discrimination are examined in the 
framework of national procedures which are prompt, impartial and considered as such by 
the parties concerned (Digest, Para. 817.); 
 Includes lack of specific provisions accompanied by civil remedies and penal sanctions 
for the protection of workers against acts of anti-union discrimination (Digest, 
Para. 824.); 
 Includes lack of access to means of redress which are expeditious, inexpensive and fully 
impartial (Digest, Para. 820.); 
 Includes lack of provisions for sufficiently dissuasive sanctions against acts of anti-union 
discriminative measures, lack of legislation providing full compensation, both in financial 
and in occupational terms; 
 Includes legislation that does not provide the same protection against anti-union 
discrimination for trade union members and former trade union officials as to current 
trade union leaders (Digest, Para. 775.) or to trade unions not recognized by the 
employers as representing the majority of workers concerned (Digest, Para. 776.). 
 
39. Acts of interference of employers and/or public authorities (de jure) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 855-859, 863-868 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 225-234 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows undue interference that is such as to impair or shall be so 
applied as to impair trade union rights and its guarantees; 
 Includes legal provisions which allow employers to undermine workers‘ organizations 
through artificial promotions of workers (Digest, Para. 864.); 
 
89
 See footnote No. 88. 
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 Includes legislation that allows acts of interference which are designed to promote the 
establishment of workers‘ organizations under the domination of employers or 
employer‘s organization (e.g. legislation that permit the establishment of parallel unions 
by employers); 
 Includes legislation that allows discrimination between workers‘ organization, except if it 
leads to trade union monopoly in which case it should be coded under evaluation 
criterion no. 33; 
 Includes legislation that allows the disclosure of information on trade union membership 
and activities; infringement on the inviolability of correspondence and telephonic 
conversation; establishment of a register containing data on trade union members (Digest, 
Paras. 175-177.). 
  
40. Lack of adequate legal guarantees against acts of interference (de jure) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 860-862, 865 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 225-234 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes the lack of clear and precise legal provisions ensuring the adequate protection of 
workers‘ organizations against acts of interference (rapid and efficient procedures, 
coupled with effective and dissuasive sanctions). 
 
41. Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international 
organizations (de jure) 
Article 6-7 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 710-768 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 189-198 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes general prohibition in law for workers‘ organisations to establish and/or affiliate 
with federations and confederations (Paras. 710-729.); 
 Includes general prohibition in law for workers‘ organisations, federations and 
confederations to affiliate with international organisations of workers (Paras. 732-768.); 
 Includes legislation that excludes/restricts workers‘ organizations from the right to 
establish and join federations and confederations or to affiliate with international 
organizations of workers (Para. 717.); 
 Includes legislation that allows public authorities to impose previous authorization 
requirements to establish federations and confederations or to affiliate with international 
organizations of workers. 
 Note: All other infringements of rights relating to federations/confederations/international 
organizations should be coded under the specific evaluation criterion the infringement 
links to. 
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42. Other de jure acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIa (de jure) 
 
 
 Includes other de jure prohibitions, infringements, interferences not specified above under 
evaluation criteria nos. 29-41 that violate (either in a direct or an indirect way, by 
punishing or by discouraging workers) workers right to establish and join workers‘ 
organizations. 
 
43. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIa (de jure) 
 
 
 Includes lack of adequate legislation that would guarantee the due process of law (fair and 
rapid trial by an independent and impartial tribunal); 
 Includes the lack of legal guarantees for recourse to judicial authority (e.g. the lack of the 
right to appeal or cases where the appeal can only be lodged to one of the Ministries) 
against any civil, administrative, criminal and/or disciplinary decision. 
 Note: Includes de jure lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de jure right 
of workers to establish and join organizations, as listed under evaluation criteria 
nos. 29-42. 
 
IIb. Right of workers to establish and join organizations, de facto 
44. Obstacles towards the development of independent workers’ organizations in practice (de 
facto) 
Articles 1-2 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 209 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 44-46 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes practical obstacles to the establishment of an independent trade union movement 
in practice; 
 Includes major difficulties, restrictions in practice on the right of workers to establish and 
join organizations. 
 
45. Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to establish and join organizations (de facto) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 87; 
Chapter 3 (Paras. 210-271) in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 45-67 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Does not include exclusion/restriction of the armed forces and the police (with the 
exception of civilian staff); 
 Does not include restrictions on the right to join organizations of senior public officials 
and managerial and executive staff in private sector and agricultural workers, if they are 
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entitled to establish their own organizations and that the categories of such workers are 
not defined too broadly; 
 Includes the explicit or indirect exclusion/restriction of workers other than the armed 
forces and the police, from the right to establish and/or join workers organizations; 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on race, political opinion, nationality; 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on occupational categories: e.g. 1. public sector 
workers; 2. private sector workers; 3. workers in atypical occupation; 4. workers in Export 
Processing Zones and 5. workers in other vulnerable situation (e.g. domestic workers; 
migrant workers, seafarers, women; workers affected by structural changes e.g. 
outsourced workers; workers in the informal economy; workers in ―disguised‖ 
employment relationship.); 
 Includes the exclusion/restriction of workers undergoing a period of probation, workers 
who have been dismissed and retired workers (Digest, Paras. 268-270.). 
 
46. Previous authorization requirements (de facto) 
Article 2 and 7 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 272-308 (Chapter 4) in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 68-78 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes cases where public authorities can arbitrarily impose previous authorization 
requirements that may constitute an obstacle to the establishment of an organization 
(Digest, Para. 272.); 
 Includes cases where either the government or other competent administrative authorities 
(e.g. registrar) have discretionary power in practice to grant or refuse registration of 
workers‘ organization; 
 Includes undue practices that are able to impede the right of workers to establish 
organization (e.g. intentional delays in administrative procedures); 
 Includes cases where the formalities prescribed by law for the establishment of a trade 
union are applied in a manner as to delay or prevent the establishment of trade union 
organization (Digest, Para. 279.); 
 Includes decisions to prohibit the registration of a trade union which has received legal 
recognition to become effective before the statutory period of lodging an appeal has 
expired or before the court has confirmed the appeal. 
 
47. Restrictions on the freedom of choice of trade union structure and composition (de facto) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 333-337, 360-362 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 79-90 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes restrictions in practice that affect the size of organizations by requiring that a 
certain number of members should belong to the same occupation or enterprise; 
 Includes restrictions in practice on the composition of the workers‘ organization (e.g. 
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allowing only workers from the same occupation to become a member of the 
organization). 
 Does not include the following cases: 
- Restriction on public servants to form mixed (members from other sectors) organizations 
at the first level, if these organizations are not restricted to employees of any particular 
ministry, department or service, and that they may freely join federations, confederation 
of their own choosing; 
- Prohibition of executives, managers, confidential employees to form organizations open 
to lower-grade workers, if they have the right to form their own organizations and that the 
category of executive and managerial staff is not so broadly defined as to weaken the 
organizations of other workers in the enterprise or branch of activity by depriving them of 
a substantial proportion of their actual or potential membership; 
− Restrictions on first-level organizations of agricultural and domestic workers, if they are 
enabled to affiliate federations, confederation of their own choosing. (General Survey, 
Paras. 84-91.). 
 
48. Imposed trade union unity and/or favouritism/discrimination among workers' organizations 
(de facto) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 309-345 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 91-107 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes exercise of discretionary power of the competent authorities in practice to refuse 
the registration of a trade union when they consider that an already registered union 
adequately represents the workers concerned; 
 Includes the denial of the possibility to form other organizations where a single 
organization is already established; 
 Includes direct/indirect support in practice of one trade union on the account of other 
workers‘ organizations, placing one organization at an advantage or disadvantage in 
relation to the others (e.g. through unequally distributed aid, premises provided for 
holding meetings or activities to one organization but not to another, refusal to recognize 
officers of some organizations in the exercise of their legitimate activities) and thus 
creating indirectly a trade union monopoly; 
 Includes state-sponsored and controlled trade union monopolies. 
 Does not include the distinction between the most representative trade union 
organizations and other trade union organizations, except if this distinction has an effect 
of depriving other trade union organizations of the essential means for defending the 
occupational interests of their members, for organizing their administration and activities 
and formulating their programmes (Digest, Para. 346.) or if the determination of the most 
representative trade union is not based on objective and pre-established criteria (Digest, 
Para. 347.). 
 Discrimination between trade union organizations should be coded under evaluation 
criterion no. 56, except if it leads to trade union monopoly, in which case it should be 
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coded under evaluation criterion no. 48. 
 Note: Systems which prohibit union security practices (closed shop, union shop and 
agency shop) in order to guarantee the right not to join an organization, as well as systems 
which authorize such practices, are compatible with Convention No. 87. However, union 
security clauses legislatively imposed in such a way resulting in a trade union monopoly 
are contrary to the principles of freedom of association (Digest, Para. 363.). 
 
49. Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or 
legislation (de facto) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 677-705 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 180-185 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes arbitrary dissolution/suspension by administrative authorities (administrative 
dissolution of trade unions) in practice; 
 Includes discretionary cancellation of the registration of an organization by the registrar or 
their removal from the register, being tantamount to the dissolution of the organization by 
administrative authority (Digest, Para. 685.); 
 Includes dissolution by the trade union said to be voluntary, though it can be proven that 
the decision was not freely taken or not by following the procedure regulated in the  by-
laws of the trade union (e.g. by not the congress convened in a regular manner or by all 
the workers concerned); 
 Includes discretionary dissolution or suspension in practice for reasons that are not 
proportionate (e.g. for illegal activities carried out by some leaders, for irregularities in the 
financial management, etc.); 
 Includes cases where the dissolution/suspension was not a remedy of last resort with the 
exhaustion other possibilities with less serious effects for the organization as a whole; 
 Includes cases that indirectly lead to the dissolution or suspension (e.g. loss of advantages 
essential to carrying out their activities, depriving it of its financial resources or 
annulment or suspension of legal personality); 
 Includes cases where the administrative decision can take effect before the expiry of the 
statutory period for lodging an appeal, without an appeal having been entered or before 
the confirmation of such decisions by a judicial authority (Digest, Para. 703.). 
 
50. Prejudice or discrimination with regard to employment because of trade union 
membership/legitimate activities (de facto) 
Article 1 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 769-781, 782-788, 799-803, 654-657, 658, 660, 675 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 199-212 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Refers to discriminatory measures in practice on grounds of trade union membership or 
legitimate trade union activities both at the time of hiring/recruitment and in the course of 
employment (Digest, Para. 781.); 
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 Includes direct and/or indirect discrimination in hiring (Digest, Paras. 782-784.); 
 Includes practice of blacklisting (Digest, Para. 803.); 
 Includes direct and/or indirect discriminatory measures during employment, in particular 
non-renewal of contract, excluding union members from receiving bonuses, transfers, 
downgrading, restrictions of any kind (e.g. remuneration, social benefits, vocational 
training) (Digest, Paras. 781., 785-788.); 
 Includes direct and/or indirect discriminatory measures for participating in legitimate and 
peaceful strikes. 
 
51. Committed against trade union leaders re 50 (de facto) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 799-803 in Digest of decisions and principles. 
 
 Includes cases when the incident is committed against trade union leaders (e.g. for having 
presented a list of dispute grievances); 
 Includes incidents committed either during the period of office or for a certain time 
thereafter. 
 
52. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re 50 (de facto) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 813-836 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 214-224 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes infringements in practice of the right to fair and rapid trial (e.g. non-informing 
about charges, delays in procedure, lack of adequate time and/or facilities to prepare 
defence, etc.); 
 Includes infringements in practice of measures that guarantee an effective protection of 
trade unionists (e.g. procedures which should be prompt, impartial and considered as 
such by the parties concerned (Digest, Para. 817.)); 
 Includes lack of access in practice to means of redress which are expeditious, inexpensive 
and fully impartial (Digest, Para. 820.); 
 Includes lack of sufficiently dissuasive sanctions against acts of anti-union discriminative 
measures. 
 
53. Discriminatory dismissal/suspension because of trade union membership/legitimate activities 
(de facto) 
Article 1 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 769-781, 789-798, 799-802, 804-812, 658-666, 674 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 199-210, 213 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Refers to discriminatory dismissal or suspension in practice on grounds of trade union 
membership or legitimate trade union activities; 
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 Includes massive/large-scale dismissals for reasons of trade union membership and/or 
legitimate trade union activities; 
 Includes dismissal for economic reasons if they are used as an indirect means of 
subjecting trade union leaders/members to acts of anti-union discrimination where the 
discriminatory motive and impact is proven/acknowledged (General Survey, Para. 213.); 
 Includes compulsory retirement as a consequence of trade union membership or 
legitimate trade union activities; 
 Includes direct and/or indirect discriminatory dismissal or suspension for participating in 
legitimate and peaceful strikes. 
 
54. Committed against trade union leaders re 53 (de facto) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 799-812. in Digest of decisions and principles.  
 
 Includes cases when the incident is committed against trade union leaders (e.g. for having 
presented a list of dispute grievances); 
 Includes incidents committed either during the period of office or for a certain time 
thereafter. 
 
55. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re 53 (de facto) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 813-853 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 214-224 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes infringements in practice of the right to fair and rapid trial (e.g. non-informing 
about charges, delays in procedure, lack of adequate time and/or facilities to prepare 
defence, etc.); 
 Includes infringements in practice of measures that guarantee an effective protection of 
trade unionists (e.g. procedures which should be prompt, impartial and considered as 
such by the parties concerned (Digest, Para. 817.)); 
 Includes lack of access in practice to means of redress which are expeditious, inexpensive 
and fully impartial (Digest, Para. 820.); 
 Includes lack of sufficiently dissuasive sanctions against acts of anti-union discriminative 
measures, lack of reinstatement of workers who had been dismissed without justification 
or in case reinstatement is not practicable, lack of adequate and full compensation 
without delay. 
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56. Acts of interference of employers and/or public authorities (de facto) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 855-859, 863-868 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 225-234 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes acts to place trade unions under the domination or control of employers,  
employers‘ organizations or public authorities (e.g. by supporting workers‘ organizations 
by financial or other means, such as premises or facilities); 
 Includes the establishment or attempted establishment of parallel unions and/or solidarist 
or other associations; the existence of two executive committees within a trade union, one 
of which was allegedly manipulated by the employer; dismissal of trade union officers 
prejudicing the existing trade union and promoting the establishment of another trade 
union (Digest, Para. 869-879.; General Survey, Para. 231.); 
 Includes anti-union propaganda; and anti-union tactics in the form of bribes offered to 
union members to encourage their withdrawal from the union and the presentation of 
statements of resignation to the workers, as well as the alleged efforts made to create 
puppet unions (Digest, Para. 858.); 
 Includes the use of threats of dismissal or transfer, downgrading, restrictions in 
remuneration; using means of pressure in favour of or against any trade union 
organization; 
 Includes cases of government interferences when the government has one of its members 
as a leader of a trade union which represents several categories of workers employed by 
the States (Digest, Para. 867.); 
 Includes discrimination between workers‘ organization, except if it leads to trade union 
monopoly in which case it should be coded under evaluation criterion no. 48; 
 Includes disclosure of information on trade union membership and activities; 
infringement on the inviolability of correspondence and telephonic conversation; 
establishment of a register containing data on trade union members (Digest, 
Paras. 157-177.). 
 
57. Lack of adequate guarantees against acts of interference (de facto) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 860-862, 865 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 225-234 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes infringements in practice of provisions ensuring the adequate protection of 
workers‘ organizations against acts of interference; 
 Includes infringements in practice of the right to fair and rapid trial, the lack of 
independent and impartial judiciary and/or lack of sufficiently dissuasive sanctions. 
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58. Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international 
organizations (de facto) 
Article 6-7 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 710-768 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 189-198 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes obstacles towards the establishment of federations and confederations 
(Paras. 710-729.); 
 Includes obstacles towards the affiliation of workers‘ organizations, federations, 
confederation with international organizations of workers (Paras. 732-768.); 
 Includes exclusion/restriction of workers‘ organizations from the right to establish and 
join federations and confederations or to affiliate with international organizations of 
workers (Para. 717.); 
 Includes previous authorization requirements in practice to establish federations and 
confederations or to affiliate with international organizations of workers. 
 Note: All other infringements of rights relating to federations/confederations/international 
organizations should be coded under the specific evaluation criterion the infringement 
links to. 
 
59. Other de facto acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIb (de facto) 
 
 
 Includes other de facto prohibitions, infringements and interferences not included above 
under evaluation criteria nos. 44-58 that violate (either in a direct or an indirect way or by 
intimidating, discouraging workers) workers‘ right to establish and join organizations. 
 
60. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIb (de facto) 
 
 
 Includes infringements in practice of the right to fair and rapid trial (e.g. non-informing 
about charges, delays in procedure, lack of adequate time and/or facilities to prepare 
defence, etc.); 
 Includes lack of independent and impartial judiciary; 
 Includes absence of judgement, impunity or lack of dissuasive sanctions. 
 Note: Includes de facto lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de facto 
right of workers to establish and join organizations, as listed under evaluation criteria 
nos. 44-59. 
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IIIa. Other union activities, de jure 
61. Infringements on the right to freely draw up constitutions and rules (de jure) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 369-387 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 108, 109-112 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that goes beyond the objective of protecting the interests of members 
and guaranteeing the democratic functioning of organizations, and therefore may 
undermine the rights of workers to draw up (or amend) their constitution and rules in full 
freedom (e.g. overly detailed and restrictive legal provisions, provisions that go beyond 
formal requirements listing the particulars that must be contained in the constitution/rules 
(Digest, Para. 379.)); 
 Includes interference based on legislation, e.g. making the constitution and rules subject 
to prior approval of public authorities or enabling the public authorities to draw up the 
constitution; 
 Includes legal requirements to follow a model constitution and rules which contain more 
than certain purely formal clauses or to use such a model as a basis (Digest, Para. 384.); 
 Includes requirements in law to make the constitution subject to approval by the central 
administration of the existing organization (Digest, Para. 387.); 
 Includes cases where the sole central organization or higher level organizations specified 
by law may have the exclusive right to elaborate the by-laws of first-level trade unions 
(General Survey, Para. 111.). 
 
62. Infringements on the right to freely elect representatives (de jure) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 388-453 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 108, 113-123 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that restricts, infringes the right of trade unions to primarily determine 
the regulation of procedures and methods for the election of their officials e.g. through 
excessively precise, meticulous and detailed regulation (Digest, Para. 393.); 
 Includes legislation that obliges workers‘ organizations to submit their candidates‘ names 
together with personal particulars in advance to the authorities/employers; 
 Includes infringements of the right of trade unions to determine eligibility conditions for 
their representatives (e.g. setting nationality, political beliefs or lack of them and 
requirement of being free of any criminal conviction as a condition for trade union office 
or being employed in the occupation/enterprise, certain duration of membership of the 
organization) (Digest, Paras. 405-426.); 
 Includes legal requirements for candidates to belong to the respective occupation, 
enterprise or production unit, or to be actually employed in this occupation; 
 Includes interference in the election by public authorities based on legislation (e.g. prior 
approval of the results of the elections by public authorities; interference in various stage 
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of the electoral process; obligation to submit candidates‘ names in advance to the public 
authority (Digest, Paras. 429., 437-438.)); 
 Includes legal obligation for the organization‘s members to vote (Digest, 
Paras. 427-428.); 
 Includes legislation that allows supervision of or other interventions in the election 
procedures by the administrative authorities/employers or the single trade union central 
organization (e.g. being physically present during the election, nomination by the 
authorities/political parties/employers of members of executive committees of trade 
unions); 
 Includes legislation that restricts re-elections or sets the maximum length of terms of trade 
union office (Digest, Paras. 425-426.; General Survey, Para. 121.); 
 Includes legal provisions that permit the suspension and removal of trade union officers or 
the placing of trade union organizations under control e.g. through the appointment of 
temporary administrators by the administrative authorities/employers, by the executive 
board of a single central organization (Digest, Para. 444-453.); 
 Includes legislation that – pending the final outcome of the judicial proceedings - allows 
suspending the validity of elections based on complaints brought before labour courts by 
an administrative authority challenging the results of trade union elections (Digest, 
Para. 441.). 
 Does not include cases when foreign workers are allowed to take union office only upon 
the condition of a reasonable period of residence. 
 
 
63. Infringements on the right to freely organize and control internal and financial administration 
(de jure) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 454-494 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 108, 124-127 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows interference or control in the internal administration of 
organizations that goes beyond the aim to ensure respect for democratic rules and 
provides authorities with discretionary rights of trade unions‘ internal and financial 
administration; 
 Includes lack of financial independence (e.g. being financed in such a way as to allow the 
public authorities to enjoy discretionary powers over them); 
 Includes control and restriction on the use of trade union dues and funds, including the 
collection of union dues (e.g. legislation that allows employer to withhold trade union 
dues or to withdraw the check-off facility); 
 Includes legal provisions which give the authorities the right to restrict the freedom of a 
trade union to administer and utilize its funds as it wishes for normal and lawful trade 
union purposes; 
 Includes legal provisions exceeding the obligations normally limited to submitting 
periodic financial reports or allowing administrative control over trade union assets (such 
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as financial audits and investigations) to be applied not only in exceptional cases, when 
justified by grave circumstances (e.g. presumed irregularities in the annual statement); 
 Includes legislation prohibiting the acceptance by a trade union of financial or other 
assistance from an international organization of workers to which it is affiliated or 
requiring the trade union to obtain prior authorization to receive it; 
 Includes legislation that allows interference of public authorities/employers in the right of 
trade unions to resolve any disputes by themselves (Digest, Para. 484.). 
 
64. Infringements on the right to freely organize activities/programmes (de jure) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 495-519 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 108, 128-135 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes general prohibition in law of trade union organizations‘ participation - aiming 
the advancement of their economic and social objectives - in political activities (Digest, 
Para. 498.); 
 Includes the establishment of a close relationship between trade union organizations and a 
political party by legislation (e.g. with the aim to transform the trade union movement into 
an instrument for the pursuance of political aims) (Digest, Para. 499.); 
 Includes legislative provisions which regulate in detail the internal functioning of trade 
unions; 
 Includes prohibition or restriction in law of any other legitimate trade union activities 
(Digest, Paras. 508-519., e.g. petitions, campaigns, submitting claims to the employers, 
representation of trade union members before court to defend them, organizing training 
programmes, etc.); 
 Includes legal restrictions/prohibitions relating to facilities necessary for the proper 
exercise of trade union functions (e.g. access to their offices, access to the workplace, free 
time accorded to trade union leaders) that goes beyond the aim to ensure respect for 
democratic rules. 
 
65. Other de jure acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIIa (de jure) 
 
 
 Includes other de jure prohibitions, infringements, interferences not specified above under 
evaluation criteria nos. 61-64 that violate (either in a direct or an indirect way, by 
punishing or by discouraging workers) workers rights according to other trade union 
activities. 
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66. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIIa (de jure) 
 
 
 Includes lack of adequate legislation that would guarantee the due process of law (fair and 
rapid trial by an independent and impartial tribunal); 
 Includes the lack of legal guarantees for recourse to judicial authority (e.g. the lack of the 
right to appeal or cases where the appeal can only be lodged to one of the Ministries) 
against any civil, administrative, criminal and/or disciplinary decision. 
 Note: Includes de jure lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de jure other 
union activities, as listed under evaluation criteria nos. 61-65. 
 
IIIb. Other union activities, de facto 
67. Infringements on the right to freely draw up constitutions and rules (de facto) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 369-387 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 108, 109-112 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes interference in practice in the trade union‘s right to freely draw or amend 
constitutions and rules (e.g. making the approval of the constitution and rules subject to 
arbitrary decisions of public authorities/employers); 
 Includes cases where public authorities or employers interfere in practice to draw up 
constitutions and rules of trade unions; 
 Includes imposition in practice to follow a model constitution which contains more than 
certain purely formal clauses or to use such a model as a basis; 
 Includes requirement of amendments to constitution in practice that go beyond formal 
requirements; 
 Includes requirement of making the constitution subject to approval by the central or higher 
level organizations. 
 
68. Infringements on the right to freely elect representatives (de facto) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 388-453 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 108, 113-123 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes de facto interference by public authorities/employers in trade unions‘ right to 
freely elect/re-elect their representatives (e.g. arbitrary prior approval of the results of the 
elections; interference in various stages of the electoral process; obligation to submit 
candidates‘ names in advance to the public authority; presence of representatives of public 
authorities (civil or military), labour inspectors) (Digest, Paras. 429., 437-438.); 
 Includes supervision of the election procedures by authorities/employers or the single 
trade union central organization (e.g. being physically present during the election); 
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 Includes removal or suspension of trade union officers in practice which is not the result 
of an internal decision of the trade union or normal judicial proceedings and the 
placement of trade unions under control by public authorities (Digest, Paras. 444-453.); 
 Includes intimidation of candidates and other trade unionist to impede their participation; 
 Includes suspension of the validity of elections – pending the final outcome of the judicial 
proceedings - based on complaints brought before labour courts by an administrative 
authority challenging the results of trade union elections (Digest, Para. 441.). 
 
 
69. Infringements on the right to freely organize and control internal and financial administration 
(de facto) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 454-494 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 108, 124-127 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes lack of financial independence in practice (e.g. examination of books and other 
documents without safeguards of ordinary due processes of law; discretionary power of 
authorities/employers for investigation and to demand information at any time by public 
authorities); 
 Includes cases where organizations are financed in such a way as to allow the public 
authorities to enjoy discretionary powers over them; 
 Includes control and restriction in practice on the use of trade union dues and funds, 
including the collection of union dues (e.g. withholding trade union dues or to 
withdrawing the check-off facility); 
 Includes interference through freezing of union bank accounts (Digest, Para. 486.) or 
prohibiting trade union leaders from receiving remuneration of any kind (Digest, 
Para. 458.); 
 Includes obstruction of the acceptance by a trade union of financial or other assistance 
from an international organization of workers to which it is affiliated or imposing prior 
authorization in practice in order to receive it; 
 Includes interference of public authorities/employers in the right of trade unions to 
resolve any disputes by themselves (Digest, Para. 484.). 
 
70. Infringements on the right to freely organize activities/programmes (de facto) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 495-519 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 108, 128-135 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes major difficulties, restrictions in practice of trade union organizations‘ 
participation in political activities for the promotion of their specific objectives (but not 
for the promotion of essentially political interests); 
 Includes major difficulties, restrictions in practice of any legitimate trade union activities 
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(Digest, Paras. 508-519., e.g. petitions, campaigns, submitting claims to the employers, 
representation of trade union members before court to defend them, organizing training 
programmes, etc.); 
 Includes restrictions/prohibitions in practice relating to facilities necessary for the proper 
exercise of trade union functions (e.g. access to their offices, access to the workplace, free 
time accorded to trade union leaders) that goes beyond the aim to ensure respect for 
democratic rules. 
  
71. Other de facto acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIIb (de facto) 
 
 
 Includes other de facto prohibitions, infringements and interferences not included above 
under evaluation criteria nos. 67-70 that violate (either in a direct or an indirect way or by 
intimidating, discouraging workers) workers‘ rights according to the other trade union 
activities. 
 
72. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIIb (de facto) 
 
 
 Includes infringements in practice of the right to fair and rapid trial (e.g. non-informing 
about charges, delays in procedure, lack of adequate time and/or facilities to prepare 
defence, etc.); 
 Includes lack of independent and impartial judiciary; 
 Includes absence of judgement, impunity or lack of dissuasive sanctions. 
 Note: Includes de facto lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de facto 
other union activities, as listed under evaluation criteria nos. 67-71. 
 
IVa. Right to collective bargaining, de jure 
73. General prohibition on the right to collective bargaining (de jure) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 880-884 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 235-236, 260-264 in General Survey 1994. 
 Includes explicit general legal prohibition of collective bargaining. 
74. Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to collective bargaining (de jure) 
Article 5 - 6 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 885-911 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 261-264 in General Survey 1994.  
 
 Includes the explicit or indirect exclusion/restriction in law of workers from the right to 
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collective bargaining other than the armed forces, police and public servants engaged in 
the administration of State; 
 Does not include exclusion/restriction of the armed forces, police and public servants 
engaged in the administration of State; 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on race, political opinion, nationality; 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on occupational categories: e.g. 1. public sector 
workers (other than public servants directly engaged in the administration of state, e.g. 
teachers, public hospital workers); 2. private sector workers; 3. workers in atypical 
occupation; 4. workers in Export Processing Zones and 5. workers in other vulnerable 
situation (e.g. agricultural, rural workers; domestic workers; migrant workers, seafarers, 
women; workers affected by structural changes e.g. outsourced workers; self-employed 
workers; workers in ―disguised‖ employment relationship). 
 
75. Exclusion/restriction of subjects covered by collective bargaining (de jure) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 912-924 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Para. 250 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legal restrictions on the scope of negotiable issues (e.g. wages, benefits and 
allowances, working hours, rest periods, leave and conditions of work, selection criteria 
in case of redundancy, the coverage of the collective agreement, system for the collection 
of union dues, the granting of trade union facilities, including access to the workplace 
beyond what is provided for in legislation, etc. (Digest, Para. 913.)); 
 Includes legal prohibition on the extension of matters covered by collective bargaining; 
 Includes legislation that allows the employer and public authorities as employers to 
unilaterally regulate the terms and conditions of employment or to refuse to bargain 
collectively on certain issues. 
 Note: ―With regard to allegations concerning the refusal to bargain collectively on certain 
matters in the public sector, the Committee has recalled the view of the Fact-Finding and 
Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association that ‗there are certain matters which 
clearly appertain primarily or essentially to the management and operation of government 
business; these can reasonably be regarded as outside the scope of negotiation. It is 
equally clear that certain other matters are primarily or essentially questions relating to 
conditions of employment and that such matters should not be regarded as falling outside 
the scope of collective bargaining conducted in an atmosphere of mutual good faith and 
trust.‖ (Digest, Para. 920.) 
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76. Compulsory arbitration accorded to collective bargaining (de jure) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 925-928, 992-997, 566-567 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 254-259 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Does not include recourse to compulsory arbitration if it is at the request of both parties 
involved in a dispute, where compulsory arbitration is not indicated as binding, in the 
case of public servants engaged in the administration of State, in essential services in the 
strict sense of the term (those services whose interruption would endanger the life, 
personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population) or in case of acute 
national emergency; 
 Includes imposition of compulsory arbitration by law in cases where the parties do not 
reach agreement through collective bargaining; 
 Includes legislation that enables public authorities and/or one of the parties to recourse 
unilaterally to compulsory arbitration, except in cases, where authorities might be 
justified to step in when it is obvious that the longstanding deadlock in bargaining will 
not be broken without some initiative on their part. 
 
77. Infringements on the determination/recognition of trade unions entitled to collective 
bargaining (de jure) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 944-983 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 238-243 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows the discretionary refusal to recognize the organizations 
representative of the workers or the most representative one of these organizations for 
collective bargaining purposes; 
 Includes legislation that bases the determination of the representative organization not on 
objective, pre-established and precise criteria; 
 Includes legislation that requires excessively high representation thresholds or 
membership for trade unions for collective bargaining purposes, e.g. by requiring 
absolute majority (50 per cent of the members of the bargaining unit) without granting 
collective bargaining rights to all the union in this unit, at least on behalf of their own 
members, in case no union covers more than 50 per cent of the workers in the unit (rights 
of minority unions (Digest, Paras. 974-980.); 
 Includes legislation that sets excessive, lengthy and complicated procedures to determine 
the trade union(s) entitled to negotiate; 
 Includes legislation that sets excessively long periods after which an organization which 
fails to secure a sufficiently large number or an organization other than the certified 
organizations can ask for new election; 
 Includes legislation that does not provide the right to any new organization other than the 
certified organization to demand a new election after a reasonable period has elapsed; 
 Includes legislation that entitles representatives of unorganized workers to be one of the 
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parties in collective bargaining in spite of the existing workers‘ organizations. 
 Note: With regard to legislation that allows the procedure of certifying unions as 
exclusive bargaining agents, the following safeguards should be included: (a) certification 
to be made by an  independent body; (b) the representative organizations to be chosen by 
a majority vote of the employees in the unit concerned; (c) the right of an organization 
which fails to secure a sufficiently large number of votes to ask for a new election after a 
stipulated period; (d) the right of an organization other than the certified organizations to 
demand a new election after a fixed period, often 12 months, has elapsed since the 
previous election. (Digest, Para. 969.) 
 
78. Acts of interference in collective bargaining and/or insufficient promotion of collective 
bargaining (de jure) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 880-881, 925-938, 984-991, 1003-1004, 1046, 1058 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 244-249 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that infringes the free and voluntary character of collective bargaining 
and allows any undue interference in the negotiation process; 
 Includes lack of mechanisms for the promotion of collective bargaining (i.e. lack of 
machinery and procedures to facilitate bargaining, lack of access to information on the 
economic situation of the bargaining unit, enterprise or companies in the same sector) or 
includes legislation that does not guarantee the autonomy of parties to collective 
bargaining (Digest, Para. 933.); 
 Includes the legal prohibition/restriction of access to voluntary dispute settlement 
procedures, to which the parties may have recourse on a voluntary basis and by mutual 
agreement, to facilitate the conclusion of a collective agreement; 
 Includes legislation that determines and imposes the level of bargaining or entitles 
administrative authority to determine and impose the level of bargaining; 
 Includes legislation that sets unreasonable and discouraging time-limits for bargaining; 
 Includes legislation that infringes the rights of workers‘ organizations to choose which 
delegates will represent them in collective bargaining or that regulates the composition of 
the representatives of the parties (Digest, Paras. 984-985.); 
 Includes legislation that provides incentives to workers to give up the right to collective 
bargaining; 
 Includes legislation that as part of the government‘s economic stabilization policy allows 
restrictions on future collective bargaining for instance on wage rates or wage increases 
beyond the level of the increase in the cost of living, except if such restriction is imposed 
as an exceptional measure and only to the extent that is necessary (e.g. not exceeding 
sectors actually facing an emergency situation), without exceeding a reasonable period 
and if it is accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect workers‘ living standards 
(Digest, Paras. 1024-1032.). 
 Does not include legislation that allows the interventions of the authorities in cases it is 
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obvious that the deadlock in bargaining will not be broken without some initiative on 
their part, except cases where the intervention is not consistent with the principle of free 
and voluntary negotiations (Digest, Paras. 1003-1004.). 
 Note: ―Article 4 of Convention No. 98 in no way places a duty on the government to 
enforce collective bargaining, nor would it be contrary to this provision to oblige social 
partners, within the framework of the encouragements and promotion of the full 
development and utilization of collective bargaining machinery, to enter into negotiations 
on terms and conditions of employment. The public authorities should however refrain 
from any undue interference in the negotiation process.‖ (Digest, Para. 928.). 
 Note: ―The Committee has endorsed the point of view expressed by the Committee of 
Experts in its 1994 General Survey: ‗While the principle of autonomy of the parties to 
collective bargaining is valid as regards public servants covered by Convention No. 151, 
the special characteristics of the public service described above require some flexibility in 
its application. Thus, in the view of the Committee, legislative provisions which allow 
Parliament or the competent budgetary authority to set upper and lower limits for wage 
negotiations or to establish and overall ―budget package‖ within which the parties may 
negotiate monetary or standard-setting clauses (...) or those which give the financial 
authorities the right to participate in collective bargaining alongside the direct employers, 
are compatible with the Convention, provided they leave a significant role to collective 
bargaining. It is essential, however, that workers and their organizations are be able to 
participate fully and meaningfully in designing this overall bargaining framework, which 
implies in particular that they must have access to all the financial, budgetary and other 
data enabling them to assess the situation on the basis of the facts (...).‖ (Digest, 
Para. 1038.) 
 
79. Acts of interference according to collective agreements (de jure) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 940-943, 1001-1023, 1047-1053 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 251-253 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows intervention in drafting collective agreements (e.g. 
observance of criteria pre-established by the law); 
 Includes legislation that allows the unilateral alteration of the content of collective 
agreements (e.g. by subjecting collective agreements to government economic policy) or 
the discretionary refusal to approve a collective agreement (e.g. on grounds such as 
incompatibility with the general policy of the government); 
 Includes legislation that allows the unilateral suspension/cancellation of collective 
agreements freely entered into by the parties by decree (e.g. because they were contrary to 
national economic policy), unless the parties agreed on the suspension/cancellation; 
 Includes legislation that allows/requests prior approval of collective agreements (system 
of previous administrative authorization) unless the approval may only be refused if the 
collective agreement has a procedural flaw or does not conform to the minimum standards 
laid down by general labour legislation (General Survey, Para. 251.); 
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 Includes legal provisions on the obligation to renegotiate existing collective agreements 
(e.g. forced renegotiation of collective agreements for reasons of economic crisis); 
 Includes legal provisions on the compulsory extension of the period for which collective 
agreements are in force, unless it is used only in cases of emergency and for brief periods 
of time (Digest, Para. 1023.); 
 Includes legislation that sets an excessive statutory period for the duration in force of 
collective agreements (Digest, Paras. 1047-1049.); 
 Includes legislation that allows the extension of a collective agreement (e.g. to an entire 
sector or to non-member workers of enterprises) contrary to the views of the organization 
representing most of the workers in a category covered by the extended agreement; or if 
the extended agreement is a collective agreement that was not negotiated by the most 
representative organization (Digest, Paras. 1052-1053.); 
 Includes legislation that allows offering better working conditions to non-unionized 
workers under individual agreements if the latter can override certain clauses in the 
collective agreement, except if the relationship between individual contracts and the 
collective agreement has been agreed between the employer and the trade union 
organizations (Digest, Paras. 1054-1056.). 
 Does not include a ―procedure to draw the attention of the parties in certain cases to 
considerations of general interest that might call for further examination by them of 
proposed agreements, provided, however, that preference is always given to persuasion 
rather than coercion‖. (General Survey, Para. 253.) 
 
80. Infringements of the consultation with workers’ organizations (de jure) 
Paras. 1065-1088 in Digest of decisions and principles. 
 
 Includes legislation that infringes the principle of consultation and cooperation (social 
dialogue) between public authorities and employers‘ and workers‘ organizations (e.g. by 
discriminating between the relevant organizations); 
 Includes legislation that allows by-passing tripartite consultation during the preparation 
and adoption of legislation affecting workers‘ and employers‘ and their organizations‘ 
interests or before the establishment of new labour, social or economic policy (e.g. refusal 
to permit the participation of trade union organizations in the preparation of new 
legislation affecting their interests). 
 
81. Other de jure acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re Iva (de jure) 
 
 
 Includes other de jure prohibitions, infringements, interference not included above under 
evaluation criteria nos. 73-80 that violates (either in a direct or an indirect way, by 
punishing them or by discouraging them) workers‘ right to bargain collectively. 
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82. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re Iva (de jure) 
 
 
 Includes lack of adequate legislation that would guarantee the due process of law (fair and 
rapid trial by an independent and impartial tribunal); 
 Includes the lack of legal guarantees for recourse to judicial authority (e.g. the lack of the 
right to appeal or cases where the appeal can only be lodged to one of the Ministries) 
against any civil, administrative, criminal and/or disciplinary decision. 
 Note: Includes de jure lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de jure right 
to collective bargaining, as listed under evaluation criteria nos. 73-81. 
 
IVa. Right to collective bargaining, de facto 
83. Obstacles towards collective bargaining in practice (de facto) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 880-882 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 235-236, 260-264 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes obstacles to the free and voluntary negotiation in practice; 
 Includes major difficulties, restrictions in practice on the right to collective bargaining. 
 
84. Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to collective bargaining (de facto) 
Article 5-6 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 885-911 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 261-264 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes the explicit or indirect exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to 
collective bargaining other than the armed forces, police and public servants engaged in 
the administration of State; 
 Does not include exclusion/restriction of the armed forces, police and public servant 
engaged in the administration of State; 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on race, political opinion, nationality; 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on occupational categories: e.g. 1. public sector 
workers (other than public servants directly engaged in the administration of state, e.g. 
teachers, public hospital workers); 2. private sector workers; 3. workers in atypical 
occupation; 4. workers in Export Processing Zones and 5. workers in other vulnerable 
situation (e.g. agricultural, rural workers; domestic workers; migrant workers, seafarers, 
women; workers affected by structural changes e.g. outsourced workers, workers in 
privatized companies; workers in the informal economy; workers in ―disguised‖ 
employment relationship.). 
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85. Exclusion/restriction of subjects covered by collective bargaining (de facto) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 912-924 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Para. 250 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes infringements by setting in practice the subjects covered by collective bargaining 
unilaterally either by public authorities or employers; 
 Includes arbitrary refusal in practice to bargain collectively on certain issues. 
 Note: ―With regard to allegations concerning the refusal to bargain collectively on certain 
matters in the public sector, the Committee has recalled the view of the Fact-Finding and 
Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association that ‗there are certain matters which 
clearly appertain primarily or essentially to the management and operation of government 
business; these can reasonably be regarded as outside the scope of negotiation‖. It is 
equally clear that certain other matters are primarily or essentially questions relating to 
conditions of employment and that such matters should not be regarded as falling outside 
the scope of collective bargaining conducted in an atmosphere of mutual good faith and 
trust.‖ (Digest, Para. 920.) 
 
86. Compulsory arbitration accorded to collective bargaining (de facto) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 925-928, 992-997, 566-567 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 254-259 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Does not include recourse to compulsory arbitration if it is at the request of both parties 
involved in a dispute, or where compulsory arbitration is not indicated as binding, in the 
case of public servants engaged in the administration of State, in essential services in the 
strict sense of the term (those services whose interruption would endanger the life, 
personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population) or in case of acute 
national emergency; 
 Includes imposition of compulsory arbitration in cases where the parties do not reach 
agreement through collective bargaining; 
 Includes cases where public authorities and/or one of the parties recourse unilaterally to 
compulsory arbitration (except cases, when authorities might be justified to step in when 
it is obvious that the deadlock in bargaining will not be broken without some initiative on 
their part). 
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87. Infringements on the determination/recognition of trade unions entitled to collective 
bargaining (de facto) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 944-983 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 238-243 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes cases where the determination of the representative organization is based on the 
discretionary decision of employers and/or public authorities in practice; 
 Includes the discretionary refusal to recognize a trade union, the non-recognition of the 
most representative organizations and the infringement of the  right to determine the trade 
union(s) entitled to negotiate; 
 Includes the denial of collective bargaining rights for the unions in the unit, at least on 
behalf of their own members, in case no union covers more than 50 per cent of the 
workers in the unit (rights of minority unions, Digest, Paras. 974-980.)); 
 Includes the discretionary rejection of the request for a new election of the organization 
which fails to secure a sufficiently large number or an organization other than the 
certificated organizations after a reasonable period has elapsed; 
 Includes practices applied in order to delay the recognition process (excessive, lengthy 
and complicated procedure); 
 Includes collective bargaining with representatives of unorganized workers in practice in 
spite of the existence of workers‘ organizations; 
 Includes privileges provided in a discretionary manner to the most representative 
organization that go beyond priority in representation for the purpose of collective 
bargaining, consultation by governments or the appointment of delegates to international 
bodies and might lead to depriving other trade union organizations of the essential means 
for defending the occupational interests of their members, for organizing their 
administration and activities and formulating their programmes (Digest, Para. 346.). 
 Note: Allowing the procedure of certifying unions as exclusive bargaining agents, the 
following safeguards should be included: (a) certification to be made by an  independent 
body; (b) the representative organizations to be chosen by a majority vote of the 
employees in the unit concerned; (c) the right of an organization which fails to secure a 
sufficiently large number of votes to ask for a new election after a stipulated period; 
(d) the right of an organization other than the certificated organizations to demand a new 
election after a fixed period, often 12 months, has elapsed since the previous election. 
(Digest, Para. 969.) 
 
88. Acts of interference in collective bargaining and/or insufficient promotion of collective 
bargaining (de facto) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 880-881, 925-938, 984-991, 1003-1004,1046, 1058 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 244-249 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes infringements in practice of the principle of free and voluntary bargaining and 
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the principle of bargaining in good faith (e.g. unjustified delays in the holding of 
negotiations (Digest, Para. 937.)) or the autonomy of parties to collective bargaining; 
 Includes refusal to bargain collectively, to use the mechanisms promoting and facilitating 
collective bargaining (i.e. denial of access to information on the economic situation of the 
bargaining unit, enterprise or companies in the same sector); 
 Includes the unilateral determination of the level of bargaining and the setting of 
unreasonable and discouraging time-limits for bargaining; 
 Includes infringements on the rights of workers‘ organizations to choose which delegates 
will represent them in collective bargaining (Digest, Paras. 984-985.); 
 Includes offering incentives to workers to give up their right to collective bargaining 
(Digest, Para. 1058.); 
 Includes restrictions as part of the government‘s economic stabilization policy on future 
collective bargaining for instance on wage rates or wage increases beyond the level of the 
increase in the cost of living, except if such restriction is imposed as an exceptional 
measure and only to the extent that is necessary (e.g. not exceeding sectors actually 
facing an emergency situation), without exceeding a reasonable period and if it is 
accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect workers‘ living standards (Digest, 
Paras. 1024-1032.). 
 Does not include interventions of the authorities in cases it is obvious that the deadlock in 
bargaining will not be broken without some initiative on their part, except the 
intervention is not consistent with the principle of free and voluntary negotiations 
(Digest, Paras. 1003-1004.). 
 Note: ―Article 4 of Convention No. 98 in no way places a duty on the government to 
enforce collective bargaining, nor would it be contrary to this provision to oblige social 
partners, within the framework of the encouragements and promotion of the full 
development and utilization of collective bargaining machinery, to enter into negotiations 
on terms and conditions of employment. The public authorities should however refrain 
from any undue interference in the negotiation process.‖ (Digest, Para. 928.) 
 Note: ―The Committee has endorsed the point of view expressed by the Committee of 
Experts in its 1994 General Survey: ‗While the principle of autonomy of the parties to 
collective bargaining is valid as regards public servants covered by Convention No. 151, 
the special characteristics of the public service described above require some flexibility in 
its application. Thus, in the view of the Committee, legislative provisions which allow 
Parliament or the competent budgetary authority to set upper and lower limits for wage 
negotiations or to establish and overall ―budget package‖ within which the parties may 
negotiate monetary or standard-setting clauses (...) or those which give the financial 
authorities the right to participate in collective bargaining alongside the direct employers, 
are compatible with the Convention, provided they leave a significant role to collective 
bargaining. It is essential, however, that workers and their organizations are be able to 
participate fully and meaningfully in designing this overall bargaining framework, which 
implies in particular that they must have access to all the financial, budgetary and other 
data enabling them to assess the situation on the basis of the facts (...).‖ (Digest, 
Para. 1038.) 
 96 Working Paper No. 99 
89. Acts of interference according to collective agreements (de facto) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 940-943, 1001-1023, 1047-1053 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 251-253 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes the failure to recognize and/or implement a collective agreement, even on a 
temporary basis; 
 Includes infringements of collective agreements in practice (e.g. intervention in drafting 
collective agreements; the unilateral alteration of the content of collective agreements or 
the recourse to renegotiation or unilaterally imposing the duration of collective 
agreements); 
 Includes the discretionary refusal to approve a collective agreement; unilateral 
suspension/cancellation of collective agreement (unless the parties agree on the 
suspension/cancellation); 
 Includes the prior approval of collective agreements in practice; 
 Includes the unilateral extension of the period for which collective agreements are in 
force; 
 Includes the discretionary or unilateral extension of a collective agreement (e.g. to an 
entire sector or to non-member workers of enterprises) if contrary to the views of the 
organization representing most of the workers in a category covered by the extended 
agreement; or if the extended agreement is a collective agreement that was not negotiated 
by the most representative organization (Digest, Paras. 1052-1053.); 
 Includes the case for offering better working conditions to non-unionized workers under 
individual agreements if the latter can override certain clauses in the collective 
agreement; 
 Does not include a ―procedure to draw the attention of the parties in certain cases to 
considerations of general interest that might call for further examination by them of 
proposed agreements, provided, however, that preference is always given to persuasion 
rather than coercion‖. (General Survey, Para. 253.) 
 
90. Infringements of the consultation with workers’ organizations (de facto) 
Paras. 1065-1088 in Digest of decisions and principles. 
 
 Includes infringements on the principle of consultation and cooperation (social dialogue) 
between public authorities and employers‘ and workers‘ organizations (e.g. by 
discriminating between the relevant organizations); 
 Includes by-passing/refusal of tripartite consultation during the preparation and adoption 
of legislation affecting workers‘ and employers‘ and their organizations‘ interests or 
before the establishment of new labour, social or economic policy (e.g. refusal to permit 
the participation of trade union organizations in the preparation of new legislation 
affecting their interests); 
 Includes infringements of the principles of full and frank consultation, consultation in 
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good faith and with mutual respect (e.g. not providing sufficient information on the issue 
being on the agenda). 
 
91. Other de facto acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IVb (de facto) 
 
 
 Includes other de facto prohibitions, infringements and interference not included above 
under evaluation criteria nos. 83-90 that violates (either in a direct or an indirect way or by 
intimidating, discouraging workers) workers‘ right to bargain collectively. 
 
92. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IVb (de facto) 
 
 
 Includes infringements in practice of the right for fair and rapid trial (e.g. non-informing 
about charges, delays in procedure, lack of adequate time and/or facilities to prepare 
defence, etc.); 
 Includes lack of independent and impartial judiciary; 
 Includes absence of judgement, impunity or lack of dissuasive sanctions. 
 Note: Includes de facto lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de facto 
right to collective bargaining, as listed under evaluation criteria nos. 83-91. 
 
 
Va. Right to strike, de jure 
93. General prohibition on the right to strike (de jure) 
Paras. 520-523, 570-571 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 136-142,145-151, 152 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes explicit or indirect prohibition by law of the right to strike. 
 Does not include prohibition of strikes in the event of an acute national emergency (such 
as those arising as a result of a serious conflict, insurrection or natural disaster), but just in 
cases where the decision making lies with an independent body which has the confidence 
of all parties concerned, if it is for a limited period and to the extent necessary to meet the 
requirements of the situation (Digest, Para. 571., General Survey, Para 152.). 
 
94. Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to strike (de jure) 
Paras. 572-594 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 154-160, 169 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes explicit or indirect exclusion/restriction by law of workers from the right to 
strike other than those working in essential services in the strict sense of term (i.e. 
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services whose interruption could endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole 
or part of the population)
90
 or public servants exercising authority in the name of State;
91
 
 Includes legislation that provide an overly broad definition of essential services and 
public sector workers exercising authority in the name of State; 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on race, political opinion, nationality; 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on occupational categories: e.g. 1. public sector 
workers (other than public servants directly engaged in the administration of state); 
2. private sector workers; 3. workers in atypical occupation; 4. workers in Export 
Processing Zones and 5. workers in other vulnerable situation (e.g. agricultural, rural 
workers; domestic workers; migrant workers, seafarers, women; workers affected by 
structural changes e.g. outsourced workers, workers in privatized companies; self-
employed workers; workers in ―disguised‖ employment relationship.). 
 Note: ―What is meant by essential services in the strict sense of the term depends to a 
large extent on the particular circumstances prevailing in a country. Moreover, this 
concept is not absolute, in the sense that a non-essential service may become essential if a 
strike lasts beyond a certain time or extends beyond a certain scope, thus endangering the 
life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population‖. (Digest, Para. 582.) 
 
95. Exclusion/restriction based on the objective of the strike (de jure) 
Paras. 526-544 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 165-168 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legal prohibition/restrictions of strikes other than purely political strikes, thus 
prohibition of strikes aiming to defend the occupational and socio-economic interests of 
workers in the broader sense (e.g. seeking of solutions to economic and social policy 
questions and problems facing the undertaking which are of direct concern to the workers 
(Digest, Para. 526.); protest strike aimed at criticizing a government‘s economic and 
social policies (Digest, Para. 529.)); 
 Includes legal prohibition/restriction of sympathy strikes, provided the initial strike they 
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 The following may be considered to be essential services in the strict sense of the term: the 
hospital sector; electricity services; water supply services; the telephone service; the police and the 
armed forces; the fire-fighting services; the public or private prison services; the provision of food 
to pupils of school age and the cleaning of schools; air traffic control. (Digest, Para. 585.) 
The following do not constitute essential services in the strict sense of the term: radio and television; 
the petroleum sector; ports; banking; computer services for the collection of excise duties and taxes; 
department stores and pleasure parks; the metal and mining sectors; transport generally; airline 
pilots; production, transport and distribution of fuel; railway services; metropolitan transport; postal 
services; refuse collection services; refrigeration enterprises; hotel services; construction; 
automobile manufacturing; agricultural activities, the supply and distribution of foodstuffs; the 
Mint; the government printing services and the state alcohol, salt and tobacco monopolies; the 
education sector; mineral water bottling company. (Digest, Para. 587.). 
91
 E.g. officials working in the administration of justice and the judiciary. (Digest, Para. 578.) 
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are supporting is in itself lawful; 
 Includes cases when the sympathy/solidarity strike was called by federation, 
confederation (Digest, Para. 525.) or by an international affiliation; 
 Does not include social peace obligations arising from collective agreements if they are 
compensated by the right to ―have recourse to impartial and rapid mechanisms, within 
which individual and collective agreements can be examined‖ (Digest, Para. 533.); and if 
the social peace obligation does not prevent workers‘ organizations from striking against 
the social and economic policy of the Government; 
 Includes a legal ban on strikes related to recognition disputes (for collective bargaining) 
(Digest, Para. 536.) and on calling for industrial action in support of multi-employers 
contracts (collective agreements) (Digest, Para. 540.); 
 Includes limiting strike actions solely to industrial disputes that are likely to be resolved 
through the signing of a collective agreement (Digest, Para. 531.); 
 Includes prohibition on strike actions that are not linked to a collective dispute to which 
the employee or union is a party (Digest, Para. 538.). 
 Note: ―The solution to a legal conflict as a result of a difference in interpretation of a legal 
text should be left to the competent courts. The prohibition of strikes in such a situation 
does not constitute a breach of freedom of association.‖ (Digest, Para. 532.) 
 
96. Exclusion/restriction based on the type of the strike (de jure) 
Paras. 545-546 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Para. 173 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legal prohibition/restriction on different types of strike actions, unless the strike 
action ceases to be peaceful; 
 Includes prohibition of strikes during particular days or at particular places other than 
those necessary to ensure public law and order. 
 Note: ―(...) Any work stoppage, however brief and limited, may generally be considered 
as a strike. This is more difficult to determine when there is no work stoppage as such but 
a slowdown in work (go-slow strike) or when work rules are applied to the letter (work-
to-rule); these forms of strike action are often just as paralyzing as a total stoppage. 
Noting that national law and practice vary widely in this respect, the Committee is of the 
opinion that restrictions as to the forms of strike action can only be justified if the action 
ceases to be peaceful.‖ (General Survey, Para. 173.) 
 
97. Lack of compensatory guarantees accorded to lawful restrictions on the right to strike (de 
jure) 
Paras. 595-603 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Para. 164 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that restricts or does not provide recourse to adequate, impartial, 
speedy conciliation and arbitration procedures (compensatory guarantees) in cases where 
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restrictions are lawfully placed on the right to strike (essential services in the strict sense 
of the term and the public service workers exercising authority in the name of sate); 
 Includes e.g. legislation that entitles the minister to appoint all members in the 
conciliation/arbitration body. 
 
98. Infringements on the determination of minimum services (de jure) 
Paras. 604-627 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 161-162 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes imposition of a minimum service by law in cases other than a) the essential 
services in the strict sense of the term, b) the services which are not essential but where 
the extent and duration of a strike might be such as to result in an acute national crisis 
endangering the normal living conditions of the population and c) the public services of 
fundamental importance (Digest, Para. 606.);
92
 
 Includes imposition of a minimum service by law that is not genuinely and exclusively a 
minimum service and goes beyond the intention to ensure safety of persons and 
machinery and the prevention of accidents (Digest, Para. 605.); 
 Includes legislation that allows determining minimum services and minimum number of 
workers unilaterally by the employers/public authorities (Digest, Para. 610.); 
 Includes legislation that determines or allows to determine minimum services in such a 
way which results in the strike becoming ineffective in practice (i.e. over-generous, not 
limited to the operations which are strictly necessary to meet the basic needs of the 
population or the minimum requirements of the service) (Digest, Para. 612.). 
 
99. Compulsory arbitration accorded to strikes (de jure) 
Paras. 564- 569 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Para. 153 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Does not include legislation that allows compulsory arbitration at the request of both 
parties involved in a dispute; which does not indicate compulsory arbitration as binding; 
or which allows compulsory arbitration in cases the right to strike is acceptably 
restricted/banned by law (public servants exercising authority in the name of State or in 
essential services in the strict sense of the term); 
 Includes imposition of compulsory arbitration (automatically) by law to prevent strike 
from occurring altogether or to end an ongoing strike; 
 Includes legislation that enables public authorities and/or employers to have recourse 
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 Examples of when the Committee has considered that the conditions were met for requiring a 
minimum operational service: ferry service; underground railway‘s activities; rail transport sector; 
transportation of passengers and commercial goods; postal service; refuse collection service; 
banking service and the petroleum sector. (Digest, Para. 615-626.). 
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unilaterally to compulsory arbitration to prevent or end strike actions. 
 
100. Infringements of the prerequisites lawfully required for exercising the right to strike (de 
jure) 
Paras. 547-563 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 170-172 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Does not include legislation which provides for voluntary negotiation, conciliation and 
arbitration before calling the strike or allows to suspend a strike for such procedures, as 
long as the restriction is accompanied by adequate, impartial and speedy negotiation, 
conciliation and arbitration procedures and does not prevent the calling of the strike once 
the period of time for previous negotiation, conciliation and mediation has expired 
(Digest, Paras. 549-550.); 
 Includes legislation that sets or allows to set too lengthy/unreasonable period of time for 
previous negotiation, conciliation and mediation; 
 Includes legislation that requests unreasonable period of notice/cooling-off periods before 
calling a strike, resulting in excessive delays and undermining the right to strike action 
(Digest, Para. 554.); 
 Includes legislation that requires a previous ballot where the ballot method, the quorum 
and the majority required is such as that the exercise of the right to strike is excessively 
limited (e.g. requirement of absolute majority of workers (Digest, Paras. 555-563.)); 
 Includes complicated legal procedures for declaring a strike that makes it practically 
impossible to declare a legal strike (Digest, Para. 548.). 
 
101. Acts of interference during the course of strike action (de jure) 
Paras. 628-653 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 174-175 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows the public authorities/government but not an independent 
body to declare a strike action illegal (Digest, Para. 628.); 
 Includes legislation that allows back-to-work orders or to hire workers during a strike in 
sectors that cannot be regarded as essential service in the strict sense of the term or when a 
strike does not cause a situation in which the life, health or personal safety of the 
population might be endangered (Digest, Paras. 632-639.); 
 Includes the prohibition by law of strike pickets, except for cases where it may disturb 
public order and threaten the right of workers to continue to work (Digest, 
Paras. 648-653.); 
 Includes legislation that allows the use of police, military and requisitioning orders to 
break a strike over occupational claims, unless these actions are aimed at maintaining 
essential services in circumstances of the utmost gravity (Digest, Para. 635.). 
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102. Imposing excessive sanctions in case of legitimate and peaceful strikes (de jure) 
Paras. 667-674 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 176-179 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Legislation that allows direct and/or indirect discriminatory measures for participating in 
legitimate and peaceful strikes should be coded under evaluation criterion no. 35; 
 Legislation that allows direct and/or indirect discriminatory dismissal/suspension/refusal 
of re-employment for participating in legitimate and peaceful strikes should be coded 
under evaluation criterion no. 37; 
 Includes legislation that allows excessive, disproportionate and/or penal sanctions for 
organizing or participating in legitimate and peaceful strike, irrespectively whether the 
strike is lawful or unlawful under the national legislation; 
 Includes legislation that orders/allows the closure of trade union offices because of strike 
action (Digest, Para. 659.). 
 Note: The principles of freedom of association do not protect abuses consisting of 
criminal acts while exercising the right to strike. Penal sanctions should only be imposed 
as regards strikes where there are violations of strike prohibitions which are themselves in 
conformity with the principles of freedom of association. All penalties in respect of 
illegitimate actions linked to strikes should be proportionate to the offence or fault 
committed and the authorities should not have recourse to measures of imprisonment for 
the mere fact of organizing or participating in a peaceful strike. (Digest, Paras. 667-668.) 
 
103. Other de jure acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re Va (de jure) 
 
 
 Includes other de jure prohibitions, infringements, interference not included above under 
evaluation criteria nos. 93-102 that violates (either in a direct or an indirect way, by 
punishing them or by discouraging them) the right to strike. 
 
104. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re Va (de jure) 
 
 
 Includes lack of adequate legislation that would guarantee the due process of law (fair and 
rapid trial by an independent and impartial tribunal); 
 Includes the lack of legal guarantees for recourse to judicial authority (e.g. the lack of the 
right to appeal or cases where the appeal can only be lodged to one of the Ministries) 
against any civil, administrative, criminal and/or disciplinary decision. 
 Note: includes de jure lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de jure right 
to strike, as listed under evaluation criteria nos. 93-103. 
 
 Working Paper No. 99 103 
Vb. Right to strike, de facto 
105. Obstacles to strike actions in practice (de facto) 
Paras. 520-523, 570-571 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 136-142,145-151, 152 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes major difficulties, restrictions, obstructions in practice on the right to strike in 
practice. 
 Does not include prohibition of strikes in the event of an acute national emergency (such 
as those arising as a result of a serious conflict, insurrection or natural disaster), but just in 
cases where the decision making lies with an independent body which has the confidence 
of all parties concerned, if it is for a limited period and to the extent necessary to meet the 
requirements of the situation. (Digest, Para. 571, General Survey, Para 152.) 
 
106. Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to strike (de facto) 
Paras. 572-594 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 154-160, 169 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to strike in practice other than 
those excluded/restricted by existing legislation that is in line with the principles of 
freedom of association, thus workers working in essential services in the strict sense of 
term
93
 - i.e. services whose interruption could endanger the life, personal safety or health 
of the whole or part of the population - or public servants exercising authority in the name 
of State;
94
 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on race, political opinion, nationality; 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on occupational categories: e.g. 1. public sector 
workers (other than public servants directly engaged in the administration of state); 
2. private sector workers; 3. workers in atypical occupation; 4. workers in Export 
Processing Zones and 5. workers in other vulnerable situation (e.g. agricultural, rural 
workers; domestic workers; migrant workers, seafarers, women; workers affected by 
structural changes e.g. outsourced workers, workers in privatized companies; workers in 
the informal economy; workers in ―disguised‖ employment relationship.). 
 Note: ―What is meant by essential services in the strict sense of the term depends to a 
large extent on the particular circumstances prevailing in a country. Moreover, this 
concept is not absolute, in the sense that a non-essential service may become essential if a 
strike lasts beyond a certain time or extends beyond a certain scope, thus endangering the 
life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population‖. (Digest, Para. 582.) 
 
 
93
 See footnote No. 90. 
94
 See footnote No. 91. 
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107. Exclusion/restriction based on the objective of the strike (de facto) 
Paras. 526-544 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 165-168 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes discretionary power of authorities to prohibit and/or restrict a strike by 
considering it purely political (e.g. prohibiting/restricting strikes aiming to defend the 
occupational and socio-economic interests of workers in the broader sense; protest strike 
aimed at criticizing a government‘s economic and social policies); 
 Includes major difficulties in practice to the organizing of sympathy strikes (provided the 
initial strike they are supporting is in itself lawful), including those ones called by 
federation, confederation (Digest, Para. 525.) or by an international organization; 
 Includes prohibition/restriction of strikes related to recognition disputes. 
 Note: ―The solution to a legal conflict as a result of a difference in interpretation of a legal 
text should be left to the competent courts. The prohibition of strikes in such a situation 
does not constitute a breach of freedom of association.‖ (Digest, Para. 532.) 
 
108. Exclusion/restriction based on the type of the strike (de facto)  
Paras. 545-546 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Para. 173 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes major difficulties/restrictions in practice on different types of strike actions, 
unless the strike action ceases to be peaceful; 
 Includes prohibition of strikes during particular days or at particular places other than 
those necessary to ensure public law and order. 
 Note: ―(...) Any work stoppage, however brief and limited, may generally be considered 
as a strike. This is more difficult to determine when there is no work stoppage as such but 
a slowdown in work (go-slow strike) or when work rules are applied to the letter (work-
to-rule); these forms of strike action are often just as paralyzing as a total stoppage. 
Noting that national law and practice vary widely in this respect, the Committee is of the 
opinion that restrictions as to the forms of strike action can only be justified if the action 
ceases to be peaceful.‖ (General Survey, Para. 173.) 
 
109. Lack of compensatory guarantees accorded to lawful restrictions on the right to strike (de 
facto) 
Paras. 595-603 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Para. 164 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes the denial of compensatory guarantees in cases where the right to strike is 
lawfully restricted (essential services in the strict sense of the term or public servants 
exercising authority in the name of State); 
 Includes major difficulties in practice of recourse to impartial, speedy conciliation and 
arbitration procedures (Digest, Para. 596.) in cases where restrictions are lawfully placed 
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on the right to strike (essential services in the strict sense of the term and the public 
service workers exercising authority in the name of sate); 
 Includes e.g. cases where the minister appoints all members in the conciliation/arbitration 
body. 
 
110. Infringements on the determination of minimum services (de facto) 
Paras. 604-627 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 161-162 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 
 Includes imposition of minimum service in practice in cases other than the essential 
services in the strict sense of the term; in services which are not essential but where the 
extent and duration of a strike might be such as to result in an acute national crisis 
endangering the normal living conditions of the population; and in public services of 
fundamental importance (Digest, Para. 606.);
95
 
 Includes imposition of minimum service in practice – despite existing legislation - in 
cases where it goes beyond the intention to ensure safety of persons and machinery and 
the prevention of accidents (Digest, Para. 605.); 
 Includes cases where the minimum services and minimum number of workers were 
determined unilaterally (Digest, Para. 610.); 
 Includes cases where minimum services were imposed in such a way that results in the 
strike becoming ineffective in practice (i.e. over-generous, not limited to the operations 
which are strictly necessary to meet the basic needs of the population or the minimum 
requirements of the service) (Digest, Para. 612.). 
 
111. Compulsory arbitration accorded to strikes (de facto) 
Paras. 564-569 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Para. 153 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Does not include recourse to compulsory arbitration if it is at the request of both parties 
involved in a dispute; where compulsory arbitration is not indicated as binding; or in case 
the right to strike is restricted/banned (disputes in the public service involving public 
servants exercising authority in the name of State or in essential services in the strict 
sense of the term); 
 Includes imposition of compulsory arbitration at the discretion of the public authorities 
and/or employers with the aim to prevent or end strike action; 
 Includes recourse to compulsory arbitration unilaterally by public authorities and/or 
employers. 
 
95
 See footnote No. 92. 
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112. Infringements of the prerequisites lawfully required for exercising the right to strike (de 
facto) 
Paras. 547-563 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 170-172 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes too lengthy period of time for previous negotiation, conciliation and mediation; 
 Includes infringements in practice with respect to strike ballots (infringements during the 
voting procedures, the counting of votes, presence of public authorities, etc.); 
 Includes complicated procedures for declaring a strike that makes it practically 
impossible to declare a legal strike. (Digest, Para. 548.) 
 
113. Acts of interference during the course of strike action (de facto) 
Paras. 628-653 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 174-175 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes declaration of a strike as illegal by public authorities in practice but not by an 
independent body (Digest, Para. 628.); 
 Includes back-to-work orders or hiring of workers in practice during a strike in sectors 
that cannot be regarded as essential service in the strict sense of the term or when a strike 
does not cause a situation in which the life, health or personal safety of the population 
might be endangered (Digest, Paras. 632-639.); 
 Includes the use of the military and requisitioning orders to break a strike unless these 
actions aim to maintain essential services (Digest, Para. 635.); 
 Includes the intervention of the army and/or police during the course of strike not limited 
to the maintenance of public order (Digest, Para. 645.) and/or not in ―situation where law 
and order is seriously and genuinely threatened‖ (Digest, Paras. 644, 640-647.); 
 Includes the prohibition of strike pickets in practice, except for cases it disturbs public 
order and threatens workers who continued to work. 
 
114. Imposing excessive sanctions in case of legitimate and peaceful strikes (de facto) 
Paras. 667-674 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 176-179 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Cases of direct and/or indirect discriminatory measures for participating in legitimate 
and peaceful strikes should be coded under evaluation criterion no. 50; 
 Cases of direct and/or indirect discriminatory dismissal/suspension/refusal of re-
employment for participating in legitimate and peaceful strikes should be coded under 
evaluation criterion no. 53; 
 Includes excessive, disproportionate and/or penal sanctions for organizing or participating 
in legitimate and peaceful strike, irrespectively whether the strike is lawful or unlawful 
under the national legislation; 
 Includes the closure of trade union offices because of strike action (Digest, Para. 659.). 
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 Note: The principles of freedom of association do not protect abuses consisting of 
criminal acts while exercising the right to strike. Penal sanctions should only be imposed 
as regards strikes where there are violations of strike prohibitions which are themselves in 
conformity with the principles of freedom of association. All penalties in respect of 
illegitimate actions linked to strikes should be proportionate to the offence or fault 
committed and the authorities should not have recourse to measures of imprisonment for 
the mere fact of organizing or participating in a peaceful strike. (Digest, Paras. 667-668.) 
 
115. Committed against trade union leaders re 114 (de facto) 
 
 
 Includes cases when the incident is committed against trade union leaders. 
 
116. Other de facto acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re Vb (de facto) 
 
 
 Includes other de facto prohibitions, infringements and interference not included above 
under evaluation criteria nos. 105-115 that violates (either in a direct or an indirect way or 
by intimidating, discouraging workers) right to strike. 
 
117. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re Vb (de facto) 
 
 
 Includes infringements in practice of the right for fair and rapid trial (e.g. non-informing 
about charges, delays in procedure, lack of adequate time and/or facilities to prepare 
defence, etc.); 
 Includes lack of independent and impartial judiciary; 
 Includes absence of judgement, impunity or lack of dissuasive sanctions. 
 Note: Includes de facto lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de facto 
right to strike, as listed under evaluation criteria nos. 105-116. 
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3.2.  Issues of non-compliance in relation to the 
rights of employers’ organizations 
VIa. Fundamental civil liberties, de jure 
118. Arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of members of employers' 
organizations (de jure) 
Paras. 61-95 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 31-32 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows (arbitrary) arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging, 
fining and other heavy criminal sanctions (e.g. education through labour, forced labour) 
for reasons connected with membership in employers‘ organization and/or legitimate 
activities in relation with their right of association – even for a short period; 
 Includes legislation that indicates prosecution and sanction for membership in employers‘ 
organization and/or activities in relation with their right of association that should be 
considered legitimate even if the national legislation considers it illegal, but the legislation 
is such as to impair or shall be so applied as to impair civil liberties, freedom of 
association and collective bargaining rights and its guarantees; 
 Includes legislation that allows arrest and detention of members of employers‘ 
organizations without any charges being laid or court warrants being issued and without 
being accompanied by safeguards; 
 Includes legislation that allows the arrest and sentencing of members of employers‘ 
organizations on ground of the ―disturbance of public order‖; 
 Includes legislation that imposes sanctions that are not proportionate to the offence or 
fault committed. 
 
119. Infringements of employers' organizations' basic freedoms and/or of their right to protection 
of their premises and property (de jure) 
Paras. 121-192, 706-708 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 34-40 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes de jure non-compliance with freedom of movement; rights of assembly and 
demonstration; freedom of opinion and expression; 
 Includes legislation that (directly or indirectly) violates freedom of movement of members 
of employers‘ organizations (Digest, Paras. 121-129.). It includes cases such as: 
- Prohibition for persons to leave any country, including their own country, and to return to 
their country for reasons of membership in employers‘ organizations and/or legitimate 
activities in relation with their right of association (Digest, Para. 122.); 
- House arrest, surveillance, banishment or expulsion from their country for membership in 
employers‘ organizations and/or their legitimate activities (Digest, Para. 124., 128.). 
 Includes legislation that is such as to violate employers‘ right for peaceful and legitimate 
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assembly and demonstration in pursuit of their legitimate objectives (Digest, 
Paras. 130-153.); 
- Includes prohibition or dissolution of peaceful and legitimate demonstrations that are 
considered to be illegitimate by national legislation, but the national legislation is such as 
to impair or shall be so applied as to impair civil liberties, freedom of association and 
collective bargaining rights and its guarantees; 
- Includes both the meetings of organizations in their premises, and also public meetings 
and demonstrations (Digest, Paras. 131-151.); 
- Includes prior authorization, interference by public authorities based on legislation for 
reasons that go beyond the aim of maintaining public order; 
- Includes attendance of  meetings by a representative of the public authorities; 
- Includes requesting unreasonable, excessive formalities, setting time restrictions; 
- Includes lack of precise instruction to police authorities in order to avoid cases where 
people are arrested simply for having organized or participated in a demonstration. 
 Includes legislation that violates employers‘ freedom of opinion and expression (Digest, 
Paras. 154-174.); 
- This includes freedom of opinion and expression both at their meetings, in publications 
(through uncensored and independent press (Digest, Para. 158.)) and in other activities in 
relation to their right of association (Digest, Para. 154.); 
- Includes acts of previous authorization and censorship of publications; subjecting 
employers‘ organization‘s publication to the granting of a licence at the discretion of 
licensing authorities; imposing restrictions on the subject matter of publications; 
requirement to provide a substantial bond before being able to publish a newspaper; 
- Includes measures of administrative control, arbitrary withdrawal of a licence; 
- Includes the temporary or definitive suspension and/or seizure of publications (Digest, 
Paras. 172-173.). 
 Includes legislation that allows arbitrary occupation and seizure of employers‘ 
organizations‘ and their members‘ premises and property; 
 Includes confiscation based on legislation and legally obtained court order for reasons 
considered to be illegitimate by national legislation, but where the legislation is such as to 
impair or shall be so applied as to impair civil liberties, freedom of association and 
collective bargaining rights and its guarantees; 
 Includes entry or search with prior authorization or with obtained legal warrant for 
activities considered to be illegitimate by national legislation, but where the legislation is 
such as to impair or shall be so applied as to impair civil liberties, freedom of association 
and collective bargaining rights and its guarantees; 
 Includes legislation that allows the disposal of dissolved assets of organizations in a 
manner contrary to the organizations‘ own rules, or in the absence of such rules, which 
disposes the assets to others than the employers‘ concerned (Digest, Paras. 706-709.; 
General Survey, Paras. 186-188.); 
 Includes legislation that allows the closure of enterprise in the event of a strike and thus 
infringes the freedom of work of persons not participating in a strike and disregards the 
basic needs of the enterprise (maintenance of equipment, prevention of accidents and the 
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right of employers and managerial staff to enter the installations of the enterprise and to 
exercise their activities) (Digest, Para. 676.). 
 
120. Excessive prohibitions/restrictions on employers' organizations' rights in the event of state of 
emergency (de jure) 
Paras. 193-204 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 677, 701, 777 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 41-43 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows unjustified suspensions, prohibitions, derogations, 
exemptions from civil liberties, rights of employers‘ organizations and its guarantees 
based on a reason that a state of emergency exists (e.g. arbitrary arrest, detention of 
members‘ of employers‘ organizations, restrictions on their meetings, restrictions on 
publications; suspension or dissolution of associations by administrative authority, etc.). 
 Does not include restrictions imposed in the context of a state of emergency if such 
restrictions are justified in the event of an acute national emergency and are accompanied 
by normal judicial safeguards (Digest, Paras. 198-199.). 
 
121. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re VIa (de jure) 
Paras. 48-57, 75-83, 89-90, 96-120 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 29, 31-32 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes lack of adequate legislation that would guarantee the due process of law (fair and 
rapid trial by an independent and impartial tribunal, e.g. non-informing about charges, 
delays in procedure, lack of adequate time and/or facilities to prepare defence, etc.); 
 Includes the lack of legal guarantees for recourse to judicial authority (e.g. the lack of the 
right to appeal or cases where the appeal can only be lodged to one of the Ministries) 
against any administrative decision concerning the rights of employers‘ organizations; 
 Includes legal proceedings overly lengthy (Digest, Paras. 104-105.); 
 Includes the lack of dissuasive and exemplary sanction or compensation for damages 
suffered. 
 Note: Includes de jure lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de jure 
fundamental civil liberties, as listed under evaluation criteria nos. 118-120. 
 
VIb. Fundamental civil liberties, de facto 
122. Murder or disappearance of members of employers' organizations (de facto) 
Paras. 42-60 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 28-30 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes those cases where the murder or disappearance is connected with  membership in 
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employers‘ organization and/or activities in relation of their right of association (e.g. 
targeted killings, dispersal of public meetings by the police involving loss of life); 
 Refers only to de facto issues of non-compliance, as it is unlikely that national legislation 
would contain any paragraph that would explicitly render death penalty for membership in 
employers‘ organization or their activities; 
 Includes murder or disappearance of family members of members of employers‘ 
organizations. 
 
123. Committed against leaders of the organization re 122 (de facto) 
 
 
 Includes cases when the incident is committed against leaders of employers‘ organizations. 
 
124. Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 122 (de facto) 
Paras. 48-57, 75-83, 89-90, 96-120 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 29, 31-32 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes infringements in practice of the right to fair and rapid trial (e.g. non-informing 
about charges, delays in procedure, lack of adequate time and/or facilities to prepare 
defence, etc.); 
 Includes legal proceedings overly lengthy (‗Justice delayed is justice denied‘) (Digest, 
Paras. 104-105.); 
 Includes lack of independent and impartial judiciary; 
 Includes absence of judgement, impunity or lack of dissuasive sanctions, compensation 
for damages suffered. 
 Note: Impunity refers to cases in which those committing violations are not brought to 
account since they are not subject to inquiry that might lead to their being accused, 
arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to dissuasive sanctions. It also includes 
ineffective investigatory institutions in which no meaningful progress in investigative and 
judicial phases can be observed or where such institutions are observed not to be 
independent. 
 
125. Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 122 (de facto) 
Paras. 52-53 in Digest of decisions and principles. 
 
 Includes flagrant cases, occurring in a widespread and/or systematic manner that is 
continuously followed by the absence of independent judicial inquiry and judgements 
against the guilty parties (situation of impunity), therefore reinforcing the climate of 
violence and insecurity and thus creating an extremely damaging effect on the exercise of 
freedom of association and collective bargaining rights. 
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126. Other violent action and/or arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of members 
and leaders of the employers organizations (de facto) 
Paras. 42-95 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 28-33 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes those cases where the violent action is connected with membership in 
employers‘ organization and/or activities in relation to their right of association; 
 Includes violent actions against  family members of members of employers‘ 
organizations; 
 Refers only to de facto issues of non-compliance; 
 Includes violent actions such as physical assault, attacks, injury, torture, cruelty or ill-
treatment while in detention (Digest, Para. 56.); internment in psychiatric hospitals 
(Digest, Para. 91.); 
 Includes intimidation (e.g. death threat), coercion under threat of force; 
 Includes cases in which the dispersal of public meetings by the police, being excessive, 
has involved serious injury; 
 Includes the militarization of workplaces; 
 Includes the creation of an environment of fear, climate of violence, coercion and threats;  
 Includes prosecution of and arbitrary sanctions (arrest, detention, imprisonment, fines or 
other heavy criminal sanctions) for reasons connected with membership in employers‘ 
organizations and/or their legitimate activities (Digest, Para. 71.); 
 Includes prosecution of and arbitrary sanctions (arrest, detention, imprisonment, fines) 
based on fictitious charges; 
 Includes arrest, detention and apprehension without any charges being brought or without 
any court warrant being issued; 
 Includes cases where the sanction imposed is not proportionate to the offence or fault 
committed (heavy criminal sanctions); education through labour systems; 
 Includes apprehension and systematic or arbitrary interrogation by police in practice 
(Digest, Para. 68.). 
 
127. Committed against leaders of the organization re 126 (de facto) 
 
 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 123 
 
128. Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 126 (de facto) 
Paras. 48-57, 75-83, 89-90, 96-120 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 29, 31-32 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 124 
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129. Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 126 (de facto) 
Paras. 52-53 in Digest of decisions and principles. 
 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 125 
 
130. Infringements of employers' organizations' basic freedoms and/or attacks against their 
premises and property (de facto) 
Paras. 121-192, 706-708 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 34-40 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes de facto non-compliance with freedom of movement; rights of assembly and 
demonstration; freedom of opinion and expression; 
 Includes infringements in practice that results in the prohibition or restriction of freedom 
of movement. It includes cases such as: 
- Prohibition to leave any country, including the employer own country, and to return to 
his/her country, withholding travel documents (Digest, Para. 122.) or other measures that 
prevent representatives of employers‘ organizations from e.g. participating in international 
meetings of employers‘ organizations;  
- Restricted movement; house arrest, surveillance (Digest, Para. 124.); 
- Practice of freeing members of employers‘ organizations on condition that they leave the 
country (Digest, Para. 127.); 
- Restriction of a person‘s movements to a limited area, accompanied by the prohibition of 
entry into the area in which his/her organization operates and he/she carries on his/her 
functions. 
 Includes infringements in practice of the right of peaceful and legitimate assembly and 
demonstration by interference of public authorities for reasons that go beyond the aim of 
maintaining public order and security (Digest, Paras. 130-153.); 
- This contains both the meetings of organizations in their premises and also public 
meetings and demonstration (Digest, Paras. 131-151.); 
- Includes the use of force that goes beyond the aim of maintaining public order and 
security; 
- Includes cases of arbitrary refusal to hold public meetings and demonstrations; 
- Includes the holding of meetings only with the presence of the members of the police or 
any representative of the public authorities (General Survey, Para. 35.); 
- Includes lack of precise instruction to police authorities in order to avoid cases where 
public order is not seriously threatened, people are not arrested simply for having 
organized or participated in a demonstration. 
 Includes infringements in practice of employers‘ freedom of opinion and expression 
(Digest, Paras. 154-173.); 
- This includes freedom of opinion and expression both at employers‘ organizations 
meetings, in publications (through uncensored and independent press (Para. 158.)) and in 
other activities in relation to their right of association (Digest, Para. 154.); 
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- Includes measures of arbitrary administrative control, withdrawal of a licence, control of 
printing plants and equipments, the control of paper supply (General Survey, 
Paras. 38-39.); 
- Includes censorship in practice; and the arbitrary temporary or definitive suspension 
and/or seizure of publications (Digest, Paras. 172-173.). 
 Includes arbitrary occupation, seizure and destruction of premises and property of 
employers‘ organizations and its members in practice; 
 Includes arbitrary confiscation of property without legally obtained court order; 
 Includes entry or search without prior authorization or without having obtained legal 
warrant (Digest, Paras. 180-182., 185.); 
 Includes entry or search with prior authorization or with obtained legal warrant in cases 
where the public authority does not have good reasons to believe that evidence of criminal 
proceeding under the ordinary law will be found; 
 Includes cases where the search is not restricted to the purpose for which the warrant was 
issued; 
 Includes cases where the assets of organizations that are dissolved are seized and not 
handed over to the association that succeeds it or distributed in accordance with its own 
rule, or in the absence of such rule, is handed at the disposal of others than the employers 
concerned (Digest, Paras. 706-709.; General Survey, Paras. 186-188.); 
 Includes the closure of enterprise in the event of a strike, being an infringement of the 
freedom of work of person not participating in a strike and the basic needs of the 
enterprise (maintenance of equipment, prevention of accidents and the right of employers 
and managerial staff to enter the installations of the enterprise and to exercise their 
activities) (Digest, Para. 676.). 
 
131. Committed against leaders of the organization re 130 (de facto) 
 
 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 123 
 
132. Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 130 (de facto) 
Paras. 48-57, 75-83, 89-90, 96-120 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 29, 31-32 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 124 
 
133. Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 130 (de facto) 
Paras. 52-53 in Digest of decisions and principles. 
 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 125 
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134. Excessive prohibitions/restrictions on employers' organizations' rights in the event of state of 
emergency (de facto) 
Paras. 193-204 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 677, 701, 777 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 41-43 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes unjustified suspensions, prohibitions, derogations, exemptions from civil 
liberties, freedom of association and collective bargaining rights and its guarantees based 
on a reason that a state of emergency exists (e.g. arbitrary arrest, detention of employers, 
restrictions on their meetings, restrictions on publications;, suspension or dissolution of 
associations by administrative authority, etc.); 
 Includes calling state of emergency by the state for the purpose of evading the  rights of 
employers‘ organizations, freedom of association principles or ignoring civil liberties; 
 Includes major difficulties, restrictions in practice on civil liberties, rights of employers‘ 
organizations and its guarantees in the event of state of emergency. 
 Does not include restrictions imposed in the context of a state of emergency if such 
restrictions are justified in the event of an acute national emergency and are accompanied 
by normal judicial safeguards (Digest, Paras.198-199.). 
 
135. Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 134 (de facto) 
Paras. 48-57, 75-83, 89-90, 96-120 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 29, 31-32 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 124 
 
136. Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 134 (de facto) 
Paras. 52-53 in Digest of decisions and principles. 
 
 See under evaluation criterion no. 125 
 
 
VIIa. Right of employers to establish and join organizations, de jure 
137. Prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion from the right of employers to establish and join 
organizations (de jure) 
Articles 1-2 and 7 of Convention No. 87; 
Article 1 and 3 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 209-308 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 44-78 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes explicit general legal prohibition on the establishment of employers‘ 
organization; 
 Includes the explicit exclusion or indirect restriction of employers from the right to 
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establish and/or join employers‘ organizations; 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on race, political opinion, nationality (Digest, 
Paras. 210-215.) or on occupational categories; 
 Includes legislation that allows public authorities to impose previous authorization 
requirements that may constitute an obstacle to the establishment of an organization 
(Digest, Para. 272.); 
 Includes legislation that goes beyond setting formalities to ensure the normal functioning 
of organization (Digest, Paras. 275-278.); 
 Includes legislation obliging organizations to deposit their rules, unless this is merely a 
formality; 
 Includes acquisition of legal personality subject to legal conditions that restrict 
establishment of employers‘ organizations (Digest, Para. 272.); 
 Includes legal requirements regarding minimum number of members at too high level 
(Digest, Paras. 283-292.); 
 Includes legal formalities (e.g. excessively detailed provisions) that are able to impair or 
discourage employers from the establishment of organization (Digest, Para. 281.); 
 Includes conditions of registration that are tantamount to obtaining previous authorization 
from the public authorities (e.g. complicated, lengthy procedures, excessive registration 
requirements) (Digest, Paras. 295.); 
 Includes legislation that entitles the competent authority with discretionary power to grant 
or reject registration; 
 Includes legislation that allows a decision to prohibit the registration of an employers‘ 
organization to become effective before the statutory period of lodging an appeal has 
expired or before the court has confirmed the appeal (Digest, Para. 301.); 
 Includes legislation that allows direct and/or indirect discriminatory measures or prejudice 
against an employer on grounds of being a member in an employers‘ organization or for 
exercising his/her freedom of association and collective bargaining rights;  
 Includes lack of adequate legal measure guaranteeing effective protection for employers 
against discriminatory measures (prompt, impartial and fair procedures together with 
sufficiently dissuasive sanctions against such discriminatory measures). 
 
138. Restrictions on the right of employers to establish and join to organizations of their own 
choosing (de jure) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 309-345, 360-362 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 79-107 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legal restrictions on the structure and composition of organizations; 
 Includes restrictions in law that affect the size of organizations by setting that a certain 
number of members should belong to the same occupation or enterprise; 
 Includes legal restrictions on the composition of employers‘ organizations (e.g. restricting 
the members of the organization to employers from the same occupation, setting undue 
 Working Paper No. 99 117 
quota or high minimum proportion of certain employers in law); 
 Includes cases where legislation permits only first level organizations. 
 Includes legislation that permits only single organizations at various levels and imposes a 
monopoly situation (e.g. by prohibiting the creation of more than one first-level 
organization either in a given occupation, economic category or a given territorial are 
(Digest, Paras. 311-332.), or by permitting one national employers‘ organization for a 
given category of employers); 
 Includes legislation that imposes either a monopoly situation or the proliferation of 
employers‘ organizations and thus obstruct employers‘ organizations to establish or join 
organizations ―of their own choosing‖ (Digest, Paras. 320-323.); 
 Includes cases when the indirect result of a legislation is that it is impossible to establish a 
second organization representing employers‘ interest (e.g. by fixing the percentage for 
membership in a level that makes it impossible to establish several organizations (General 
Survey, Para. 94.)); 
 Includes cases where legislation institutionalizes a factual monopoly, by referring to the 
single organization by name (Digest, Para. 330.); 
 Includes obligation in law to affiliate to the single central organization or to conform to 
the constitutions of the single existing central organization or to pay contributions to a 
single national employers‘ organization; 
 Includes legislation that allows discrimination between employers‘ organizations if it 
creates indirectly a monopoly situation (for instance by placing an employers‘ 
organization at an advantage or disadvantage in relation to another employers‘ 
organization (Digest, Para. 341.)); other cases of discrimination between employers‟ 
organizations should be coded under evaluation criterion no. 140. 
 Does not include the distinction between the most representative employers‘ organizations 
and other employers‘ organizations, except if this distinction has an effect of depriving 
other employers‘ organizations of the essential means for defending the occupational 
interests of their members, for organizing their administration and activities and 
formulating their programmes (Digest, Para. 346.) or if the determination of the most 
representative employers‘ organization is not based on objective and pre-established 
criteria (Digest, Para. 347.). 
 
139. Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or 
legislation (de jure) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 677-705 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 180-185 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows dissolution or suspension by administrative authorities, 
(administrative dissolution of employers‘ organizations) without ensuring the right of 
appeal to an independent and impartial judicial body (Digest, Para. 691.); 
 Includes legislation that allows the cancellation of registration of an organization by the 
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registrar or the removal of employers‘ organizations from the register (Digest, 
Paras. 685-686.) or the annulment/suspension of legal personality; 
 Includes legislation that allows dissolution and suspension for reasons considered to be 
illegal in the national legislation, but which legislation is such as to impair or shall be so 
applied to impair rights of employers‘ organizations and its guarantees; 
 Includes dissolution and suspension by law on account of unreasonably determined 
insufficient membership (Digest, Para. 680.); 
 Includes legislation that allows dissolution or suspension for reasons that are not 
proportionate (e.g. for illegal activities carried out by some leaders, for irregularities in the 
financial management, etc.); 
 Includes dissolution/suspension by law where the dissolution/suspension is not being a 
remedy of last resort with the exhaustion other possibilities with less serious effects for 
the organization as a whole; 
 Includes cases where the administrative decision can take effect before the expiry of the 
statutory period for lodging an appeal, without an appeal having been entered or before 
the confirmation of such decisions by a judicial authority (Digest, Para. 703.). 
 
140. Acts of interference of workers’ organizations and/or public authorities (de jure) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 855-859, 863-868 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 225-234 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows undue interference by workers‘ organizations and/or 
public authorities that is such as to impair or shall be so applied as to impair employers‘ 
organization rights and its guarantees; 
 Includes legislation that allows acts of interferences which are designed to promote the 
establishment of an employers‘ organization under the domination of public authorities; 
 Includes legislation that allows for discrimination between employers‘ organizations, 
unless it leads to a monopoly situation in which case it should be coded under evaluation 
criterion no. 138; 
 Includes legislation that allows the disclosure of information on membership and 
activities in employers‘ organization; infringement on the inviolability of correspondence 
and telephonic conversation; establishment of a register containing data on members of 
employers‘ organization (Digest, Paras. 175-177.). 
 
141. Lack of adequate legal guarantees against acts of interference (de jure) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 860-862, 865 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 225-234 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes the lack of clear and precise legal provisions ensuring the adequate protection of 
employers‘ organizations against acts of interference (rapid and efficient procedures, 
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coupled with effective and dissuasive sanctions). 
 
142. Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international 
organizations (de jure) 
Article 6-7 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 710-768 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 189-198 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes general prohibition in law for employers‘ organizations to establish and/or 
affiliate with federations and confederations (Paras. 710-729.); 
 Includes general prohibition in law for employers‘ organizations, federations and 
confederations to affiliate with international organizations of employers (Paras. 732-768.); 
 Includes legislation that excludes/restricts employers‘ organizations from the right to 
establish and join federations and confederations or to affiliate with international 
organizations of employers; 
 Includes legislation that allows public authorities to impose previous authorization 
requirements to establish federations and confederations or to affiliate with international 
organizations of employers. 
 Note: All other infringements of rights relating to federations/confederations/international 
organizations should be coded under the specific evaluation criterion the infringement 
links to. 
 
143. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re VIIa (de jure) 
 
 
 Includes lack of adequate legislation that would guarantee the due process of law (fair and 
rapid trial by an independent and impartial tribunal); 
 Includes the lack of legal guarantees for recourse to judicial authority (e.g. the lack of the 
right to appeal or cases where the appeal can only be lodged to one of the Ministries) 
against any civil, administrative, criminal and/or disciplinary decision. 
 Note: Includes de jure lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de jure right 
of employers to establish and join organizations, as listed under evaluation criteria 
nos. 137-142. 
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VIIb. Right of employers to establish and join organizations, de facto 
144. Prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion from the right of employers to establish and join 
organizations (de facto) 
Articles 1-2 and 7 of Convention No. 87; 
Article 1 and 3 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 209-308 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 44-78 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes major difficulties, restrictions and obstacles in practice on the right of employers 
to establish and join organizations; 
 Includes the explicit exclusion or indirect restriction of employers from the right to 
establish and/or join employers‘ organizations; 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on race, political opinion, nationality or on 
occupational categories; 
 Includes cases where public authorities can arbitrarily impose previous authorization 
requirements that may constitute an obstacle to the establishment of an organization 
(Digest, Para. 272.); 
 Includes cases where either the government or other competent administrative authorities 
(e.g. registrar) have discretionary power in practice to grant or refuse registration of 
employers‘ organization; 
 Includes undue practices that are able to impede the right of employers to establish 
organization (e.g. intentional delays in administrative procedures); 
 Includes cases where the formalities prescribed by law for the establishment of an 
employers‘ organization are applied in a manner as to delay or prevent the establishment 
of an employers‘ organization (Digest, Para. 279.); 
 Includes decisions to prohibit the registration of an employers‘ organization which has 
received legal recognition to become effective before the statutory period of lodging an 
appeal has expired or before the court has confirmed the appeal; 
 Includes direct and/or indirect discriminatory measures or prejudice against an employer 
on grounds of being a member in an employers‘ organization or for exercising his/her 
freedom of association and collective bargaining rights; 
 Includes lack of adequate protection in practice for employers against discriminatory 
measures (infringements in practice of the right to fair, impartial and rapid trial, lack of 
dissuasive sanctions against such discriminatory measures). 
 
145. Restrictions on the right of employers to establish and join to organizations of their own 
choosing (de facto) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 309-345, 360-362 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 79-107 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes restrictions in practice that affect the size of organizations by requiring  that a 
certain number of members should belong to the same occupation; 
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 Includes restrictions in practice on the composition of the employers‘ organization (e.g. 
allowing only employers from the same occupation to become a member of the 
organization); 
 Includes exercise of discretionary power of the competent authorities in practice to refuse 
the registration of an employers‘ organization when they consider that an already 
registered organization adequately represents the employers concerned; 
 Includes the denial of the possibility to form other organizations where a single 
organization is already established; 
 Includes direct/indirect support in practice of one employers‘ organization on the account 
of other employers‘ organizations, placing one organization at an advantage or 
disadvantage in relation to the others and thus creating indirectly a monopoly situation; 
 Includes state-sponsored and controlled monopoly of employers‘ organization; 
 Includes discrimination between employers‘ organizations, if it creates indirectly a 
monopoly situation (for instance through unequally distributed aid, premises provided for 
holding meetings or activities to one organization but not to another, refusal to recognize 
officers of some organizations in the exercise of their legitimate activities) other cases of 
discrimination between employers‟ organizations should be coded under evaluation 
criterion no. 147. 
 Does not include the distinction between the most representative employers‘ 
organizations and other employers‘ organizations, except if this distinction has an effect 
of depriving other employers‘ organizations of the essential means for defending the 
occupational interests of their members, for organizing their administration and activities 
and formulating their programmes (Digest, Para. 346.) or if the determination of the most 
representative employers‘ organization is not based on objective and pre-established 
criteria (Digest, Para. 347.). 
 
146. Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or 
legislation (de facto) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 677-705 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 180-185 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes arbitrary dissolution/suspension by administrative authorities (administrative 
dissolution of employers‘ organization) in practice; 
 Includes discretionary cancellation of the registration of an organization by the registrar or 
their removal from the register, being tantamount to the dissolution of the organization by 
administrative authority (Digest, Para. 685.); 
 Includes dissolution by the employers‘ organization said to be voluntary, though it can be 
proven that the decision was not freely taken or not by following the procedure regulated 
in the by-laws of the employers‘ organization; 
 Includes discretionary dissolution or suspension in practice for reasons that are not 
proportionate (e.g. for illegal activities carried out by some leaders, for irregularities in the 
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financial management, etc.); 
 Includes cases where the dissolution/suspension was not a remedy of last resort with the 
exhaustion other possibilities with less serious effects for the organization as a whole; 
 Includes cases that indirectly lead to the dissolution or suspension (e.g. loss of advantages 
essential to carrying out their activities, depriving it of its financial resources or 
annulment or suspension of legal personality); 
 Includes cases where the administrative decision can take effect before the expiry of the 
statutory period for lodging an appeal, without an appeal having been entered or before 
the confirmation of such decisions by a judicial authority (Digest, Para. 703.). 
 
147. Acts of interference of workers’ organizations and/or public authorities (de facto) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 855-859, 863-868 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 225-234 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes undue interference of workers‘ organizations and/or public authorities that is 
such as to impair or shall be so applied as to impair employers‘ organization rights and its 
guarantees; 
 Includes acts of interferences which are designed to promote the establishment of an 
employers‘ organization under the domination of public authorities; 
 Includes the establishment of parallel employers‘ organizations or other associations by 
public authorities; propaganda of public authorities against an already existing 
employers‘ organization or tactics in the form of bribes offered to members of employers‘ 
organization, or threats of closure of enterprise to encourage their withdrawal from their 
organization; 
 Includes cases of government interferences when the government has one of its members 
as a leader of an employers‘ organization (Digest, Para. 867.); 
 Includes discrimination between employers‘ organizations, unless it leads to a monopoly 
situation in which case it should be coded under evaluation criterion no. 145; 
 Includes disclosure of information on membership and activities in employers‘ 
organization; infringement on the inviolability of correspondence and telephonic 
conversation; establishment of a register containing data on members in employers‘ 
organization (Digest, Paras. 157-177.). 
 
148. Lack of adequate guarantees against acts of interference (de facto) 
Article 2 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 860-862, 865 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 225-234 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes infringements in practice of provisions ensuring the adequate protection of 
employers‘ organizations against acts of interference; 
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 Includes infringements in practice of the right to fair and rapid trial, the lack of 
independent and impartial judiciary and/or lack of sufficiently dissuasive sanctions. 
 
149. Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international 
organizations (de facto) 
Article 6-7 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 710-768 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 189-198 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes obstacles in practice towards the establishment of federations and confederations 
(Paras. 710-729.); 
 Includes obstacles towards the affiliation of employers‘ organizations, federations, 
confederation with international organizations of employers (Paras. 732-768.); 
 Includes exclusion/restriction of employers‘ organizations in practice from the right to 
establish and join federations and confederations or to affiliate with international 
organizations of employers; 
 Includes previous authorization requirements in practice to establish federations and 
confederations or to affiliate with international organizations of employers. 
 Note: All other infringements of rights relating to federations/confederations/international 
organizations should be coded under the specific evaluation criterion the infringement 
links to. 
 
150. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re VIIb (de facto) 
 
 
 Includes infringements in practice of the right to fair and rapid trial (e.g. non-informing 
about charges, delays in procedure, lack of adequate time and/or facilities to prepare 
defence, etc.); 
 Includes lack of independent and impartial judiciary; 
 Includes absence of judgement, impunity or lack of dissuasive sanctions. 
 Note: Includes de facto lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de facto 
right of employers to establish and join organizations, as listed under evaluation criteria 
nos. 144-149. 
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VIIIa. Other activities of employers’ organizations, de jure 
151. Infringements on the right to freely draw up constitutions, rules and to organize their 
administration, activities, programmes (de jure) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 369-519 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 108, 109-135 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that violates the rights of employers‘ organizations to freely draw up 
their constitutions and rules, to freely organize their internal and financial administration, 
activities and programmes. 
 Infringements of the right of employers‘ organizations to freely draw up their 
constitutions and rules include: 
- Legislation that goes beyond the objective of protecting the interests of members and 
guaranteeing the democratic functioning of organizations, and therefore may undermine 
the rights of employers‘ organizations to draw up (or amend) their constitution and rules 
in full freedom (e.g. overly detailed and restrictive legal provisions, provisions that go 
beyond formal requirements listing the particulars that must be contained in the 
constitution/rules (Digest, Para. 379.)); 
- Interference based on legislation, e.g. making the constitution and rules subject to prior 
approval of public authorities or enabling the public authorities to draw up the 
constitution; 
- Legal requirements to follow a model constitution and rules which contain more than 
certain purely formal clauses or to use such a model as a basis (Digest, Para. 384.). 
 Infringements of the right employers‘ organizations to freely elect their representatives 
include: 
- Legislation that restricts, infringes the right of employers‘ organizations to primarily 
determine the regulation of procedures and methods for the election of their officials e.g. 
through excessively precise, meticulous and detailed regulation (Digest, Paras. 392-393.); 
- Legislation that obliges employers‘ organizations to submit their candidates‘ names 
together with personal particulars in advance to the authorities; 
- Infringements of the right of employers‘ organizations to determine eligibility conditions 
for their representatives (e.g. setting nationality, political beliefs or lack of them and 
requirement of being free of any criminal conviction as a condition for office) (Digest, 
Paras. 390., 405-426.); 
- Interference in the election by public authorities based on legislation (e.g. prior approval 
of the results of the elections by public authorities; nomination by the authorities/political 
parties of members; interference in various stage of the electoral process for instance by 
being physically present during the election; obligation to submit candidates‘ names in 
advance to the public authority (Digest, Paras. 429., 437-438.)); 
- Legislation that restricts re-elections or sets the maximum length of terms of office 
(Digest, Paras. 425-426.; General Survey, Para. 121.); 
- Legal provisions that permit the suspension and removal of officers or the placing of 
employers‘ organizations under control e.g. through the appointment of temporary 
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administrators by the administrative authorities (Digest, Para. 444-453.); 
- Legislation that – pending the final outcome of the judicial proceedings - allows 
suspending the validity of elections based on complaints brought before labour courts by 
an administrative authority challenging the results of elections (Digest, Para. 441.). 
 Infringements of the right of employers‘ organizations to freely organize their internal and 
financial administration include: 
- Legislation that allows interference or control in the internal administration of 
organizations that goes beyond the aim to ensure respect for democratic rules and 
provides authorities with discretionary rights of employers‘ organizations‘ internal and 
financial administration; 
- Lack of financial independence (e.g. being financed in such a way as to allow the public 
authorities to enjoy discretionary powers over them); 
- Control and restriction on the use of dues and funds of employers‘ organizations, 
including the collection of employers‘ organizations‘ dues (Digest, Para. 484.); 
- Legal provisions which give the authorities the right to restrict the freedom of a 
employers‘ organization to administer and utilize its funds as it wishes for normal and 
lawful purposes of the organization; 
- Legal provisions exceeding the obligations normally limited to submitting periodic 
financial reports or allowing administrative control over the assets of employers‘ 
organization (such as financial audits and investigations) to be applied not only in 
exceptional cases, when justified by grave circumstances (e.g. presumed irregularities in 
the annual statement); 
- Legislation prohibiting the acceptance of financial or other assistance from an 
international organization of employers to which it is affiliated or requiring the 
employers‘ organization to obtain prior authorization to receive it; 
- Legislation that allows interference of public authorities in the right of employers‘ 
organizations to resolve any disputes by themselves (Digest, Para. 460.). 
 Infringements of the right of employers‘ organizations to freely organize their activities 
and programmes include: 
- General prohibition in law of employers‘ organizations‘ participation - aiming the 
advancement of their economic and social objectives - in political activities (Digest, 
Para. 498.); 
- Establishment of a close relationship between employers‘ organizations and a political 
party by legislation (e.g. with the aim to transform the employers‘ organization into an 
instrument for the pursuance of political aims) (Digest, Para. 499.); 
- Legislative provisions which regulate in detail the internal functioning of employers‘ 
organizations; 
- Prohibition or restriction in law of any other legitimate activities of employers‘ 
organizations (Digest, Paras. 508-519., e.g. petitions, campaigns, organizing training 
programmes, etc.); 
- Legal restrictions/prohibitions relating to facilities necessary for the proper exercise of 
employers‘ organizations‘ functions that go beyond the aim to ensure respect for 
democratic rules. 
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152. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re VIIIa (de jure) 
 
 
 Includes lack of adequate legislation that would guarantee the due process of law (fair and 
rapid trial by an independent and impartial tribunal); 
 Includes the lack of legal guarantees for recourse to judicial authority (e.g. the lack of the 
right to appeal or cases where the appeal can only be lodged to one of the Ministries) 
against any civil, administrative, criminal and/or disciplinary decision. 
 Note: Includes de jure lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de jure other 
union activities, as listed under evaluation criterion no. 151. 
 
VIIIb. Other activities of employers’ organizations, de facto 
153. Infringements on the right to freely draw up constitutions, rules and to organize their 
administration, activities, programmes (de facto) 
Article 3 of Convention No. 87; 
Paras. 369-519 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 108, 109-135 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes infringements in practice of the rights of employers‘ organizations to freely draw 
up their constitutions and rules, to freely organize their internal and financial 
administration, activities and programmes. 
 Infringements of the right of employers‘ organizations to freely draw up their 
constitutions and rules in practice include: 
- Interference in practice in the  right of employers‘ organizations to freely draw or amend 
constitutions and rules (e.g. making the approval of the constitution and rules subject to 
arbitrary decisions of public authorities); 
- Includes cases where public authorities interfere in practice to draw up constitutions and 
rules of employers‘ organizations; 
- Imposition in practice to follow a model constitution which contains more than certain 
purely formal clauses or to use such a model as a basis; 
- Requirement of amendments to constitution in practice that go beyond formal 
requirements; 
- Requirement of making the constitution subject to approval by the central or higher level 
organizations. 
 Infringements of the right of employers‘ organizations to freely elect their representative 
in practice include: 
- De facto interference by public authorities in the right of employers‘ organizations to 
freely elect/re-elect their representatives (e.g. arbitrary prior approval of the results of the 
elections; interference in various stages of the electoral process; obligation to submit 
candidates‘ names in advance to the public authority; presence of representatives of public 
authorities (civil or military), labour inspectors) (Digest, Paras. 429., 437-438.); 
- Supervision of the election procedures by authorities (e.g. being physically present during 
 Working Paper No. 99 127 
the election); 
- Removal or suspension of officers in practice which is not the result of an internal 
decision of the employers‘ organization or normal judicial proceedings and the placement 
of employers‘ organizations under control by public authorities (Digest, Paras. 444-453.); 
- Intimidation of candidates and other members of employers‘ organization to impede their 
participation; 
- Suspension of the validity of elections – pending the final outcome of the judicial 
proceedings - based on complaints brought before labour courts by an administrative 
authority challenging the results of elections (Digest, Para. 441.). 
 Infringements of the right of employers‘ organizations to freely organize their internal and 
financial administration in practice include: 
- Lack of financial independence in practice (e.g. examination of books and other 
documents without safeguards of ordinary due processes of law; discretionary power of 
authorities for investigation and to demand information at any time by public authorities); 
- Cases where organizations are financed in such a way as to allow the public authorities to 
enjoy discretionary powers over them; 
- Control and restriction in practice on the use of dues and funds of employers‘ 
organizations, including the collection of union dues (Digest, Para. 484.); 
- Interference through freezing of employers‘ organizations bank accounts (Digest, 
Para. 486.); 
- Obstruction of the acceptance of financial or other assistance from an international 
organization of employers to which it is affiliated or imposing prior authorization in 
practice in order to receive it; 
- Interference of public authorities in the right of employers‘ organizations to resolve any 
disputes by themselves (Digest, Para. 460.). 
 Infringements of the right of employers‘ organizations to freely organize their activities 
and programmes in practice include: 
- Major difficulties, restrictions in practice of employers organizations‘ participation in 
political activities for the promotion of their specific objectives (but not for the promotion 
of essentially political interests); 
- Major difficulties, restrictions in practice of any legitimate activities of employers‘ 
organizations (Digest, Paras. 508-519., e.g. petitions, campaigns, organizing training 
programmes, etc.); 
- Restrictions/prohibitions in practice relating to facilities necessary for the proper exercise 
of employers‘ organizations‘ functions that goes beyond the aim to ensure respect for 
democratic rules. 
 
154. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re VIIIb (de facto) 
 
 
 Includes infringements in practice of the right to fair and rapid trial (e.g. non-informing 
about charges, delays in procedure, lack of adequate time and/or facilities to prepare 
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defence, etc.); 
 Includes lack of independent and impartial judiciary; 
 Includes absence of judgement, impunity or lack of dissuasive sanctions. 
 Note: Includes de facto lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de facto 
other union activities, as listed under evaluation criterion no. 153. 
 
IXa. Right to collective bargaining, de jure 
155. Prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion from the right to collective bargaining (de jure) 
Article 4-6 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 880-911 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 235-236, 260-264 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes explicit general legal prohibition of collective bargaining; 
 Includes the explicit exclusion or indirect restriction in law of employers or their 
organizations from the right to collective bargaining; 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on race, political opinion, nationality or on 
occupational categories. 
 
156. Exclusion/restriction of subjects covered by collective bargaining (de jure) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 912-924 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Para. 250 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legal restrictions on the scope of negotiable issues (e.g. wages, benefits and 
allowances, working hours, rest periods, leave and conditions of work, selection criteria 
in case of redundancy, the coverage of the collective agreement, system for the collection 
of union dues, etc. (Digest, Para. 913.)); 
 Includes legal prohibition on the extension of matters covered by collective bargaining. 
 Does not include legislation that excludes from the subjects covered by negotiations of 
matters which are for the employer to decide upon as part of the freedom to manage the 
enterprise. 
 Note: ―With regard to allegations concerning the refusal to bargain collectively on certain 
matters in the public sector, the Committee has recalled the view of the Fact-Finding and 
Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association that ‗there are certain matters which 
clearly appertain primarily or essentially to the management and operation of government 
business; these can reasonably be regarded as outside the scope of negotiation. It is 
equally clear that certain other matters are primarily or essentially questions relating to 
conditions of employment and that such matters should not be regarded as falling outside 
the scope of collective bargaining conducted in an atmosphere of mutual good faith and 
trust.‖ (Digest, Para. 920.) 
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157. Compulsory arbitration accorded to collective bargaining (de jure) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 925-928, 992-997 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 254-259 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Does not include recourse to compulsory arbitration if it is at the request of both parties 
involved in a dispute, where compulsory arbitration is not indicated as binding, in the 
case of public servants engaged in the administration of State, in essential services in the 
strict sense of the term (those services whose interruption would endanger the life, 
personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population) or in case of acute 
national emergency; 
 Includes imposition of compulsory arbitration by law in cases where the parties do not 
reach agreement through collective bargaining; 
 Includes legislation that enables public authorities and/or one of the parties to recourse 
unilaterally to compulsory arbitration, except in cases, where authorities might be 
justified to step in when it is obvious that the longstanding deadlock in bargaining will 
not be broken without some initiative on their part. 
 
158. Infringements on the determination/recognition of employers' organizations entitled to 
collective bargaining (de jure) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 944-983 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 238-243 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes legislation that allows the discretionary refusal to recognize the organizations 
representative of the employers or the most representative one of these organizations for 
collective bargaining purposes; 
 Includes legislation that bases the determination of the representative organization not on 
objective, pre-established and precise criteria; 
 Includes legislation that requires excessively high representation thresholds or 
membership for employers‘ organizations for collective bargaining purposes, or  sets 
excessive, lengthy and complicated procedures to determine the employers‘ organizations 
entitled to negotiate; 
 Includes legislation that sets excessively long periods after which an organization which 
fails to secure a sufficiently large number or an organization other than the certified 
organizations can ask for new election; 
 Includes legislation that does not provide the right to any new organization other than the 
certified organization to demand a new election after a reasonable period has elapsed; 
 Includes legislation that grants exclusive collective bargaining rights to an organization 
(e.g. the Chamber of Commerce) which is created by law and to which affiliation is 
compulsory (Digest, Para. 983.). 
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159. Acts of interference in collective bargaining and collective agreement (de jure) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 880-881, 925-938, 940-943, 984-991, 998-1023, 1046-1058 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 244-253 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes acts of interference in collective bargaining and/or insufficient promotion of 
collective bargaining and acts of interference according to collective agreements. 
 Acts of interference in collective bargaining and/or insufficient promotion of collective 
bargaining include: 
- Legislation that infringes the free and voluntary character of collective bargaining and 
allows any undue interference in the negotiation process; 
- Legislation that does not guarantee the autonomy of parties to collective bargaining 
(Digest, Para. 933.); 
- Lack of mechanisms for the promotion of collective bargaining (i.e. lack of machinery 
and procedures to facilitate bargaining); 
- Legal prohibition/restriction of access to voluntary dispute settlement procedures, to 
which the parties may have recourse on a voluntary basis and by mutual agreement, to 
facilitate the conclusion of a collective agreement; 
- Legislation which lays down mandatory bargaining and prevents the employer from 
withdrawing, irrespective of circumstances and at the risk of being disproportionately 
penalized (Digest, Para. 930.); 
- Legislation that determines and imposes the level of bargaining or entitles administrative 
authority to determine and impose the level of bargaining; 
- Legislation that sets unreasonable and discouraging time-limits for bargaining; 
- Legislation that infringes the rights of employers‘ organizations to choose which 
delegates will represent them in collective bargaining or that regulates the composition of 
the representatives of the parties (Digest, Paras. 981-983.); 
- Legislation that as part of the government‘s economic stabilization policy allows 
restrictions on future collective bargaining for instance on wage rates or wage increases 
beyond the level of the increase in the cost of living, except if such restriction is imposed 
as an exceptional measure and only to the extent that is necessary (e.g. not exceeding 
sectors actually facing an emergency situation), without exceeding a reasonable period 
and if it is accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect workers‘ living standards 
(Digest, Paras. 1024-1032.). 
 Does not include legislation that allows the interventions of the authorities in cases it is 
obvious that the deadlock in bargaining will not be broken without some initiative on 
their part, except cases where the intervention is not consistent with the principle of free 
and voluntary negotiations (Digest, Paras. 1003-1004.). 
 Does not include legislation that allows for the employers‘ side in the negotiation process, 
where it represents the public administration to seek the opinion of the Ministry of 
Finances or an economic and financial body that verifies the financial impact of draft 
collective agreements, provided that the employers and trade union organizations can 
express their points of view through consultations (Digest, Paras. 1037., 1039.). 
 Working Paper No. 99 131 
 Note: ―Article 4 of Convention No. 98 in no way places a duty on the government to 
enforce collective bargaining, nor would it be contrary to this provision to oblige social 
partners, within the framework of the encouragements and promotion of the full 
development and utilization of collective bargaining machinery, to enter into negotiations 
on terms and conditions of employment. The public authorities should however refrain 
from any undue interference in the negotiation process.‖ (Digest, Para. 928.) 
 Note: ―The Committee has endorsed the point of view expressed by the Committee of 
Experts in its 1994 General Survey: ‗While the principle of autonomy of the parties to 
collective bargaining is valid as regards public servants covered by Convention No. 151, 
the special characteristics of the public service described above require some flexibility in 
its application. Thus, in the view of the Committee, legislative provisions which allow 
Parliament or the competent budgetary authority to set upper and lower limits for wage 
negotiations or to establish and overall ―budget package‖ within which the parties may 
negotiate monetary or standard-setting clauses (...) or those which give the financial 
authorities the right to participate in collective bargaining alongside the direct employers, 
are compatible with the Convention, provided they leave a significant role to collective 
bargaining. It is essential, however, that workers and their organizations are be able to 
participate fully and meaningfully in designing this overall bargaining framework, which 
implies in particular that they must have access to all the financial, budgetary and other 
data enabling them to assess the situation on the basis of the facts. This is not the case of 
legislative provisions which, on the grounds of the economic situation of a country, 
impose unilaterally, for example, a specific percentage increase and rule out any 
possibility of bargaining, in particular by prohibiting the exercise of means of pressure 
subject to the application of severe sanctions. (...) The Committee (...) takes full account 
of the serious financial and budgetary difficulties facing governments, particularly during 
periods of prolonged and widespread economic stagnation. However, it considers that the 
authorities should give preference as far as possible to collective bargaining in 
determining the conditions of employment of public servants where the circumstances 
rule this out, measures of this kind should be limited in time and protect the standard of 
living of the workers who are the most affected.‖ (Digest, Para. 1038.) 
 Acts of interference according to collective agreements include: 
- Legislation that allows intervention in drafting collective agreements (e.g. observance of 
criteria pre-established by the law); 
- Legislation that allows the unilateral alteration of the content of collective agreements by 
public authorities (e.g. by subjecting collective agreements to government economic 
policy) or the discretionary refusal to approve a collective agreement (e.g. on grounds 
such as incompatibility with the general policy of the government); 
- Legislation that allows the unilateral suspension/cancellation of collective agreements 
freely entered into by the parties by decree (e.g. because they were contrary to national 
economic policy), unless the parties agreed on the suspension/cancellation; 
- Legislation that allows/requests prior approval of collective agreements by public 
authorities (system of previous administrative authorization) unless the approval may only 
be refused if the collective agreement has a procedural flaw or does not conform to the 
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minimum standards laid down by general labour legislation (General Survey, Para. 251.); 
- Legal provisions on the obligation to renegotiate existing collective agreements (e.g. 
forced renegotiation of collective agreements for reasons of economic crisis);  
- Legal provisions on the compulsory extension of the period for which collective 
agreements are in force, unless it is used only in cases of emergency and for brief periods 
of time (Digest, Para. 1023.); 
- Legislation that sets an excessive statutory period for the duration in force of collective 
agreements (Digest, Paras. 1047-1049.); 
- Legislation that allows the extension of a collective agreement contrary to the views of 
the organization representing most of the employers in a category covered by the 
extended agreement; or if the extended agreement is a collective agreement that was not 
negotiated by the most representative organization (Digest, Paras. 1052-1053.). 
 Does not include legislation that allows offering better working conditions to non-
unionized workers under individual agreements if the latter can override certain clauses 
in the collective agreement, as long as the relationship between individual contracts and 
the collective agreement has been agreed between the employer and the trade union 
organizations (Digest, Paras. 1054-1056.). 
 Does not include a ―procedure to draw the attention of the parties in certain cases to 
considerations of general interest that might call for further examination by them of 
proposed agreements, provided, however, that preference is always given to persuasion 
rather than coercion‖. (General Survey, Para. 253.). 
 
160. Infringements of the consultation with employers’ organizations (de jure) 
Paras. 1065-1088 in Digest of decisions and principles. 
 
 Includes legislation that infringes the principle of consultation and cooperation (social 
dialogue) between public authorities and employers‘ and workers‘ organizations (e.g. by 
discriminating between the relevant organizations); 
 Includes legislation that allows by-passing tripartite consultation during the preparation 
and adoption of legislation affecting workers‘ and employers‘ and their organizations‘ 
interests or before the establishment of new labour, social or economic policy (e.g. refusal 
to permit the participation of employers‘ organizations in the preparation of new 
legislation affecting their interests). 
 
161. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IXa (de jure) 
 
 
 Includes lack of adequate legislation that would guarantee the due process of law (fair and 
rapid trial by an independent and impartial tribunal); 
 Includes the lack of legal guarantees for recourse to judicial authority (e.g. the lack of the 
right to appeal or cases where the appeal can only be lodged to one of the Ministries) 
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against any civil, administrative, criminal and/or disciplinary decision. 
 Note: Includes de jure lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de jure right 
to collective bargaining, as listed under evaluation criteria nos. 155-160. 
 
IXb. Right to collective bargaining, de facto 
162. Prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion from the right to collective bargaining (de facto) 
Article 4-6 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 880-911 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 235-236, 260-264 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes obstacles to the free and voluntary negotiation in practice; 
 Includes major difficulties, restrictions in practice on the right to collective bargaining; 
 Includes the explicit or indirect exclusion/restriction of employers or their organizations 
from the right to collective bargaining; 
 Includes exclusion/restriction based on race, political opinion, nationality or on 
occupational categories. 
 
163. Exclusion/restriction of subjects covered by collective bargaining (de facto) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 912-924 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Para. 250 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes infringements by setting in practice the subjects covered by collective bargaining 
unilaterally by public authorities; 
 Includes arbitrary refusal in practice to bargain collectively on certain issues. 
 Does not include the exclusion from the subjects covered by negotiations of matters 
which are for the employer to decide upon as part of the freedom to manage the 
enterprise. 
 Note: ―With regard to allegations concerning the refusal to bargain collectively on certain 
matters in the public sector, the Committee has recalled the view of the Fact-Finding and 
Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association that ‗there are certain matters which 
clearly appertain primarily or essentially to the management and operation of government 
business; these can reasonably be regarded as outside the scope of negotiation‖. It is 
equally clear that certain other matters are primarily or essentially questions relating to 
conditions of employment and that such matters should not be regarded as falling outside 
the scope of collective bargaining conducted in an atmosphere of mutual good faith and 
trust.‖ (Digest, Para. 920.) 
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164. Compulsory arbitration accorded to collective bargaining (de facto) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 925-928, 992-997 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 254-259 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Does not include recourse to compulsory arbitration if it is at the request of both parties 
involved in a dispute, or where compulsory arbitration is not indicated as binding, in the 
case of public servants directly engaged in the administration of State, in essential 
services in the strict sense of the term (those services whose interruption would endanger 
the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population) or in case of 
acute national emergency; 
 Includes imposition of compulsory arbitration in cases where the parties do not reach 
agreement through collective bargaining; 
 Includes cases where public authorities and/or one of the parties recourse unilaterally to 
compulsory arbitration (except cases, when authorities might be justified to step in when 
it is obvious that the deadlock in bargaining will not be broken without some initiative on 
their part). 
 
165. Infringements on the determination/recognition of employers' organizations entitled to 
collective bargaining (de facto) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 944-983 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 238-243 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes cases where the determination of the representative organization is based on the 
discretionary decision of public authorities in practice; 
 Includes the discretionary refusal to recognize an employers‘ organization, the non-
recognition of the most representative organizations and the infringement of the right to 
determine the employers‘ organization(s) entitled to negotiate; 
 Includes the discretionary rejection of the request for a new election of the organization 
which fails to secure a sufficiently large number or an organization other than the 
certificated organizations after a reasonable period has elapsed; 
 Includes practices applied in order to delay the recognition process (excessive, lengthy 
and complicated procedure); 
 Includes legislation that grants exclusive collective bargaining rights to an organization 
(e.g. the Chamber of Commerce) which is created by law and to which affiliation is 
compulsory (Digest, Para. 983.). 
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166. Acts of interference in collective bargaining and collective agreement (de facto) 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98; 
Paras. 880-881, 925-938, 940-943, 984-991, 998-1023, 1046-1058 in Digest of decisions and principles; 
Paras. 244-253 in General Survey 1994. 
 
 Includes acts of interference in collective bargaining and/or insufficient promotion of 
collective bargaining and acts of interference according to collective agreements; 
 Acts of interference in collective bargaining and/or insufficient promotion of collective 
bargaining in practice include: 
- Infringements in practice of the principle of free and voluntary bargaining, the principle 
of bargaining in good faith (e.g. unjustified delays in the holding of negotiations (Digest, 
Para. 937.)) or the autonomy of parties to collective bargaining; 
- Mandatory bargaining and prevention of the employer from withdrawing, irrespective of 
circumstances and at the risk of being disproportionately penalized (Digest, Para. 930.); 
- Refusal to bargain collectively, to use the mechanisms promoting and facilitating 
collective bargaining; 
- Unilateral determination of the level of bargaining and the setting of unreasonable and 
discouraging time-limits for bargaining; 
- Infringements on the rights of employers‘ organizations to choose which delegates will 
represent them in collective bargaining (Digest, Paras. 984-985.); 
- Restrictions on future collective bargaining as part of the government‘s economic 
stabilization policy for instance on wage rates or wage increases beyond the level of the 
increase in the cost of living, except if such restriction is imposed as an exceptional 
measure and only to the extent that is necessary (e.g. not exceeding sectors actually 
facing an emergency situation), without exceeding a reasonable period and if it is 
accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect workers‘ living standards (Digest, 
Paras. 1024-1032.). 
 Does not include interventions of the authorities in cases it is obvious that the deadlock in 
bargaining will not be broken without some initiative on their part, except the 
intervention is not consistent with the principle of free and voluntary negotiations. 
(Digest, Paras. 1003-1004.). 
 Does not include legislation that allows for the employers‘ side in the negotiation process, 
where it represents the public administration to seek the opinion of the Ministry of 
Finances or an economic and financial body hat verifies the financial impact of draft 
collective agreements, provided that the employers and trade union organizations can 
express their points of view through consultations (Digest, Paras. 1037., 1039.). 
 Note: ―Article 4 of Convention No. 98 in no way places a duty on the government to 
enforce collective bargaining, nor would it be contrary to this provision to oblige social 
partners, within the framework of the encouragements and promotion of the full 
development and utilization of collective bargaining machinery, to enter into negotiations 
on terms and conditions of employment. The public authorities should however refrain 
from any undue interference in the negotiation process.‖ (Digest, Para. 928.). 
 Note: ―The Committee has endorsed the point of view expressed by the Committee of 
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Experts in its 1994 General Survey: ‗While the principle of autonomy of the parties to 
collective bargaining is valid as regards public servants covered by Convention No. 151, 
the special characteristics of the public service described above require some flexibility in 
its application. Thus, in the view of the Committee, legislative provisions which allow 
Parliament or the competent budgetary authority to set upper and lower limits for wage 
negotiations or to establish and overall ―budget package‖ within which the parties may 
negotiate monetary or standard-setting clauses (...) or those which give the financial 
authorities the right to participate in collective bargaining alongside the direct employers, 
are compatible with the Convention, provided they leave a significant role to collective 
bargaining. It is essential, however, that workers and their organizations are be able to 
participate fully and meaningfully in designing this overall bargaining framework, which 
implies in particular that they must have access to all the financial, budgetary and other 
data enabling them to assess the situation on the basis of the facts. This is not the case of 
legislative provisions which, on the grounds of the economic situation of a country, 
impose unilaterally, for example, a specific percentage increase and rule out any 
possibility of bargaining, in particular by prohibiting the exercise of means of pressure 
subject to the application of severe sanctions. (...) The Committee (...) takes full account 
of the serious financial and budgetary difficulties facing governments, particularly during 
periods of prolonged and widespread economic stagnation. However, it considers that the 
authorities should give preference as far as possible to collective bargaining in 
determining the conditions of employment of public servants where the circumstances 
rule this out, measures of this kind should be limited in time and protect the standard of 
living of the workers who are the most affected.‖ (Digest, Para. 1038.). 
 Acts of interference according to collective agreements in practice include: 
- Failure to recognize and/or implement a collective agreement, even on a temporary basis; 
- Infringements of collective agreements in practice (e.g. intervention by public authorities 
in drafting collective agreements; the unilateral alteration of the content of collective 
agreements or the recourse to renegotiation or unilaterally imposing the duration of 
collective agreements); 
- Discretionary refusal by public authorities to approve a collective agreement; unilateral 
suspension/cancellation of collective agreement (unless the parties agree on the 
suspension/cancellation); 
- Prior approval of collective agreements in practice; 
- Unilateral extension of the period for which collective agreements are in force; 
- Discretionary or unilateral extension of a collective agreement if contrary to the views of 
the organization representing most of the employers in a category covered by the 
extended agreement; or if the extended agreement is a collective agreement that was not 
negotiated by the most representative organization (Digest, Paras. 1052-1053.). 
 Does not include the case for offering better working conditions to non-unionized 
workers under individual agreements if the latter can override certain clauses in the 
collective agreement, as long as the relationship between individual contracts and the 
collective agreements has been agreed between the employer and the trade union 
organizations (Digest, Paras. 1054-1056.). 
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 Does not include a ―procedure to draw the attention of the parties in certain cases to 
considerations of general interest that might call for further examination by them of 
proposed agreements, provided, however, that preference is always given to persuasion 
rather than coercion‖. (General Survey, Para. 253.). 
 
167. Infringements of the consultation with employer’s organizations (de facto) 
Paras. 1065-1088 in Digest of decisions and principles. 
 
 Includes infringements on the principle of consultation and cooperation (social dialogue) 
between public authorities and employers‘ and workers‘ organizations (e.g. by 
discriminating between the relevant organizations); 
 Includes by-passing/refusal of tripartite consultation during the preparation and adoption 
of legislation affecting workers‘ and employers‘ and their organizations‘ interests or 
before the establishment of new labour, social or economic policy (e.g. refusal to permit 
the participation of employers‘ organizations in the preparation of new legislation 
affecting their interests); 
 Includes infringements of the principles of full and frank consultation, consultation in 
good faith and with mutual respect (e.g. not providing sufficient information on the issue 
being on the agenda). 
 
168. Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IXb (de facto) 
 
 
 Includes infringements in practice of the right for fair and rapid trial (e.g. non-informing 
about charges, delays in procedure, lack of adequate time and/or facilities to prepare 
defence, etc.); 
 Includes lack of independent and impartial judiciary; 
 Includes absence of judgement, impunity or lack of dissuasive sanctions. 
 Note: Includes de facto lack of guarantee of due process of law with regard to de facto 
right to collective bargaining, as listed under evaluation criteria nos. 162-167. 
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Annex I. Coding Spreadsheet 
 
  Trade Unions Year 
  Ia. Fundamental civil liberties, de jure   
1 Arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of trade unionists   
2 Infringements of trade unionists' basic freedoms    
3 Infringements of trade union's right to protection of their premises and property   
4 Excessive prohibitions/restrictions on trade union rights in the event of state of emergency   
5 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re Ia   
  Ib. Fundamental civil liberties, de facto   
6 Murder or disappearance of trade unionists   
7 Committed against trade union leaders re 6   
8 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 6   
9 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 6   
10 Other violent actions against trade unionists   
11 Committed against trade union leaders re 10   
12 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 10   
13 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 10   
14 Arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of trade unionists   
15 Committed against trade union leaders re 14   
16 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 14   
17 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 14   
18 Infringements of trade unionists' basic freedoms   
19 Committed against trade union leaders re 18   
20 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 18   
21 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 18   
22 Attacks against trade union premises and property   
23 Committed against trade union leaders re 22   
24 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 22   
25 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 22   
26 Excessive prohibitions/restrictions on trade union rights in the event of state of emergency   
27 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 26   
28 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 26   
  IIa. Right of workers to establish and join organizations, de jure   
29 General prohibition on the right of workers to establish and join organizations   
30 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to establish and join organizations   
31 Previous authorization requirements   
32 Restrictions on the freedom of choice of trade union structure and composition   
33 Imposed trade union unity and/or favouritism/discrimination among workers' organizations   
34 Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or legislation   
35 Prejudice or discrimination with regard to employment because of trade union membership/ legitimate activities   
36 Lack of adequate legal guarantees against anti-union discriminatory measures re 35   
37 Discriminatory dismissal/suspension because of trade union membership/legitimate activities   
38 Lack of adequate legal guarantees against anti-union discriminatory measures re 37   
39 Acts of interference of employers and/or public authorities   
40 Lack of adequate legal guarantees against acts of interference     
41 Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international organizations   
42 Other de jure acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIa   
43 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIa   
  IIb. Right of workers to establish and join organizations, de facto   
44 Obstacles towards the development of independent workers' organizations in practice   
45 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to establish and join organizations   
46 Previous authorization requirements   
47 Restrictions on the freedom of choice of trade union structure and composition   
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48 Imposed trade union unity and/or favouritism/discrimination among workers' organizations   
49 Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or legislation   
50 Prejudice or discrimination with regard to employment because of trade union membership/legitimate activities   
51 Committed against trade union leaders re 50   
52 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re 50   
53 Discriminatory dismissal/suspension because of trade union membership/legitimate activities   
54 Committed against trade union leaders re 53   
55 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re 53   
56 Acts of interference of employers and/or public authorities   
57 Lack of adequate guarantees against acts of interference   
58 Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international organizations   
59 Other de facto acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIb   
60 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIb   
  IIIa. Other union activities, de jure   
61 Infringements on the right to freely draw up constitutions and rules   
62 Infringements on the right to freely elect representatives   
63 Infringements on the right to freely organize and control internal and financial administration   
64 Infringements on the right to freely organize activities/programmes   
65 Other de jure acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIIa   
66 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIIa   
  IIIb. Other union activities, de facto   
67 Infringements on the right to freely draw up constitutions and rules   
68 Infringements on the right to freely elect representatives   
69 Infringements on the right to freely organize and control internal and financial administration   
70 Infringements on the right to freely organize activities/programmes   
71 Other de facto acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IIIb   
72 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IIIb   
  IVa. Right to collective bargaining, de jure   
73 General prohibition on the right to collective bargaining   
74 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to collective bargaining   
75 Exclusion/restriction of subjects covered by collective bargaining   
76 Compulsory arbitration accorded to collective bargaining   
77 Infringements on the determination/recognition of trade unions entitled to collective bargaining    
78 Acts of interference in collective bargaining and/or insufficient promotion of collective bargaining   
79 Acts of interference according to collective agreements   
80 Infringements of the consultation with workers' organizations   
81 Other de jure acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IVa   
82 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IVa   
  IVb. Right to collective bargaining, de facto   
83 Obstacles towards collective bargaining in practice   
84 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to collective bargaining   
85 Exclusion/restriction of subjects covered by collective bargaining   
86 Compulsory arbitration accorded to collective bargaining   
87 Infringements on the determination/recognition of trade unions entitled to collective bargaining    
88 Acts of interference in collective bargaining and/or insufficient promotion of collective bargaining   
89 Acts of interference according to collective agreements   
90 Infringements of the consultation with workers' organizations   
91 Other de facto acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re IVb   
92 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IVb   
  Va. Right to strike, de jure   
93 General prohibition on the right to strike   
94 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to strike   
95 Exclusion/restriction based on the objective of the strike   
96 Exclusion/restriction based on the type of the strike   
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97 Lack of compensatory guarantees accorded to lawful restrictions on the right to strike   
98 Infringements on the determination of minimum services   
99 Compulsory arbitration accorded to strikes   
100 Infringements of the prerequisites lawfully required for exercising the right to strike    
101 Acts of interference during the course of strike action   
102 Imposing excessive sanctions in case of legitimate and peaceful strikes   
103 Other de jure acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re Va   
104 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re Va   
  Vb. Right to strike, de facto   
105 Obstacles to strike actions in practice   
106 Exclusion/restriction of workers from the right to strike   
107 Exclusion/restriction based on the objective of the strike   
108 Exclusion/restriction based on the type of the strike   
109 Lack of compensatory guarantees accorded to lawful restrictions on the right to strike   
110 Infringements on the determination of minimum services   
111 Compulsory arbitration accorded to strikes   
112 Infringements of the prerequisites lawfully required for exercising the right to strike    
113 Acts of interference during the course of strike action   
114 Imposing excessive sanctions in case of legitimate and peaceful strikes   
115 Committed against trade union leaders re 114   
116 Other de facto acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference re Vb   
117 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re Vb   
  Employers' Organizations   
  VIa. Fundamental civil liberties, de jure   
118 Arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of members of employers' organizations   
119 Infringements of employers' organizations' basic freedoms and/or of their right to protection of their premises and property   
120 Excessive prohibitions/restrictions on employers' organizations' rights in the event of state of emergency   
121 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re VIa   
  VIb. Fundamental civil liberties, de facto   
122 Murder or disappearance of members of employers' organizations   
123 Committed against leaders of the organization re 122   
124 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 122   
125 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 122   
126 Other violent action and/or arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and fining of members of the employers' organizations   
127 Committed against leaders of the organization re 126   
128 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 126   
129 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 126   
130 Infringements of employers' organizations' basic freedoms and/or attacks against their premises and property   
131 Committed against leaders of the organization re 130   
132 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 130   
133 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 130   
134 Excessive prohibitions/restrictions on employers' organizations' rights in the event of state of emergency   
135 Lack of guarantee of due process of law and/or impunity re 134   
136 Severity (widespread and/or systematic) re 134   
  VIIa. Right of employers to establish and join organizations, de jure   
137 Prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion from the right of employers to establish and join organizations   
138 Restrictions on the right of employers to establish and join to organizations of their own choosing   
139 Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or legislation   
140 Acts of interference of workers' organizations and/or public authorities   
141 Lack of adequate legal guarantees against acts of interference     
142 Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international organizations   
143 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re VIIa   
  VIIb. Right of employers to establish and join organizations, de facto   
144 Prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion from the right of employers to establish and join organizations   
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145 Restrictions on the right of employers to establish and join to organizations of their own choosing   
146 Dissolution/suspension of legally functioning organizations by public authorities and/or legislation   
147 Acts of interference of workers' organizations and/or public authorities   
148 Lack of adequate guarantees against acts of interference     
149 Infringement of the right to establish and join federations/confederations/international organizations   
150 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re VIIb   
  VIIIa. Other activities of employers organizations, de jure   
151 Infringements on the right to freely draw up constitutions, rules and to organize their administration, activities, programmes   
152 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re VIIIa   
  VIIIb. Other activities of employers organizations, de facto   
153 Infringements on the right to freely draw up constitutions, rules and to organize their administration, activities, programmes   
154 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re VIIIb   
  IXa. Right to collective bargaining, de jure   
155 Prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion from the right to collective bargaining   
156 Exclusion/restriction of subjects covered by collective bargaining   
157 Compulsory arbitration accorded to collective bargaining   
158 Infringements on the determination/recognition of employers' organizations entitled to collective bargaining   
159 Acts of interference in collective bargaining and collective agreement   
160 Infringements of the consultation with employers' organizations   
161 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IXa   
  IXb. Right to collective bargaining, de facto   
162 Prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion from the right to collective bargaining   
163 Exclusion/restriction of subjects covered by collective bargaining   
164 Compulsory arbitration accorded to collective bargaining   
165 Infringements on the determination/recognition of employers' organizations entitled to collective bargaining   
166 Acts of interference in collective bargaining and collective agreement   
167 Infringements of the consultation with employers' organizations   
168 Lack of guarantee of due process of law re IXb   
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Annex II. Supplementary document for workers’ organizations 
 
Severity 
 
Issue of non-compliance Severity 
6. Murder or disappearance of trade unionists 
  
 
10. Other violent actions against trade unionists  
14. Arrest, detention, imprisonment, charging and 
fining of trade unionists 
 
18. Infringements of trade unionists‘ basic 
freedoms  
 
22. Attacks against trade union premises and 
property 
 
26. Excessive prohibitions/restrictions on trade 
union rights in the event of state of emergency 
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Excluded Sectors 
 
Issue of non-compliance Reference to original source 
30. De jure exclusion/restriction of workers from 
the right to establish and join organizations 
 
45. De facto exclusion/restriction of workers from 
the right to establish and join organizations 
 
74. De jure exclusion/restriction of workers from 
the right to collective bargaining 
 
84. De facto exclusion/restriction of workers from 
the right to collective bargaining 
 
94. De jure exclusion/restriction of workers from 
the right to strike 
 
106. De facto exclusion/restriction of workers 
from the right to strike 
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Other acts of prohibitions, infringements and interference 
 
Issue of non-compliance Reference to original source 
42. Other de jure acts of prohibitions, 
infringements and interference re IIa 
 
59. Other de facto acts of prohibitions, 
infringements and interference re IIb 
 
65. Other de jure acts of prohibitions, 
infringements and interference re IIIa 
 
71. Other de facto acts of prohibitions, 
infringements and interference re IIIb 
 
81. Other de jure acts of prohibitions, 
infringements and interference re IVa 
 
91. Other de facto acts of prohibitions, 
infringements and interference re IVb 
 
103. Other de jure acts of prohibitions, 
infringements and interference re Va 
 
116. Other de facto acts of prohibitions, 
infringements and interference re Vb 
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Notes 
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Annex III. Supplementary document for employers’ organizations 
 
Severity 
 
Issue of non-compliance Severity 
122. Murder or disappearance of members of 
employers' organizations 
 
126. Other violent action and/or arrest, detention, 
imprisonment, charging and fining of members of 
the employers‘ organizations 
 
 
  
130. Infringements of employers' organizations' 
basic freedoms and/or attacks against their 
premises and property 
 
134. Excessive prohibitions/restrictions on 
employers' organizations' rights in the event of 
state of emergency 
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Excluded Sectors 
 
Issue of non-compliance Reference to original source 
137. De jure prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion 
from the right of employers to establish and join 
organizations 
 
144. De facto prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion 
from the right of employers to establish and join 
organizations 
 
155. De jure prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion 
from the right to collective bargaining 
 
162. De facto prohibition, restrictions on/exclusion 
from the right to collective bargaining 
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Notes 
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